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ABSTRACT 
 
 With the rapid development of new digital technologies, cities are increasingly critical sites 
of techno-social experimentation and transformation. Through ‘smart city’ initiatives, city 
governments around the world are partnering with transnational technology firms to deeply 
integrate digital technologies—including extensive Internet of Things (IoT) sensing networks and 
increasingly complex infrastructures for data analytics—into everyday urban spaces. At the same 
time, emerging forms of digitally-mediated “platform capitalism,” represented by companies such 
as Airbnb and Uber, are dramatically disrupting existing economic, political and socio-spatial 
relations across urban contexts. In opposition to these trends, citizens’ initiatives in Barcelona, 
Spain are organizing around calls for “technological sovereignty,” radically rethinking existing 
models of urban development by claiming community control over emerging digital technologies. 
 My ethnographic dissertation asks: Are emerging digital technologies inherently tools of 
technocratic governance, surveillance, and capital accumulation? Or how might they become loci 
for imagining and building alternative digital urban futures? I operationalize this question through 
three sub-questions focused on the production of alternative economies, urban space, and digital 
subjectivities, respectively, within the movement for technological sovereignty in Barcelona. 
These three sub-questions are the basis of the three articles attached as appendices.  
 The first paper (Appendix A) explores the concept of technological sovereignty employed 
by activists in Barcelona, describing its basis in experiments with alternative arrangements of work 
and property, an ethics of care, and an engagement with municipal institutions. Reviewing existing 
literature on the politics of digital development in geography, I argue for the need to think beyond 
critiques of techno-capitalist development—and beyond binaries of techno-optimism and techno-
pessimism. Analyses of ongoing processes of technological change in general, and smart cities in 
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particular, too often present emerging digital technologies as silver-bullet solutions to a multitude 
of existing societal problems—making the world more connected, efficient, and sustainable, 
holding the promise to improve quality of life for millions of people. In contrast, more critical 
approaches highlight the ways such processes facilitate increased state and corporate surveillance, 
new forms of power and control, and new forms of exploitation and exclusion. Beyond such 
binaries, this paper argues for the need to imagine a multiplicity of possible social futures emergent 
in the entangled processes of urban and technological change. It explores the practices and 
discourses of the TS movement as a way to demonstrate how such alternatives might be brought 
about through grassroots organizing and collective experimentation.  
 The second article (Appendix B) engages geographic literature on the automatic production 
of space—the way evolving assemblages of hardware, code, and data produce space with little to 
no direct human intervention—viewing it through the lens of philosopher Bernard Stiegler’s notion 
of proletarianization as the loss of knowledge. In contrast to this view of digital infrastructure, I 
describe the practices of Guifinet—neighborhood-based associations that build and maintain their 
own broadband internet infrastructure—focusing on the multiple forms of knowledge production 
and circulation on which the project is based. I present Guifinet as an example of amateur practices 
of de-proletarianization—as participants re-claim critical forms of knowledge about the processes 
(re)producing urban space. In doing so, I demonstrate the possibilities for digital infrastructures to 
create new spaces for democratic power based on alternative logics of techno-social organization.  
 The third article (Appendix C) explores the question of digital subjectivity in the movement 
for technological sovereignty in Barcelona. I approach digital subjectivity as the way people 
understand their relationship to digital technology and processes of technological change, 
structured by discursively produced hierarchies of technological expertise that are intimately 
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entangled in the reproduction of gender, race, class, age, and other axes of difference. The paper 
employs the work of Stiegler (1998) and Barad (2007) to explore the co-constitution of humanity 
and technics, and recognize the way material practices involving an array of human and nonhuman 
actors iteratively reproduce hierarchies of difference. Against the hegemonic subject positions of 
techno-capitalism, I explore the practices of technological sovereignty activists that challenge the 
discursive privileging and separation of “technical” knowledge from its social entanglements and 
produce a diversity of subjects enacting a being-toward alternative techno-social futures.  
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INTRODUCTION 
“[I]f too many ruins are being accumulated in the name of 
‘development’ and economic competition, then this raises a 
preliminary question: what relation to technics and technologies 
would enable us to think the reconstruction of a global future?” 
(Stielger 2013, p. 10) 
 
“How should we reimagine contemporary cognitive ecologies so 
that they become life-enhancing rather than aimed toward 
dysfunctionality and death for humans and nonhumans alike?” 
(Hayles 2017, p. 141) 
 
 At the 2016 meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, the forum’s 
founder, Klaus Schwab, coined the term the “4th Industrial Revolution” to refer to the ongoing 
development of new digital technologies that are increasingly proliferating into the spaces of 
everyday life. These technologies include developments in “artificial intelligence, robotics, the 
Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, 3-D printing, nanotechnology, biotechnology, materials 
science, energy storage, and quantum computing” (Schwab 2016). According to this discourse, 
these technological innovations promise (or threaten) to “disrupt” existing forms of social, cultural, 
political, and economic organization—including widespread changes to work and employment 
(Stiegler 2015; Bissell and Del Casino 2017), health (Lupton 2013), transportation (Narla 2013), 
and liberal democracy (Zúñiga et al 2010; Lynch 2017). 
 Within this vision, the “smart city” is pictured as the ideal spatial form of the technological 
future-in-the-making—urban spaces structured by dense infrastructures of sensors, servers, and 
autonomous and semi-autonomous devices that direct flows of people, information, and resources 
(Albino et al 2015). These advances produce unprecedented amounts of data, allowing the once 
unruly spaces of the city to be known and controlled in previously unimaginable ways (Kitchin 
2014; Leszczynski 2016). New “urban operating systems” and centralized control rooms integrate 
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data across systems allowing for the common coordination of energy, waste, transportation, and 
security systems, for example, across a given city (Mattern 2015; Marvin and Luque-Ayala 2017). 
Such new forms of control lay the ground work for the future proliferation of autonomous and 
semi-autonomous machines—from robots to self-driving cars—in urban space, as these machines 
can be networked to the broader data streams and thus navigate complex urban environments 
(Sanfeliu and Andrade-Cetto 2006). Proponents of this vision argue that these developments will 
make cities more efficient and sustainable while increasing transparency in governance and overall 
health, security, and wellbeing for urban residents.   
 Schwab’s notion of the 4th Industrial Revolution (hereafter “4IR”) and related visions of 
the smart city, which have now been widely adopted by policymakers, entrepreneurs, and others1, 
present a narrow vision of the future. This future is driven forward by continually accelerating 
technological change to which individuals and communities are called upon to adapt. Those who 
fail to adapt to the demands of the information economy will be left behind. As Garcés (2018) 
argues, this discourse represents a kind of perversion of post-human thought—in which processes 
of technological change are afforded an agency over and above any “human” ability to interact 
with it. By presenting technological innovation as the primary driver of change, promoters of the 
discourse of the 4th Industrial Revolution aim to de-politicize complex social, political, economic, 
and cultural issues. A techno-capitalist future becomes seen as the only possible one.  
                                                
1 References to the Fourth Industrial Revolution litter the University of Arizona’s 2018 Stategic 
Plan. In the introduction, President Robert Robbins writes: “Its framework is inspired by the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution — a time of augmented intelligence and the fusion of digital, physical, and 
biological worlds. Navigating tomorrow’s ever-evolving societal, economic, and cultural 
landscapes will take audacious ingenuity” (University of Arizona 2018, p. 2). The language of 
“navigating” the future, rather than shaping or contesting the future it is common in this discourse.  
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 This dissertation contests the narrow imaginary of the future presented by the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution (4IR) and its claim to inevitability, and calls for a radical re-thinking of 
human relationships to technology and the possibilities for alternative urban futures. In the face of 
the purported inevitability of the 4IR, observers of technological change have tended to fall into 
one of two categories. While techno-optimists celebrate the potential of technological 
advancements to solve intractable problems of sustainability and increase overall well-being, 
critics explore the potential of ongoing processes of digital development to create new forms of 
surveillance and control (Klauser et al 2014; Leszczynski 2016), and increased inequality (March 
and Ribera-Fumaz 2016)—accelerating processes of capital accumulation. While much of this 
critical literature recognizes the entanglement of evolving technological systems in a broader 
socio-technical milieu, there have been fewer attempts to explore how this socio-technical milieu 
might be re-organized, re-directed, or inflected to produce different, more progressive and just 
outcomes.  
 Both the techno-optimism of smart city and 4IR proponents as well as the critical 
discourses of their detractors risk relying—to different degrees—on a lingering techno-
determinism that fails to recognize or fully explore the complex entanglements of technological 
objects and systems in broader social, political, and economic processes. In the digital geographies 
literature, Rose (2017) highlights the failure of most scholars to fully theorize posthuman agency, 
presenting it as a mere resistance against the emerging and evolving agency of digital systems. 
This failure of existing literature helps explain the persistence of the techno-optimist/techno-
pessimist binary. If technical devices and systems possess an agency against which humans can 
only hope to “resist”, then the possible outcomes of processes of technological development and 
expansion are limited—and thus easily declared positive or negative.  
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 Rose calls instead for an approach that recognizes the way human agency is exercised 
through practices of reinvention with digital systems. Such a theoretical approach opens 
possibilities for imagining and building alternative sets of practices and meanings in relation to 
digital technologies. This opening to alternative practices and relationships is seen as well in the 
two quotations in the epitaph. Stiegler and Hayles both call for a re-imagining of the futures made 
possible by advances in digital technologies. They both highlight the ways technological 
development has become tied to regimes of capital accumulation, social inequality, surveillance, 
and ecological destruction. Yet, they do not see this to be the inevitable outcome of technological 
advancements and digitalization.  
 Historically, access to emerging technologies and their integration in everyday processes 
of production and consumption have long been the focus of politics, from workers’ struggles over 
control of the means of production, to geopolitical conflict and colonial projects focused on 
establishing national technological superiority. Progressive and utopian thinkers have long 
imagined the possibilities for democratizing access to technologies and technological 
knowledge—portraying such possibilities through science fiction and political treatises. Such 
utopian imaginings have continued in the present. Srnicek and Williams (2015) and Mason (2016), 
for example, have recently put forth proposals for harnessing the power and productivity of 
advancements in digital technology to implement a “world without work.” These writers call for 
new forms of public policy, in which the state heavily taxes or otherwise collectivizes 
advancements in digital technology in order to ensure a universal basic income that meets the 
essential needs of all citizens.  
 While I am sympathetic to these authors’ goals, I am concerned about such proposals’ 
simplistic understanding of power, and reliance on the State and a rights-based notion of 
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citizenship—which supposes new forms of centralized control and administrative processes of 
inclusion and exclusion. Further, this framework fails to re-think human relationships to emerging 
technologies—how we use them, adapt them, think about them and think with them—and thus 
risks reinforcing existing practices and inequalities. This dissertation is interested in grassroots 
alternatives. Building on Rose’s (2017) theoretical intervention asserting the role of posthuman 
agency and the co-constitution of humanity and technics, this dissertation offers an empirical and 
theoretical exploration of the possibilities for radical forms of “reinvention” in which individuals-
in-collectives remake their social world, their spaces, and themselves through experimentation 
with open-source digital technologies.   
 
Research Context and Questions 
 I came to be interested in the topic of digital technology and competing visions of urban 
futures several years ago, while researching a master-planned “new city” and autonomous 
libertarian enclave project in southern Honduras. The project was supported ideologically and 
logistically by leaders from Silicon Valley, who hoped to experiment with new forms of free-
market governance and territorial organization—pushing far beyond existing ‘neoliberal’ 
experiments (Lynch 2017). The city was imagined as the future site of offshore data centers and 
technology manufacturing, and—like all new city projects around the world—projected as a smart 
city that would make use of all the latest technologies for urban governance and management 
(Datta 2018a; Lynch 2018). Technology was not the primary focus of the project; rather, notions 
of digital innovation and development appeared to be seamlessly integrated into its driving 
libertarian capitalist political economic ideology. While I had long been interested in the political 
and cultural power exercised by “tech visionaries” and utopian thinkers with ties to Silicon Valley, 
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this research raised an important new question for me: why do these thinkers seem to possess a 
kind of monopoly over how we understand and imagine technology and its role in social and 
political life? It was this question that inspired me to take up this project.  
 Based on these experiences, I became particularly interested in the notion of the “smart 
city” and the way this vision of the future city seemed to become the new normal for urban 
development and re-development projects globally. I found ample scholarly work examining the 
smart city discourse and critiquing its political economic model—based on the privatization and 
de-politicization of urban governance (e.g., Kitchin 2014; Wiig 2015)—and its logics of control 
and surveillance for disciplining the unruliness of urban life (e.g, Klauser et al 2014; Vanolo 2014; 
Leszczynski 2016). Yet, I found little in the academic literature about what it would actually mean 
to live in a smart city, or about how its narrow discourse of technological development and 
efficiency might be challenged politically in practice. Upon researching where in the world this 
smart city agenda had taken hold, I was surprised to see Barcelona topping several lists of global 
smart cities. This smart city model seemed an awkward fit with the city’s reputation as a hub of 
resistance against corporate globalization (Juris 2007) and austerity (Antentas 2012), and of robust 
local democracy (Blakeley 2005) and economic cooperativism (Miro and Fernandez 2016). It was 
this tension that drew me to Barcelona as a potential site to study the politics of digital development 
in urban life. 
 In 2011, then-Mayor of Barcelona, Xavier Trias, launched an initiative to turn the city into 
a premier smart city. Under his leadership, the municipal government entered into new 
partnerships with technology firms like Cisco, IBM, and Telefónica to become a test-bed of smart 
city technology. The city launched a series of pilot projects across transportation, education, health, 
energy, and other sectors, and developed CityOS, an operating system allowing for the integration 
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of data across urban systems. Figure 2, taken from the BCN Smart City website, reads: “A city 
that wants to aspire to really be smart has to develop all its key areas (transport, education, health, 
waste management, security, economy…) simultaneously and transversally” (BCNSmartCity 
website, accessed 16 September 2016). The graphic demonstrates the way integration of urban 
data across sectors was seen as the key to making the Barcelona a sustainable and “self-sufficient 
city” (Guallart 2012).  
 
Figure 1: BCN Smart City Website in September 2016. Translated from Catalan: "A sustainable and self-sufficient city nourished 
by innovation and new technologies: A city that wants to aspire to really be smart has to develop all its key areas (transport, 
education, health, waste management, security, economy…) simultaneously and transversally.” (BCNSmartCity Website, 
Accessed 16 September 2016) 
 
In their critique of the Barcelona Smart City program, March and Ribera-Fumaz (2016) 
highlight how the municipality’s approach under the Trias administration worked to de-politicize 
urban governance and legitimize processes of re-development that rose land rents and intensified 
processes of displacement and exclusion in traditionally working-class neighborhoods. In their 
conclusion, the authors call for a politicization of the smart city, writing: “it is necessary to start to 
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imagine and construct alternative urban utopias. These new imaginaries should go beyond the 
actually existing Smart City” (March and Ribera-Fumaz 2016, p. 827). It is common to find such 
calls to imagine progressive or radical alternatives to hegemonic visions of urban futures in the 
conclusions of many academic articles and popular writing about the smart city and emerging 
digital technologies (Greenfield 2017; Kitchin 2014). Yet, despite these calls, there have been far 
fewer empirical and theoretical explorations of such possibilities.   
Over the past several years, a grassroots community movement in Barcelona has begun to 
imagine and build alternative visions of the city’s future loosely organized around the notion of 
“technological sovereignty” (hereafter, “TS”). The discourse of TS calls for implementing new 
forms of community control over digital technology. I arrived in Barcelona to study the politics of 
smart city development in June 2016, just a few months after the first annual Congress on 
Technological Sovereignty (or SobTec), organized around the theme of “Re-Thinking the Model 
of the City.” SobTec brought together representatives from across the city’s hacker and activist 
communities, and featured talks on the intersection of digital technology and urban development, 
gendered violence, surveillance, infrastructure, and ethics (Figure 2). A dossier titled Sobirania 
Tecnològica published by activists at the Calafou Post-Capitalist Eco-Industrial District outside 
Barcelona in 2014 examined alternative, open-source, and community-based technological 
projects from around the world and had helped establish TS as a discourse prior to the first SobTec.  
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Figure 2: Program for 1st Congress on Technological Sovereignty. Themes including: “Urbanicide as Spectacle: Barcelona and 
the politics of large events”; “Sovereignties in infrastructures: Commons-based Telcommunication Networks”; “Resistance 
strategies vs. Surveillance machines”; “Municipality and technology: Where we are and possible futures”; “Free Software in 
Venezuela: A Battle for Technological Sovereignty”; “Masculinist Violence and New Technologies”; “Free Software in ethic 
and practice” 
 
In the years since, a diversity of loosely-networked activists, collectives, and cooperatives 
across the city have taken up the TS discourse—employing it and reworking as they experiment 
with open source technologies in community-based projects. Table 1 outlines the diversity of 
projects associated in some way with the notion of technological sovereignty. Initiatives like 
Guifinet, CommonsCloud, or the Ateneus de Fabricació work to build, maintain, or manage digital 
infrastructures or hardware—from broadband internet infrastructure to cloud storage and 3D 
printing. Programming cooperatives offer services on the local market based on free software and 
ethical business models, while eReuse and Alencop work to promote the responsible recycling and 
re-use of digital devices. Others are experimenting with open-source applications and digital 
platforms to manage and organize cooperative economies in the food, mobilities, or service 
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sectors. Finally, a variety of initiatives organize community education and training, or create 
spaces for collective reflection and theorization taking a critical perspective on ongoing processes 
of technological change. These projects and the overarching discourse of technological 
sovereignty have worked to create new alliances between hackers, cooperativists, neighborhood 
associations, leftist political parties, and others.   
Table 1 
OVERVIEW OF TS-RELATED INITIATIVES 
Area of Action Groups, Projects, and Initiatives 
Infrastructure and Hardware Guifinet et al, The Things Network, CommonsCloud, 
Equipaments Lliures, Mar de Bits, Ateneus de Fabricacio 
Software and Services Coopdevs, Jamgo, Colectic, Adab1ts, Dabne, LliureTIC, 
Barcelona Free Software 
Reuse and Recycling eReuse.org/reutilitza.cat, Alencop 
Cross-Sector Economic Activity Katuma, SomMobilitat, Riders por Derechos, Voki Voki, 
SomConexio, Pangea, ITC Commission of XES 
Education and Training Colectic, ExO, Ateneus de Fabricacio, La Comunificadora, 
Alencoop, Smart Citizen/DECODE, Smart Barris, 
Universitat Lliure de Sants, Dimmons (Digital Commons 
Research Group, Open University of Barcelona) 
Reflection and Theorization SobTec, Mobile Social Congress, Calafou, La Teixadora, 
Dimmons 
 
 This dissertation broadly asks: are new digital technologies and infrastructures inevitably 
tools of surveillance, control, and capital accumulation? Or could they become loci for imagining 
alternative, more democratic futures? To answer these questions, I examine the diverse 
experimental practices, beliefs, and values of the TS movement in Barcelona, and operationalize 
my research through three core sub-questions that examine the contested production of economies, 
urban space, and subjectivities in the technological sovereignty community:  
SQ1) How and to what extent do TS actors challenge, reshape, or reinforce existing  
 economic relations?  
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SQ2) How and to what extent do TS actors shape urban space through their use of digital  
 technology? On what forms of knowledge production and consumption do these 
 practices rely? 
SQ3) How do TS actors understand themselves as technological actors, in relation to 
 hierarchies of technological expertise? How does this intersect with hierarchies  of race, 
gender, sexuality, and other markers of difference?  
These questions allow me to explore how TS is imagined and produced as a spatially-situated 
discursive practice that iteratively reshapes the entangled relations among human and non-human 
actors that constitute urban life. The three sub-questions are meant to explore the various techno-
social entanglements through which TS activities are carried out—from the extensively networked 
relations of economic production and exchange, to the more grounded relations of spatial 
production, to the immediately embodied and affective question of digital subjectivities. While 
these questions are individually the focus of the three articles attached as appendices, I attempt to 
highlight their entanglement throughout—recognizing that questions of economies, space, and 
subjectivities are inextricable from one another.  
 
Theoretical Orientation 
 The title of this dissertation, Techno-Social Entanglements and Contested Urban Futures, 
reflects the three primary theoretical trajectories that orient this research: the question of human-
technological relations, urban space and politics, and the politics of futurity. While the individual 
papers that make up the bulk of the dissertation engage with these themes in different ways, the 
dissertation as a whole could be considered an extended examination on these three themes and 
their intersection. Below I offer an overview of these theoretical trajectories, and highlight how 
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they build on one another. I show how theories on the co-constitution of humans and technologies 
re-configure understandings of the constitutive relations of urban space. Both of these, in turn, 
open up possibilities for imagining and practicing a critical politics of futurity.  
 
Techno-Social Entanglements 
 Across the various parts of this dissertation is an extended examination of the evolving 
relationship between technology and humanity. Throughout the various sections of this 
dissertation, I make use of thinkers like Bernard Stiegler (1998; 2013) and Karen Barad (2007) to 
frame my specific arguments about the role of technology in producing and consuming knowledge 
and constituting differentiated subjectivities. Both of these thinkers, though in different ways, 
explore the constitutive role technologies play in human life, challenging any absolute ontological 
separability of the “human” from the complex material and technical environments in which 
humans are always already enmeshed and which they constantly re-shape through their work.  
 My reference to techno-social entanglements in the title and throughout the dissertation is 
a direct reference to Barad’s use of the term. She writes: “To be entangled is not simply to be 
intertwined with another, as in the joining of separate entities, but to lack an independent, self-
contained existence. Existence is not an individual affair. Individuals do not preexist their 
interactions; rather, individuals emerge through and as part of their entangled intra-relating” 
(Barad 2007, p. ix). Key to Barad’s understanding of ontology as entanglement is the notion of the 
apparatus, or the practices through which such entanglements are iteratively reshaped. Barad 
(2007) describes apparatuses as “material-discursive practices—causal intra-actions through 
which matter is iteratively and differentially articulated, reconfiguring the material-discursive field 
of possibilities and impossibilities in the ongoing dynamics of intra-activity that is agency” (p. 
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170). Understanding ontology as entanglement and agency2 as the work of apparatuses points to 
the co-constitution of humanity and technology. Human agency operates through everyday 
technics, the messy and complex intra-relations that inform and thereby re-shape, albeit 
temporarily, an ontology of entanglement. As I discuss different technical objects and systems 
throughout this dissertation, I approach them all through the lens of the apparatus—as more-than-
human material-discursive intra-actions that iteratively produce difference in the world.  
 Stiegler’s theory of technogenesis, or an originary technicity of Being, helps extend 
Barad’s ontological project and elaborate on the constitutive role of technics. This notion of 
technogenesis is vital to disrupting narrow, deterministic conceptions of what technology is or 
might be. Similar to Barad, Stiegler understands technics as the inescapable relation through which 
humans and technology co-constitute each other—to speak of the human presupposes technology 
and vice versa. In the beginning of Technic and Time, 1, Stiegler lays out a critique of Artistotle’s 
conception of tekne as separate from episteme—a discursive separation in which tekne becomes 
devalued as a mere means to an end. This separation allows for a juxtaposition between the living 
beings of biology and the inert matter of mechanics, in which technical objects are hybrids—inert 
matter given form or action through the agency of a living subject. Technical objects have no 
essence or identity of their own outside of their production by a knowing subject who puts them 
to use in the world.  
                                                
2 Social scientific literature across disciplines has long debated the notion of “agency.” The long-
running debates about structure vs. agency explore the relative ability of individual actors to affect 
change in the broader social structures within which they live (Chouinard 1997). In another move, 
scholars of science and technology studies like Latour (2005) and Bennett (2010) have argued that 
nonhuman objects, beings, and matter exercise agency through their material interactions in the 
world. Barad’s apparatus moves beyond these debates by locating agency not in individual subjects 
or objects, but in the materio-discursive intra-actions through which subject and object are 
iteratively co-constituted.  
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 In opposition to this view, Stiegler moves to theorize technics as constitutive of time and 
space. Time is experienced through “tertiary retentions” or the material objects and artefacts left 
behind from previous generations. For Stiegler, primary retention is the experience of perceiving 
an external object, secondary retention is the memory of previous perceptions, and tertiary 
retention is the externalization of memory in producing material objects in the world. This is the 
fundamental way the world is encountered and experienced, with each form of retention dependent 
on the others.  The world is encountered, remembered, and reshaped—producing both time and 
space. Tertiary retentions—or technical objects—can thus not be seen as fully determined by 
human intention. They exist in the world, and indeed constitute the world long after the moment 
of externalization. Technical objects exist in a world that is different from the world in which they 
were produced, at the same time that they help produce those emergent differences.  
 For this reason, Stiegler calls for an understanding of “inorganically organized matter” 
blurring any distinction between the inert matter of mechanics and the active living matter of 
biology. As such, he contests the essential separability of subject and object, or of the who and the 
what, pointing to their continual co-constitution through relations. He writes:  
 Différance is neither the who nor the what, but their co-possibility, the movement of their 
 mutual coming-to-be, of their coming into convention. The who is nothing without the 
 what, and conversely. Différance is below and beyond the who and the what; it poses 
 them together, a composition engendering the illusion of an opposition. (Stiegler, 1998: 
 141) 
 
Significantly, Stiegler argues that the production of tertiary retentions—that is, externalization of 
memory—is also always constitutive of interiorization, or subject formation. There is no interior 
being that pre-exists its exteriorization in the world—“the interior is constituted in exteriorization” 
(Ibid: 141). The illusion of an opposition between subject and the world—of a knowing being 
preceding the world in which it is a part and in which it acts—is the product of an “originary 
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forgetting” which is the aporia of a desire for an origin where one does not exist or is not knowable. 
To make this argument, Stiegler follows the work of Leroi-Gourhan (1945) examining the 
evolution of the human species and the use of tools, showing how the human brain and skeleton 
both co-evolved with technology. Such an argument undermines any conception of technical 
objects as “prostheses” extending a given “natural” body, instead seeing these purportedly external 
objects as constitutive of the human as species. Indeed, what makes humans distinct as humans is 
the ability to transmit memory through tertiary retentions—to exteriorize memory in anticipation 
of future uses.  
 Stiegler’s work thus challenges reductive conceptions of technical objects as mere tools, 
while also not according them a kind of radical transcendent otherness. The question is not whether 
technology is the subject and humans the object, or vice versa, but rather how technology and 
humans co-constitute each other. The techno-optimism and techno-pessimism found in much 
recent work on emerging digital technologies can be traced to a fundamental misunderstanding of 
technics at the heart of Western thinking. By seeing technics as a means to human-defined ends—
or alternatively, as seen in the discourse of the 4th industrial revolution discussed above, as a 
process over and above human ability to interact with it—Western thought has failed to understand 
the constitution of humanity and technology. The erasure of the originary relationship to technics 
obscures the experience of being-as-technics by positing the privileged position of the knowing 
subject. Both techno-pessimism and techno-optimism are positions that posit human relations to 
technology in terms of a subject-object dichotomy, fearing human subjection to technological 
systems and calling for the reassertion of human control of and direction over technology. 
Stiegler’s work reframes this relationship, allowing for a reflexive understanding of ourselves as 
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always already technical beings and open possibilities to experiment with that relationship in new 
ways.  
 
Urban Space and Politics 
 Stiegler’s theory of technogenesis and Barad’s notions of entanglement and apparatuses 
both have clear implications for geographic theories of space. Barad (2007), for instance, writes: 
“Spatiality is intra-actively produced. It is an ongoing process of the material (re)configuring of 
boundaries—an iterative (re)structuring of spatial relations” (p. 181). Geographic theories of 
spatiality have long argued that space is iteratively and continually produced in practice (Lefebvre 
1992; Massey 2005). More recently, geographers have begun to recognize the constitutive roles of 
nonhumans—from nature to technological apparatuses—in this ongoing production of space 
(Kitchin and Dodge 2005; Amin and Thrift 2017). This dissertation relies on a theory of urban 
space that recognizes its continual emergence and production through ongoing processes of intra-
action among a range of human and nonhuman actors—from planners, municipal officials, and 
urban residents, to complex urban environments and material infrastructures increasingly 
controlled by assemblages of hardware, code, and data (Amin and Thrift 2017).  
 This shift in geographic thought around the city has often been referred to as assemblage 
urbanism (McFarlane 2011) and has led to detailed analyses of the constitutive relations of cities 
and urban life in particular contexts. For instance, McFarlane (2016) highlights the relationships 
among urban infrastructure, human waste, and bodies in producing social inequality as well as 
possibilities for urban protest in Cape Town, South Africa.  Shaw et al (2010) compare practices 
of mosquito management in Tucson and Phoenix, Arizona, highlighting the roles of “managers, 
institutions, and sociocultural-environmental-technological-political contexts” along with 
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mosquitoes themselves in constituting different outcomes. Tironi and Valderrama (2018) highlight 
assemblages of humans, bicycles, digital devices, and data in a smart city biking program in 
Santiago de Chile. All of these examples employ detailed description of material relationships and 
processes in urban life.  
 Yet, the development of this post-human conception of the city in urban geography has led 
to a prolonged debate between Marxist and neo-Marxist thinkers and the emerging literature based 
around “assemblage-thinking.” Scholars of critical urban political economy have argued that 
assemblage conceptions of the urban life offer only a “naïve objectivism” while abandoning a 
critique of capitalism and the structures that constitute the “context of contexts” in which local 
urban processes are positioned (Brenner et al 2011). While these scholars largely fail to engage 
with the ontological arguments3 put forth by assemblage and related theories of the city, their 
critique raises an important question about the politics of assemblage urbanism—that is, how to 
understand politics as practice in a more-than-human city. Indeed, too often the politics of this 
post-human view of the city are left undertheorized—with scholars vaguely highlighting the 
possibilities for emergence or moments of rupture in the processes of more-than-human becoming.  
 As Rose (2017) argues, most recent work on digital technology in geography has focused 
on the agential capacities of technology and other nonhuman actors while undertheorizing 
(post)human agency in urban life—re-asserting it as a resistance against technology. In other 
words, this work fails to fully account for the co-constitution of technics and humanity. To the 
extent that other work in assemblage urbanism and related more-than-human theories has faced a 
                                                
3 The debates over assemblage theory in urban geography can be seen as the extension of earlier 
debates over the place of “scale” as a concept in human geography, with proponents of a flat 
ontology arguing that conceptions of scale work to obscure the spatially-situated practices and 
actions through which the world is made and re-made (Marston et al 2005).  
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similar problem, the failure to fully theorize post-human agency helps account for this literature’s 
sometimes ambiguous politics.  
 Rose (2017), therefore, argues for a conception of posthuman agency in the digitally-
mediated city in which humans work to re-shape the constitutive relations of the city—enacting 
alternative temporalities and spatialities. This reflects Stiegler’s focus on ongoing practices of 
reinvention, and Barad’s notion of apparatuses as material-discursive practices of intra-action. 
Farías (2011) makes a similar argument in his articulation of the politics of assemblage approaches 
to the city. He writes: “the political project this perspective involves is connected with a 
redefinition of democracy towards participatory practices that might eventually recognize and 
represent humans and nonhumans as political actors” (Farías 2011, p. 371). An urban politics that 
recognizes the more-than-human constitutive relations of urban life involves practices of creative 
re-invention and experimentation—constituting alternative apparatuses in Barad’s terms, or re-
articulating complex urban assemblages.  
Futurity 
 This dissertation is also inspired by the question of the future—of the kind of urban futures 
that are being constructed around the globe, and in Barcelona in particular, with the development 
and proliferation of new digital and networked technologies. Working through Barad’s (2007) 
ontology of entanglement implies a recognition of a future as undetermined, with multiple 
possibilities that are iteratively emergent. She writes that “intra-actions iteratively reconfigure 
what is possible and what is impossible—possibilities do not sit still. One way to mark this is to 
say that intra-actions are constraining but not determining” (p. 177). Likewise, Urry (2016) stresses 
that “[t]he future is neither fully determined, nor empty and open” (p. 12). As such “a key element 
of power is thus power to determine—to produce—the future, out of the many ways it is imagined, 
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organized, materialized and distributed” (Urry 2016, p. 17). The attempts by techno-capitalists to 
secure particular futures may reconfigure what is possible, but can never foreclose the possibilities 
for something radically different.  
 Following Urry (2016) and Kinsley (2010) I consider the evolving human-technological 
relations and the production of urban space as part of a “socio-technical politics of anticipation in 
which particular visions of the future are rendered present through the production of material 
infrastructures and artefacts… preemptively establish[ing] relations of power in an undetermined 
future” (Sammler and Lynch 2019, p. 6). Such anticipatory action has increasingly become a key 
way power is exercised in the contemporary world, as states, companies, and communities pursue 
ever more complex strategies for predicting and securing against possible futures. The drive to 
produce and analyze data about all aspects of social, political, and economic life has been at the 
heart of these forms of prediction and securitization over the past several decades. Proponents of 
big data analytics aim to make the future knowable and controllable by monitoring and constaining 
the complex dynamics of the present.  
 In this sense, I aim to extend recent literature in geography—and urban geography in 
particular—on the question of the future. Anderson (2010), for instance, examines how the future 
becomes posited as a problem or threat to liberal democracy, and therefore the object of 
anticipatory governmental action. In the case of cities in particular, scholars have examined how 
policymakers and planners imagine utopian urban futures in the case of rapid urbanization across 
much of the global South—demonstrating a desire to break with the intractable problems of 
existing cities (Datta 2018b; Lynch 2018). In contrast, Leszczynski (2016) approaches “urban 
algorithmic governance and governmentality as material-discursive projects of future-ing, i.e., of 
anticipating particular kinds of cities-to-come,” highlighting the way smart city and related 
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projects are explicitly focused on the future—specifically in guarding against futures “deemed 
undesirable or deleterious” (p. 1692). In another sense, the rise of ‘post-political’ technocratic 
urban governance more broadly can be understood as a project of constraining the possible 
imaginaries of urban futures by policing a narrow consensus as to what constitutes good 
governance and the goals of urban development (Davidson and Iveson 2015).  
 Urry (2016) highlights the importance of future-thinking to governments, corporations, 
NGO’s, universities, and all manner of organizations and collectives. In the contemporary 
conjuncture, powerful actors from Silicon Valley and the tech industry more broadly have come 
to exert considerable influence both over the way the future is imagined, as well as the 
development of key material infrastructures that aim to bring about particular visions of the future. 
Irani (2018), for instance, highlights the rise of “design thinking” within Silicon Valley, explaining 
that “design thinking teaches corporate workers to tell stories about the lives of potential customers 
and imagine different futures for them” (p. 3). She goes on to examine the emergence of design 
thinking as the production of new forms of expertise, in order to secure Silicon Valley’s future as 
the geopolitical center of the global technology sector. Kinsley (2010) describes the way 
companies like Microsoft and HP Labs produce promotional videos of as-yet-nonexistent 
technologies as a way to “encourage a familiarisation and embodied disposition towards proposed 
futures” (p. 2772). He argues that “[t]hese videos, when watched, rescript the ‘indeterminate 
potentiality’ (Massumi, 2007) of the future by performatively establishing the presence of what 
has not happened and may, in fact, never happen” (Kinsley 2010, p. 2771). Such practices work to 
limit what kinds of futures are seen as possible and desirable.   
Returning to the example given at the beginning of the dissertation, the discourse of the 4th 
Industrial Revolution propagated by powerful interests in business and policymaking alike 
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represents a totalizing imaginary of the future—subordinating all aspects of life to the exigencies 
of the technology industry. This narrow vision of the future is secured through the proliferation of 
corporate technologies into the material infrastructures and systems through which everyday life 
is re-produced, exemplified by the smart city paradigm. Kitchin and Perng (2016) highlight the 
totalizing nature of this process, writing: “The speed of technological innovation and material 
deployment, and the power of the discursive regimes driving their adoption is outpacing and 
outflanking critical reflection and intervention” (p. 2). Techno-capitalist interests are gaining 
control of vital systems, including the entangled systems of the city, while foreclosing critical 
debate about what kind of future is being built, its desirability, and possible alternatives.  
 Against this totalizing vision of the future and the material-discursive practices of the tech 
industry and their partners that enact that vision, this dissertation calls for alternatives. I aim to 
open up the digital urban future posited by the smart city to new imaginaries, and highlight the 
alternative material-discursive practices that reconfigure the constitutive relations of urban life to 
make those imaginaries possible. In doing so, I am inspired by the work of scholars like Muñoz 
(2009) and Marez (2016). Muñoz calls for a critical re-imagining of possible futures, or a “critical 
utopianism” based around notions of queerness, writing: “The future is queerness’s domain. 
Queerness is a structuring and educated mode of desiring that allows us to see and feel beyond the 
quagmire of the present. The here and now is a prison home. We must strive, in the face of the 
here and now’s totalizing rendering of reality, to think and feel a then and there” (p. 1). While 
Muñoz focuses primarily on the need to think beyond present hegemonic conceptions of gender 
and sexuality, such conceptions of queerness have been adapted to theorize the indeterminacy and 
potentiality of social futures more broadly.  
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 Adapting Muñoz’s notion of queer futurity, Marez (2016) examines the practices of 
California farmworker organizers who imagine alternatives to agribusiness’s vision of the future 
based on high-tech capitalism and the increased surveillance and eventual displacement of 
racialized workers. Marez describes the movement’s use of “technologies from below”—including 
video production technologies—to re-configure apparatuses of surveillance and control for the 
production and spread of such alternative visions.  He also considers the work of several artists 
and films that imagine futures constituted around alternative political economic and social systems, 
including an end or reversal of racialized hierarchies. Marez writes that “the collective contexts of 
such farm worker futurisms mark them as utopian alternatives to agribusiness futurism and its 
idealization of technology in the service of labor exploitation and private property” (p. 27). This 
dissertation takes a similar approach to the contesting the narrow visions of the future of urban life 
projected for Barcelona and cities around the world by large technology firms, governments, 
planners, and consultants.  
 
Study Site: Barcelona 
 Barcelona is an ideal site to study the competing visions of the future of the digital city, 
life, and technology. Since 2011, the city has become a leader of the global smart city movement 
in urban planning and governance. Barcelona is special, though, because the city also has a long 
tradition of radical politics and grassroots democracy. This creates a complex tapestry of digital 
activity that challenges the straightforward teleology of technological progress in the smart city. 
In situating the emergence of the movement for technological sovereignty (TS) in Barcelona, it is 
vital to examine the historical influences that partially structure the city today. These include: the 
city’s history as a hub of anarchist and left-libertarian movements through the late 19th and early 
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20th century, the city’s history of neighborhood-based politics and community organizing 
throughout the 1980’s, and the city’s role in the anti-globalization movements of the early 2000’s 
and in the 15M occupations of 2011.   
 
Anarchist Barcelona  
 Barcelona is a city with a long history of radical politics. Perhaps most famously, the city 
was home to large and influential anarchist workers’ movements in the late 19th and early 20th 
century, up to the 1936 Revolution and the eventual triumph of Fascist forces in the Spanish Civil 
War. The social roots of these radical movements have been the focus of much historical analysis. 
Oyón (2009), for instance, argues that recent migrant laborers from southern Spain and the 
neighborhoods where they resided formed the popular and territorial basis for radical organizing 
between 1914 and 1936. He argues that the territorial, neighborhood-based organization of the 
movement was key to its formation. Smith (1997) highlights the movements’ longer history, 
focusing on the primarily Catalan working class in the first decades of the 20th century. Analyzing 
the characteristics of this working class, Smith finds that 50% of male workers in 1905 had 
completed an apprenticeship and worked as skilled laborers in artisanal trades. In particular, he 
examines the role of labor organizing amongst skilled workers battling processes of technological 
change aimed at de-skilling and de-valuing labor in driving the growth of the anarchist workers’ 
movements.  
 Indeed, multiple accounts of the anarchist workers’ movement in Barcelona highlight the 
important role of science and technology in the movement, as organizers sought to democratize 
knowledge and demonstrate the ability and intelligence of the working class (Girón Sierra and 
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Molero-Mesa 2016). The network of local athenaeums4 (or ateneus in Catalan) served as 
community spaces for cultural events, popular education, training, and organizing (Ealham 2008). 
Smith (2002) highlights the important role of technology in the subculture of the athenaeums, 
writing: “It was after all upon technological and scientific progress that the new world was to be 
forged” (p. 32). Thus, while the anarchist labor organizers recognized the role of technology in de-
skilling and de-valuing labor, they did not reject technology, but rather sought to democratize and 
socialize it.  
 Such forms of labor organizing and popular education laid the foundation for the city’s 
experiment with anarchism during the Spanish Civil War, immediately following the 1936 military 
coup d’état overthrowing the Second Spanish Republic. Smith (2002) explains that: “The military 
uprising sparked a working-class revolution in the city [Barcelona] and throughout urban 
Catalonia, which can be seen in many respects as the culmination of the anarchist tradition” (p. 
10). Following the revolution, the state collapsed, churches were ransacked, and industry was 
collectivized, run by a series of worker committees. In his memoir from the Spanish Civil War, 
Homage to Catalonia, George Orwell (2015: p. 87) writes of Catalonia during this period:  
 I had dropped more or less by chance into the only community of any size in Western 
 Europe where political consciousness and disbelief in capitalism were more normal than 
 their opposites… In theory it was perfect equality, and even in practice it was not far from 
 it. There is a sense in which it would be true to say that one was experiencing a foretaste 
 of Socialism. Many of the normal motives of civilized life—snobbishness, money-
 grubbing, fear of the boss, etc.—had simply ceased to exist. The ordinary class division of 
 society had disappeared to an extent that is almost unthinkable in the money-tainted air of 
 England.  
Eventually anarchist influence in Civil War Barcelona faded as the Republican government slowly 
re-constituted itself following the 1936 coup d’état, and was later defeated by the Fascist forces of 
                                                
4 Defined by Merriam-Webster as “a building or room in which books, periodicals, and 
newspapers are kept for use; a literary or scientific association.” 
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General Francisco Franco leading to thirty-six years of dictatorship. Yet, the success of anarchist 
organizing in the early 20th century, and the movement’s role in fighting Fascism during the 
Spanish Civil War helped establish a left-libertarian tradition in urban politics in Barcelona that is 
still evident in contemporary forms of political organizing and action, including the TS movement.  
Neighborhood Politics and The Barcelona Model  
 With the death of Francisco Franco in 1975, Spain began a transition to liberal democracy, 
with the first municipal elections held in 1979. The waning and eventual end of the dictatorship 
gave rise to powerful neighborhood-based political movements throughout the 1970’s demanding 
social services and more de-centralized, democratic forms of governance. Blanco (2009) explains: 
“These movements demanded better social housing and the remodeling of the existing housing 
stock; improvement in public education, sanitary and health services; improvement in public 
transport services and road safety; more public spaces; more cultural activities; and political 
freedom” (p. 357). Many neighborhood movements drafted Plans Populars [People’s Plans] for 
urban regeneration specific to each neighborhood, posing an alternative to the centralized forms 
of urban governance and planning characteristic of the municipal politics during the dictatorship. 
 These neighborhood movements gained significant political influence by building alliances 
and coalitions with urban professionals, planners, and the re-emerging political parties. While 
these movements were not necessarily as radical in their political ideology as the early 20th century 
anarchist movement, they similarly stressed de-centralized, territorially-based forms of local self-
government (Blakely 2005). The power of the neighborhood associations and the form of 
participatory government they helped enact became key to what would become known as the 
“Barcelona Model” of urban development (Degen and García 2012).  
 The “Barcelona Model” has come to symbolize a unique approach to urban re-development 
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characterized by the integration of social and cultural demands in development projects, the re-
generation of public space and infrastructure, broad participation and consensus across a range of 
urban actors, and the leveraging of large international events to attract investment—mostly notably 
the 1992 Olympic Games (Garcia-Ramon and Albet 2000; Monclús 2003; Marshall 2010). Degen 
and García (2012) trace the evolution of the so-called Barcelona model, highlighting the waning 
of popular control and the influence of the neighborhood movements, particularly in the run-up to 
the Olympic Games. They argue that the early years of the transition—roughly 1979-1985—were 
characterized by decentralized democratic politics, but that this gave way to consensus building in 
the late 1980’s, and later to more top-down forms of governance. While these later forms of 
governance continued to stress citizen participation and cultural production in urban development, 
these features came to function as a tool of a centralized development strategies centered around 
building the city’s “brand” internationally.  
 Thus, while the Barcelona Model of urban governance and development has been 
celebrated internationally, it has drawn significant criticism from local observers and social 
movements. Delgado (2007), for instance, argues against the common periodization of urban 
politics in Barcelona focused on the “transition” to democratic government, instead highlighting 
the continuity in urban development priorities and plans from the dictatorship to electoral 
democracy. He argues that supposed success of the Barcelona Model has always been predicated 
on selling the city to private real estate interests to the detriment of working class communities, 
continuing a process begun under the leadership of Josep Maria de Porcioles, the city’s mayor 
during much of the dictatorship. The dominance of private interests has only become more 
pronounced in the past decades, with the global shift toward neoliberal forms of “entrepreneurial 
urbanism” (Peck 2014). Charnock et al (2014), for example, examine Barcelona’s drive to become 
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a global “knowledge city” since 2000, seeing it as “an exercise in the capture of monopoly rents” 
(p. 198) and an example of the limits of the Barcelona Model in the context of neoliberal urbanism.  
 What these debates about the Barcelona Model make clear is that struggles between 
centralized urban planning initiatives and decentralized, neighborhood-based politics is nothing 
new in Barcelona. Indeed, such struggles have played a major role in shaping the development of 
the city over the past four decades. The competing discourses of the smart city and technological 
sovereignty, and the different institutions and forms of organization on which they are based, can 
be understood as the continuation of this struggle in the contemporary conjuncture.  
Contemporary Political Organizing: Alter-Globalization, Anti-Austerity, and Free Knowledge 
 Over the past two decades, Barcelona has become an important node in various national 
and international progressive political movements. Juris (2010), for instance, highlights the role of 
Barcelona-based activists in the anti-corporate globalization movements of the early 2000’s. The 
Movement for Global Resistance (MRG) was an international network organizing protests against 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the G8, and 
other large gatherings of the world’s political and economic elite. Since 2001, counter-
globalization activists meet each year in the World Social Forum in Brazil to challenge neoliberal 
hegemony and promote alternative forms of political, social, and economic organization. 
Barcelona has been an important base of organizing and support for the movement, with a large 
community of activist collectives and social economy initiatives building cooperative economies.  
 Juris (2010) discusses the role of anarchism among Barcelona-based activists in the MRG, 
showing how anarchist ideals of de-centralization and self-management evolve under new 
conditions:   
 At one level many radicals in Barcelona continue to draw on the city’s anarchist legacy as 
 an inspiration for present day struggles. At the same time, the history of anarchism together 
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 with the influence of Catalan nationalism has contributed to a unique culture of opposition 
 characterized by grassroots participation, decentralization, and self-management… The 
 critical divide is not so much anarchist versus socialist, but rather institutional versus 
 grassroots strategies for social change. (p. 153).  
In other words, while present-day political struggles in Barcelona cannot be understood as the 
direct continuation of earlier anarchist organizing, a certain left-libertarian ethic continues to shape 
organizing strategies and the projection of alternative futures for Barcelona-based activists—from 
the neighborhood movements discussed above through the new globally-networked movements of 
the 21st century.  
 Throughout this period, Barcelona has also been an important site of development for the 
Free Culture or Free Knowledge Movement (Fuster Morell et al 2015)—a global network of 
activists working to harness the internet to promote open access to information, battling emerging 
regimes of national and international intellectual property law. Fuster Morell (2010) defines the 
Free Culture Movement as:  
 a network of individuals and organizations, linked by more or less dense networks, 
 solidarity ties and moments of confluence, sharing a loose collective identity and a 
 common set of values and principles (most importantly accessibility and the flow of 
 information and knowledge, creativity, participative formats, network settings and 
 communal ownership), whose acting together aims to challenge forms of knowledge-
 making and accessibility by engaging in the construction of digital commons and 
 mobilizations directed against the media and cultural industries, their lobbies, and 
 political institutions (at the national, regional and global levels). 
 
 This included movements for Free and Open Source Software (Söderberg 2015), as well as the 
sharing of cultural material. Activists concerned about the privatization of knowledge and culture 
implemented new regimes and practices for protecting open-source and free culture, including 
‘copyleft’ and Creative Commons licensing. This movement takes as a primary concern the 
democratization of the digital revolution—seeing in new technologies the tools necessary to build 
alternative, de-centralized political, economic, and social practices.   
 Fuster Morell (2012) explains how the Free Culture Movement, in confluence with earlier 
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generations of neighborhood-based and alter-globalization activists came to play an important role 
shaping the indignados or 15M movement in 2011. The indignados occupied public squares across 
Spain in 2011 in protest against government austerity measures taken in response to the global 
financial crisis. The occupied squares became sites for theorizing and organizing alternative social, 
political, and economic practices based around solidarity and common well-being. The movement 
called for a deepening of democracy and new forms of popular control, and made particular use of 
social media and the internet to organize actions and build extensive solidarity networks with 
activists across Spain and the globe (Barbas and Postill 2017). The Free Culture Movement was 
key in implementing alternative practices of communication, cultural production, and knowledge 
sharing in the context of the 15M protests (Fuster Morell 2012).  
 These contemporary movements demonstrate the evolution and confluence of historical 
traditions of anarchism, place-based urban politics, extensive solidarity activism, and technology 
activism in Barcelona. Throughout these examples, Barcelona-based activist strategy has stressed 
the importance of promoting forms of de-centralized, democratic organization. As I make clear in 
the three attached articles, these historical influences play a role in shaping the emergence of 
technological sovereignty as a de-centralized movement of political practice.  
Methodological Framework 
 This is a qualitative study of a grassroots techno-social movement in Barcelona, focused 
on interrogating how activists imagine and build alternative urban futures through their 
engagements with digital technology. As Cope (2019) argues: “Qualitative digital geographies are 
needed to interrogate and make sense of how we produce, experience, and know emerging digital 
worlds” (p. 97, emphasis in the original). Following the theoretical orientation of this project 
discussed above, I am interested in the daily practices through which the posthuman material-
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discursive relations of urban life are reiteratively reshaped and emergent. As such, I employed an 
ethnographic approach based on a combination of qualitative methods, including participant 
observation, semi-structured interviews, and discourse analysis. This combination of methods 
allows me to understand both the experimental practices and forms of social organization through 
which TS activists work, as well as the discourses about the city, technology, and the self that 
inspire those actions and are iteratively remade through them.  
 
Ethnography and the Study of Digital Life 
 Across and within social science disciplines there are competing conceptions as to what 
constitutes ethnographic research. For some, ethnography is a rigorous practice with more or less 
set standards for where research should take place, how that place is to be defined and understood, 
the appropriate place of the researcher, how long the researcher should remain in the “field,” what 
kinds of notes should be kept, and how that data should eventually be presented. Ethnographic 
practice in sociology and political science, for instance, has been used to supplement and “verify” 
other ways of knowing or accounting for social and political phenomena (Baiocchi and Connor 
2008). In contrast, for Henderson (2016), McGranahan (2014) and others, ethnography is less a 
hard set of practices and rules and more a sensibility or way of seeing, experiencing, thinking, and 
relating to the world that is compatible with a wide range of research practices and methods. Such 
an ethnographic sensibility and the iterative flexibility of ethnography are ideal for exploring 
questions of digital life in the contemporary world, characterized by fragmented and multiple 
space-times and the proliferation of modes of communication and socialization.  
 Within the emerging digital geographies literature, scholars are only beginning to employ 
and think through the importance of ethnographic research. Many of the shortcomings in the sub-
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discipline at the current moment—including its undertheorized notion of (post)human agency 
(Rose 2017), digital subjectivity (Elwood and Leszczynski 2018), and politics (Lynch 2019)—can 
be best addressed through ethnographic research that aims to understand how individuals and 
communities differentially experience and interact with digital technologies in their everyday 
lives. For instance, Pink and Fors (2017) conduct ethnographic research to understand how self-
tracking technologies reshape daily practices and experiences of urban space. By following the 
practices of people using self-tracking technologies in Australia and Sweden—and creating 
opportunities for research subjects to reflect on and discuss their practices and motivations—the 
authors are able to offer a more intimate and nuanced discussion of the complex human-technical 
assemblages emerging in the contemporary conjuncture.  
While geographers have definitely been interested in thinking through ethnography in 
many areas, its use when examining digital life is still more common in anthropology. Gabriela 
Coleman (2014), for example, has conducted extended ethnographic research with hackers, 
including the well-known and secretive collective Anonymous. In her book on the Free and Open 
Source Software (F/OSS) movement, Coleman (2012) also describes the challenges of conducting 
ethnographic fieldwork on a decentralized, informal community organized around ‘technical’ 
work. To do this work, Coleman honed her own technical skills, integrated herself into social 
circles of hackers, and attended meetings of hackers in specific places—mostly San Francisco. At 
the same time, she participated in numerous digital forums and projects, building new relationships 
with hackers across the world. Hine (2015) highlights the importance of the internet to all 
ethnographic practice in the contemporary world. As digital technology and the internet come to 
reshape everyday practices across the globe, ethnographers need to recognize and work through 
the ways offline and online practices become increasingly entangled.  
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Summary of Methods and the Fieldwork Period 
 Fieldwork for this project took place over two periods between 2016 and 2018. The first, 
preliminary period of fieldwork, was carried out between May and August 2016. During this 
period, I began informal conversations with representatives from various TS-related initiatives 
and, in a few cases, conducted more formal semi-structured interviews (six of which are included 
below in Table 3). Through these conversations, I established contacts that allowed me to design 
the primary fieldwork period, identifying future individuals for interviews, events to attend, and 
three specific initiatives for sustained participant observation.  
 In this project, my approach to ethnography has made use of a combination of qualitative 
methods, including participant observation and semi-structured interviews. I also collected a broad 
range of written materials, from published manifestos to blogs, websites, op-eds, and promotional 
pamphlets related to TS or the broader politics of digital development in Barcelona. While this is 
detailed below, the majority of this work is methodologically informed by my participant 
observation of the growing TS movement in the city. My approach to participant observation 
included sustained, repetitive observation and engagement with three primary collectives or 
initiatives: 1) Guifinet, 2) Ateneus de Fabricació, and 3) the SobTec organizing committee. These 
groups were selected both based on access, as well as for their diverse forms of organization and 
position within the broader TS networks. Throughout this time, I took detailed fieldnotes on my 
interactions and observations with each group, highlighting the diversity of practices, forms of 
organization, and common discourses through which the different groups operated and networked 
with others around the city.  
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1)   Guifinet is the largest and most established of the projects. It is a community wireless network 
composed of more than 35,000 active nodes spanning across Catalonia and into neighboring 
regions of Spain. The project is organized territorially, with decentralized Guifinet associations 
building and maintaining their own broadband internet infrastructure in the neighborhoods and 
towns where they live. I participated in Guifinet activities by attending weekly “guifilab” meetings 
held around Barcelona in which members of the network plan and discuss the expansion of the 
infrastructure. I also joined the local association for my neighborhood and attended monthly 
meetings to help plan and manage the network. I installed a “node”—or wireless connection 
point—in my own home using Guifinet manuals and regularly participated in group text chats 
about the management of my local network.   
2)   The Ateneus de Fabricació (AdF) are a network of public 3D printing labs operated by the 
municipal government. Inspired by the legacy of the early 20th century athenaeums, the spaces 
offer open access to advanced digital production technologies for neighborhood residents. I 
conducted regular participant observation at workshops, meetings, and courses in the AdF in the 
Ciutat Meridiana neighborhood, and attended special events at AdFs in the Barceloneta and Les 
Corts neighborhoods over the course of my field work. These observations allowed me to see the 
various ways different groups in the city make use of the space, and to follow individual subjects 
through the process of learning to use the devices for different purposes.  
3)   The SobTec organizing committee is an informal group of 5-10 individuals who meet regularly 
throughout the year to collectively theorize and promote technological sovereignty and to organize 
the annual SobTec congress. Group members would debate and discuss questions of privacy, 
ethics, and politics in relation to digital development and would work to articulate a coherent 
notion of technological sovereignty by reflecting on the practices of local initiatives and 
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associations. The group generally met once a week in La Lleialtat Santsenca, a municipal-owned, 
cooperatively-managed community space in the Sants neighborhood of the city. I regularly 
attended these meetings throughout my fieldwork period in order to better understand how the 
diversity of community-based digital projects being carried out around the city might be articulated 
under a common vision or ethic. 
 In addition to my observation of these three groups, I also conducted participant 
observation at a series of one-off events, workshops, and meetings—outlined in Table 2 below. 
These events and meetings span a range of sizes and formats, and included both mainstream smart 
city events, as well as critical and TS-related events. Some of these were events open to the public 
at which discussions of digital technology and urban politics were featured, while others were 
more closed events or meetings of individual collectives or gatherings of multiple collectives. 
Participating in these events allowed me to gain a more complete perspective on the diversity of 
projects related to TS and how they are situated within broader municipal digital politics. During 
these events, I took detailed fieldnotes to understand how TS as discourse and practice evolved or 
took on new meaning in different contexts and how it contested or related to more mainstream 
discourses of digital innovation.  
Table 2 
EVENTS, WORKSHOPS, MEETINGS 
Date Organizer Explanation 
19 June 2017 Barcelona en 
Comú 
Film screening and discussion hosted by the 
governing party in Barcelona reflecting on their first 
two years in power, including the changes to the 
city’s smart city program.  
26 June 2017 Escola del Comú Debate on the digital commons with economist 
Yochai Benkler, Barcelona councilwoman Gala Pin, 
Dr. Mayo Fuster Morell (Universitat Oberta de 
Catalunya), and Barcelona Digital Commissioner 
Francesca Bria 
6-7 October 2017 Escola del Comú Two-day event with a variety of panels and speakers 
on municipalism and the urban commons, including 
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panels on digital innovation, sovereignties, online 
resistance, and technopolitical networks. 
21-22 October 2017 Xarxa de 
Economia 
Solidaria (XES) 
Two-day event. The Solidarity Economy Fair of 
Catalonia (FESC) brings together cooperative and 
commons-based enterprises from across the region, 
with a sub-area devoted to groups working with 
digital technologies (TECNOFESC) 
5 November 2017 FairCoop 
Catalunya 
Presentations and discussion organized around 
FairCoin—an experiment in democratically-
managed, ecologically-responsible cryptocurrency.  
6 November 2017 Barcelona City 
Hall 
Digital Commissioner Francesca Bria presents 
“New Measures for Open Digital Governance” 
16 November 2017 Smart City 
World Expo 
Large annual meeting of municipalities and 
technology companies involved in developing new 
smart city infrastructures and initiatives.   
21 November 2017 La 
Comunificadora 
Open-House event for La Comunificadora, a 
municipal-sponsored project meant to organize and 
jump-start cooperative and commons-based 
enterprises, including many digital and platform-
based enterprises.  
29 November 2017 Eurecat Annual one-day event organized by the Centre 
Tecnològic de Catalunya focused on the 
technological needs and challenges faced by small 
businesses.  
30 November 2017 Barcelona City 
Hall 
Public participation and debate event for Repensem 
22@, re-developing neighborhood plans for 
Poblenou.  
20 January 2018 Comité per la 
Defensa de la 
República (CDR) 
A workshop on digital surveillance and alternative 
practices organized by the CDR for Horta-Guinardó. 
25 January 2018 Lluiretic Meeting of local programming cooperatives and 
associations to reflect on common needs and areas 
for collaboration and expansion.  
25 January, 7 
February 2018 
The Things 
Network (TTN) 
Catalunya 
Working meetings of The Things Network to 
organize in lead up to public workshop.  
8 February 2018 Barcelona 
BitCoin 
Community 
Presentation by BitCoin activist Amir Taaki on the 
possibilities to capture BitCoin for progressive and 
radical aims.  
 46 
9-10, 16-17 February 
2018 
Barcelona City 
Hall, Colectic, 
Dabne 
Four-day workshop on “Digital Political 
Participation,” including exploration of TS and 
open-source alternatives and ongoing municipal 
projects.  
14 February 2018 CommonsCloud 
Alliance 
Meeting of various local programming cooperatives 
and associations to strategize a joint project to start 
a commons-based cloud infrastructure.  
20-24 February 2018 Mobile Week 
Barcelona 
A series of public debates, speakers, and workshops 
on topics related to digital innovation, politics, urban 
development, and ethics. 
23 February 2018 Anti-Mobile 
World Congress 
Public debate about the precariousness of work in 
the app-based gig economy.  
26-28 February 2018 Mobile Social 
Congress 
Annual event hosted by SETEM-Catalunya to raise 
awareness of the abuses of the capitalist mobile 
industry and promote TS-based alternatives.  
3 March 2018 III Congrés de 
Soberania 
Tecnològica 
(SobTec) 
Annual event to promote and theorize technological 
sovereignty. Including panels, speakers, and 
workshops on: transversal sovereignties, the 
intersection of food and technological sovereignties, 
net neutrality, ethics in artificial intelligence, critical 
approaches to gamification, and platform 
cooperativism, among others.  
16 March 2018 The Things 
Network (TTN) 
Catalunya 
Public Co-Creation Workshop to strategize and plan 
a commons-based Internet of Things network.  
16 April 2018 Dimmons and 
Barcelona City 
Hall 
Meeting of TS-initiatives with representatives from 
Barcelona City Hall and the Digital Commons 
Research Group.  
  
 Over time, and through the development of connections, I also conducted 23 semi-
structured interviews (outlined in Table 3) with representatives from across different organizations 
and initiatives in the broader TS movement. These interviews were framed around a few broad 
questions focused on: (1) the history, future goals, practices and forms of organization through 
which each group operates (2), the individual’s background, experience, and motivation for 
participating in the particular group in question, and (3) their understanding of technological 
sovereignty as a concept, its potential and current shortcomings. The participants ranged in age 
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and experience with the TS movement—from relative newcomers with little formal “technical” 
training, to those with several decades of experience in hacker movements or professional 
technical careers. The subjects are roughly split in gender, with 12 subjects identifying as men and 
11 as women.  
Table 3 
LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
Name/Pseudonym  Organization/Initiative/ 
Collective 
Date 
Teo Xnet 18 July 2016 
Jordi Ateneus de Fabricació 25 July 2016 
Albert Ateneus de Fabricació 28 July 2016 
Peter Guifinet 28 July 2016 
Montse SomConexió 15 August 2016 
Silvano SmartBarris 17 August 2016 
Guillem GuifiAmunt 21 September 2017 
Sergio Coopdevs 29 January 2017 
Mauricio Decidim 7 October 2017 
Manuel FairCoin 5 November 2017 
Laura Ateneus de Fabricació 25 October 2017 
Rosa LaMoscaTV 25 October 2017 
Pep and Ana Colectic 20 November 2017 
Pau Coopdevs 29 January 2018 
Oriol Lliuretic 29 January 2018 
Irene Dabne 16 February 2018 
Miguel RidersxDerechos 4 March 2018 
Laia SETEM-Catalunya 15 March 2018 
Martha  Jamgo 16 March 2018 
Nuria Colectic 21 March 2018 
Maria La Mar de Bytes 2 April 2018 
Chris Equipaments Lliures/Lleialtec 3 May 2018 
Alba Pam a Pam 18 May 2018 
 
While these experiences detailed above refer to in-person research experiences, my 
ethnographic practice involved participation in both in-person and online environments. While 
many TS initiative may meet only once or twice a week (and some less frequently than that), 
various digitally-mediated forums create spaces for ongoing day-to-day discussions within and 
across different collectives. I thus participated in a series of email listservs and online forums 
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through applications like Telegram, Signal, and Riot—including group chats for the Barcelona 
Guifilabs, my local Guifinet association, the SobTec organizing group, as well as a general forum 
for the broader TS community with over 80 members. During this time, I kept detailed fieldnotes 
about the kinds of conversations taking place on these forums—from everyday questions of 
maintaining infrastructure or setting meetings time, to more intense political and philosophical 
debates.  
 Finally, I collected, read, and analyzed documents, manifestos, blogs, and websites from 
TS activists and initiatives, including the two dossiers on technological sovereignty (Hache 2014; 
Hache 2018) and the collectively-authored book Sobiranies (Benitez Romero et al 2017). These 
various texts allowed me to engage deeper with the way TS activists and the broader movements 
with which they are networked understand their own work. As these texts are read broadly across 
the TS movement, they also allow me to better understand the different kinds of materials through 
which individuals and collectives within the movement come to think through and theorize their 
own practices.  
Data Analysis 
 Throughout my fieldwork, I amassed an archive of qualitative data, including the fieldnotes 
from my participant observation, the recordings and transcripts of my interviews, and an array of 
documentary and visual sources—from manifestos and webpages, to promotional posters and 
flyers. I qualitatively coded these materials to extricate the primary themes of the three attached 
articles: the production of economies, space, and subjectivities in the TS movement.  
 To examine the movement’s economic practices and relations, I recognize economic 
relations as performative—that is, that economies are constituted through embodied daily practices 
in place through which individuals and collectives exercise different forms of production and 
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consumption and re-produce notions of work and property (Gibson-Graham 2006; Callon 2007). 
I thus sought to highlight in my data the ways TS activists practice and experiment with alternative 
forms of labor, production, consumption, or property in their digital projects. In keeping with this 
framework, I also recognize TS activists’ own discourses about these economic practices as forms 
of grassroots theorization that iteratively produce new relations and subjectivities. I thus coded my 
data to highlight the values, beliefs, and motivations that inspired and informed such alternative 
practices beyond the capitalist drive for profit. This allowed me to highlight the foundations of an 
alternative economic practice at the heart of the TS movement (Appendix A).  
 To examine the production of urban space in the actions of the TS movement, I employ a 
range of theories that approach urban space as always in the process of being produced. Lefebvre 
(1991) famously argued that space was continually produced through the interaction among: the 
diverse forms of representing, planning, and producing knowledge about space; the daily spatial 
practices or flows of people, goods, energy, and capital across space; and the subjective, embodied, 
emotional, and symbolic experience of being in space. More recent literature on the “automatic 
production of space” (Thrift and French 2002) highlights the way all three of these aspects of 
spatial production are increasingly mediated by technical objects and systems. Thus, to understand 
the production of space in the TS movement, I highlight moments in my data in which TS actors 
produce and consume knowledge about the spaces of the city, or actively reshape those spaces, 
through their grassroots digital project.  
 Finally, to consider how the TS movement works to shape subjectivities in relation to 
digital technology, I employ an understanding of subjectivity as embodied and performative. That 
is, subject positions are not stable and singular but—like economies and space—actively 
(re)produced through daily practices involving an array of human and nonhuman actors (Barad 
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2007; Butler; 2011; Braidotti 2013). I thus highlighted moments in the data where individuals 
came to take on new roles in technological projects through experimental practices, or moments 
in workshops and courses designed to draw attention to one’s direct material and embodied 
relationships to digital objects and systems. These moments work to re-orient relationship to digital 
systems and allow subject to explore new positionalities and ways of being in relation to the digital.  
 
Explanation of Dissertation Format and Overview of Key Contributions 
 This dissertation is composed of three stand-alone, single-authored articles based on my 
empirical fieldwork in Barcelona. The articles make three separate contributions to ongoing 
debates over the politics of the smart city, the role of digital technologies in the production of 
urban space, and the differential production of digital subjectivities.  
 The first article (Appendix A) is titled “Contesting Digital Futures: Urban Politics, 
Alternative Economies, and the Movement for Technological Sovereignty in Barcelona.” This 
article is published in Antipode (2019). The article intervenes in theoretical debates over the 
politics of “smart city” development through an engagement with literature on urban social 
movements and alternative economies. This article gives the broadest overview of the TS 
movement and the diversity of initiatives and influences that constitute it. In it, I explore the 
concept of “technological sovereignty” employed by activists in Barcelona, describing its basis in 
experiments with alternative arrangements of work and property, an ethics of care, and an 
engagement with municipal institutions. I argue for the need to think beyond binaries of techno-
optimism and techno-pessimism to imagine a multiplicity of possible futures emergent in ongoing 
processes of urban and technological change.  
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 The second article (Appendix B) is titled “Re-Claiming the Digitally-Mediated City: 
Spatial Knowledge, Digital Infrastructure, and the Work of Amateurs.” This article is currently in 
review at Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space. The paper contributes to debates on 
the evolving role of software code and networked infrastructures in producing urban space. 
Scholars have examined how digital infrastructures regulate flows of information, energy, people, 
and goods in and across cities, operating in the background of urban life. Such developments create 
concerns about privacy, transparency, and the narrowing of urban democracy. I employ Stiegler’s 
notion of “proletarianization” as the loss of knowledge, to argue that the automatic production of 
space as it is normally described constitutes the proletarianization of space, or the centralization 
of spatial knowledge. The paper describes the practices of Guifinet, groups that build and maintain 
their own broadband internet infrastructure, focusing on the multiple forms of knowledge 
production and circulation on which these projects are based. I present Guifinet as an example of 
amateur practices of de-proletarianization, as urban residents re-claim critical forms of spatial 
knowledge about the city. In doing so, I demonstrate the possibilities for digital infrastructures to 
create new spaces for democratic power based on alternative logics of techno-social organization.  
 A third article (Appendix C) is titled “Unruly Digital Subjects and the Politics of 
Technological Expertise.” This article is in preparation for submission to Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers. The paper contributes to emergent debates in feminist and queer 
digital geographies on the production of digital subjectivities. Much of this literature explores how 
conceptions of identity and belonging are shaped through digital technologies—such as when 
algorithmic logics create new processes of inclusion/exclusion, re-orienting social practices in the 
process. Yet, this literature generally approaches digital technology as a mediator of subjective 
experience, rather than asking how subjects understand and experience their relationship to 
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evolving digital systems within hierarchies of technological agency and expertise. I bring this 
literature together with earlier work in feminist geographies and related disciplines on the 
gendering and racialization of technology to consider how material discursive processes through 
which digital subjectivities are emergently produced and differentiated. In the case of Barcelona, 
I describe the ways the actions of TS activists challenge the discursive separation of technology 
from the rest of social life, and the way an inclusive digital politics queers established hierarchies 
and subject positions in relation to technological agency.   
 
Conclusions and Opportunities for Future Research 
 Geographers have long explored questions around the use and effects of digital 
technology—particularly in critical and feminist approaches to GIS (Elwood 2006; Kwan 2007); 
but only in the past few years has “digital geographies” emerged as an organizing concept, bringing 
together scholars from across the discipline around related questions of digital development (Ash 
et al 2019). This dissertation, taken as a whole, makes a series of significant contributions to this 
emerging subfield and aims to push it in new directions. These contributions can be summarized 
in three main points: 
1)   This dissertation responds to and builds on critiques that digital geographic scholarship has 
undertheorized the role of the posthuman at the expense of accounting for the agency of technical 
objects and systems (Rose 2017). It does so by adopting a theoretical orientation inspired by Barad 
(2007) and Stiegler (1998) that recognizes the inextricable entanglement of human and technical 
modes of being, and operationalizing that orientation through ethnographic research with 
community-based technology collectives. This approach puts the emphasis back on the role of 
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always differentiated and differentiating posthumans and their modes of being with technological 
objects and systems.  
2)   Across the three appendices, this dissertation traces the transversal role of emerging digital 
technologies in everyday life—from the broad, extensive relations of the economy, to grounded 
practices of spatial production and knowledge sharing, to the intimate relations that shape 
conceptions of the self. Economies, urban space, and the self are all always in the process of 
becoming and the proliferation of new technologies in everyday life inevitably reshapes all of 
these.  
3)   Finally, the dissertation offers one of very few accounts of what an active politics of contesting 
the hegemonic processes of digital innovation might look like in practice. The three appendices 
attached offer different perspectives on the kinds of political practices capable of imagining and 
building alternatives to techno-capitalism’s monopolized vision of the future. I show how 
challenging the hegemony of techno-capitalism requires experimentation with alternative 
economic practices and arrangements, new forms of knowledge production and sharing, as well as 
a radical disruption of de-politicized notions of digital citizenship and constructed hierarchies of 
technological expertise. Alternative, more just digital futures will not be brought about by simply 
expanding access to technology or including more people in existing technological practices, but 
by a radical re-thinking of what digital technologies are or might be, and how individuals-in-
collectives are able to relate to them and re-make them.  
  
 Reflecting on these contributions, I highlight at least three main directions for future 
research on the entangled processes of urban and technological change based on my experience 
and findings in this project. 
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Grassroots Technology Movements 
 While this dissertation highlights the work of activists in Barcelona, the TS movement is 
not the only example of critical, community-based technological development around the world. 
Multiple technology collectives in cities across Latin America are building and maintaining their 
own “feminist servers” and autonomous infrastructures, and founding critical programming 
cooperatives based on post-capitalist ethics (Derechos Digitales 2017). Other collectives are 
operating in cities around the world—like the Collective for Liberation, Ecology, and Technology 
(CoLET) in New York or the Tactical Technology Collective in Berlin.  
 Despite their broad diversity, these movements share important similarities. While 
extensively networked, and drawing on a global commons of open-source knowledge, these groups 
often work locally to address needs in the communities in which they are situated. These groups 
challenge taken-for-granted aspects of techno-capitalist development models—the ideology of 
“innovation” (Russell and Vinsel 2016), programmed obsolescence, and the ecological impacts of 
digital infrastructures and systems. There is ample opportunity and need for further research on 
these kinds of grassroots movements, their motivations, values, and practices. In particular, 
scholars might look to the technological practices of marginalized communities and communities 
in the Global South, exploring the relationships between experiences of urban informality, for 
instance, and forms of grassroots technological agency.  
 
Digital Subjectivity 
 While recent scholarship in digital geographies have begun to explore the ways digital 
technologies increasingly shape processes of subjectification and emergent subjectivities, there 
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remain many questions for future inquiry. In particular, as I argue here, scholars have engaged 
little with the way digital technology gets discursively tied to whiteness, masculinity, and cis-
heteronormativity, and as such de-politicized and posited as universal. This is likely due to a 
tendency in digital geographies scholarship to engage theoretical frameworks around “new 
materialisms” and posthumanism and the consequent move away from theories of discourse. Yet, 
as I hope to show in Appendix C, these theoretical orientations are completely compatible, and 
indeed only make sense in conjunction.  
 Beyond this dissertation, there is a need to explore discourses around technology, processes 
of technological change, and the distribution of technological agency, both to understand how they 
shape common conceptions of technology and to understand how they are continually reproduced 
through material discursive practices involving an array of human and nonhuman actors. This work 
could include further engagements with: the ways technology and technological innovation is 
represented in cultural productions and popular media, prevailing practices in technological 
education across cultural and spatial contexts (Holloway et al 2000; Emejulu and McGregor 2019), 
and the evolving organization of digital work (Richardson 2018), among other topics.  
 
Silicon Valley, the Tech Industry, and the Future 
 There is an urgent need for critical empirical research on the practices of elite actors in the 
technology industry and the visions of the future they aim to produce. As discussed above, 
powerful actors from Silicon Valley and the broader technology industry are not just involved in 
developing new technologies, but also in proposing radical changes to existing social, political, 
economic orders (Lynch 2017). Scholars might interrogate the way the logics of innovation and 
“disruption”—exemplified in Mark Zuckerberg’s famous motto of “move fast and break things”—
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has moved beyond the technology industry itself inspiring entrepreneurial activities across sectors 
that move at a pace far beyond existing states’ abilities to regulate them. Critical scholars cannot 
afford to simply react to these development, but need to be able to follow them in real-time and 
challenge their monopolistic claims to the future.  
 In a similar vein, critical scholars need to follow and engage ongoing processes of research 
and development in the technology sector—particularly around artificial intelligence and machine 
learning, robotics and autonomous systems. Scholars have examined the evolution and use of such 
autonomous systems in war zones (Shaw 2017), along with the emerging regimes algorithmic 
management at borders and in cities (Amoore and Raley 2017; Leszczynski 2018). Yet, many 
questions remain and the pace of technological change in the current conjuncture demands more. 
Geographers are uniquely positioned to help build a broader, public, and cross-disciplinary 
discussion about the current direction of technological research and development, its ethics and 
politics, and impacts on everyday life. In short, we need a critical geography of the technology 
industry capable of engaging in real time with the entanglement of political, economic, social, 
cultural, and technological activities in and across space.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
Contesting Digital Futures: Urban Politics, Alternative Economies, and the Movement for 
Technological Sovereignty in Barcelona 
 
 
Abstract 
Scholars have offered important critiques of the socio-spatial processes of contemporary 
technological development, including the rise of “smart city” urban development models. While 
these critiques have been essential for understanding contemporary forms of techno-capitalism and 
its reach into new areas, this paper calls for a consideration of alternative modes of digital 
development in urban life beyond the logics of securitization and capital accumulation. In 
particular, I examine the critical discourses and experimental practices of a grassroots movement 
focused on claiming “technological sovereignty” (TS) in Barcelona. The TS movement is a broad, 
de-centralized network of cooperatives, associations, and community initiatives experimenting 
with alternative practices of locally-rooted, open-source digital development. These groups 
explore democratic and cooperative practices of work, property, production, and consumption in 
relation to digital technology, based around an ethics of care and a commitment to working through 
and within local communities. In examining the values, beliefs, and practices of the TS movement, 
I bring ongoing discussions around digitalization and the “smart city” into critical conversation 
with the extensive literature on prefigurative urban politics and postcapitalist economies.  
 
Keywords: technology, sovereignty, digital, postcapitalism, urban politics 
 65 
1.   Introduction 
In the past several years, geography has seen the rapid growth of interest in questions around digital 
technologies, including robots (Del Casino 2016), big data (Kitchin 2014), algorithms (Crampton 
2016; Amoore 2018), social networks (Shelton, Poorthuis, and Zook 2015), and the new spatial 
forms to which they give rise—the smart city (Kitchin 2015), the smart border (Amoore 2006), 
and “code/space” (Kitchin and Dodge 2011). Geographers have been well positioned to offer 
insightful and necessary critiques of the ways these technologies reshape dominant epistemologies, 
relationships of power, and spatial practices, while highlighting the agentive capacities of 
technological objects and systems (Ash, Kitchin, and Leszczynski 2018).  
 Yet, this growing body of scholarship has given less attention to the question of 
alternatives—alternative digital economies, alternative spatial forms, alternative understandings 
of what technology is or might be. In much of this scholarship, emerging technologies are 
developed and controlled by state, military, and/or corporate actors; and indeed, this is the 
hegemonic model of technological development today—driven by the sometimes convergent and 
sometimes conflicting desires of the State for new forms of security, surveillance, and control, and 
by private firms’ drive for profit.  
 If, as much of the digital geographies literature has argued, we need to recognize emerging 
technologies as inherently political and entangled in power-laden socio-technical assemblages, 
then what might an aspirational postcapitalist politics (Gibson-Graham 2006) of digital technology 
look like? What kinds of radical political possibilities arise from the ongoing co-evolution of 
technics and humanity (Stiegler 2013)? If urban algorithmic governance is constituted through 
“material-discursive projects of ‘future-ing’” (Leszczynski 2016, 1691) based on logics of 
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securitization, what alternative projects of ‘future-ing’ exist or might exist? Based on what logics 
and values? 
 This paper explores the question of alternative modes of digital development in urban life. 
In particular, I explore the discourses and practices of a grassroots movement in Barcelona 
organized around the notion of “technological sovereignty” and devoted to claiming radical 
democratic control over processes of technological development. The movement experiments with 
alternative economic practices and forms of organization for digital production and consumption. 
These practices are driven by an ethics of care and deeply territorialized in the city and local 
community—seeing technological sovereignty as a way to “rethink the model of the city” (SobTec 
2016 website, accessed 17 December 2018).  
 In exploring the values, beliefs, and practices of this movement, I bring geographic 
discussions on processes of digitalization and the “smart city” into critical conversation with work 
on urban political movements and alternative economies. I build on previous work on grassroots 
urban movements that aim to radically remake the socio-political and economic relations of the 
city by enacting alternative practices—a kind of prefigurative politics of grassroots city-making 
(Davidson and Ivseson 2015; Wanzer-Serrano 2015; Gray 2017); and I highlight the importance 
of exploring the possibilities for alternative economic arrangements and practices based on post-
capitalist logics (Gibson-Graham 2006; Diprose 2017; Zanoni et al 2017; Healy et al 2018). 
Following previous geographic research on such “diverse economies,” I aim to bring 
“marginalized, hidden and alternative economic activities to light in order to make them more real 
and more credible as objects of policy and activism” (Gibson-Graham 2008). 
 The goal of this paper is to move from a standpoint of critique to a position of openness 
toward the possibilities for alternative, counter-hegemonic (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) modes of 
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digital development in (re)producing urban life. Existing initiatives of activist and hacker 
collectives around the world offer glimpses of alternatives. The Free and Open Source Software 
(F/OSS) movement has long struggled against the privatization of technological knowledge, 
working to build a digital software commons through alternative regimes of labor and property 
(Söderberg 2015), while “hacktivist” movements work to disrupt the functions of state and 
capitalist technological apparatuses (Coleman 2013). A report by the group Derechos Digitales 
(2017) documents projects around Latin America devoted to building common digital 
infrastructures, free software, and feminist technology often through social movements and 
cooperative enterprises; while two dossiers from the Calafou Postcapitalist Eco-Industrial District 
near Barcelona offer examples from around the world of self-managed servers, biohacking labs, 
and open-source 3D printing (Hache 2014; Hache 2017).  
 Since roughly 2014, a loose network of individuals and collectives has emerged in 
Barcelona organized around the notion of “technological sovereignty.” This community is focused 
on distinct projects and initiatives building community-based technological systems and services 
with social objectives. The movement is particularly interesting for the wide variety of projects 
with strong territorial ties to the city—from community-managed broadband infrastructure, 
autonomous servers, and an open source Internet of Things network, to free software cooperatives 
and spaces for public education and collective reflection. Each year since 2016 a group of activists 
has organized the “Technological Sovereignty Congress”—or SobTec—while global justice NGO, 
SETEM-Catalunya, has organized the Mobile Social Congress featuring “technological 
sovereignty” as a primary theme. Increasingly the language of “technological sovereignty” can be 
found in the manifestos and websites of many local cooperatives and associations, and is frequently 
evoked in public events, debates, training courses, and workshops.  
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 Below, I offer a brief discussion of methods and then introduce the TS movement, situating 
it in the context of contemporary Barcelona. In the following section, I review existing literature 
on the “smart city” and processes of digital innovation in cities, highlighting the lack of discussion 
around alternative modes of development. I then place this literature in relation to scholarship on 
prefigurative urban politics and alternative economies. The remainder of the paper is divided into 
two main sections. Section 3 examines TS actors’ critiques of the hegemonic model of 
technological development and their theorization of “technological sovereignty” as an alternative. 
Section 4 explores the practices and strategies for pursuing TS, focusing on the movement’s 
experimentation with alternative models of economic organization, practices of care, its 
territorialization in Barcelona and relationship to the municipal government.   
 
1.1 Methods  
This paper is based on over a year of fieldwork carried out in Barcelona between 2016 and 2018. 
During this time, I conducted participant observation with several TS-related initiatives and 
attended public events related to technology politics in the city, including the Smart City Expo, 
Mobile Week Barcelona, the Mobile Social Forum, and the Technological Sovereignty Congress 
(SobTec). I participated in several digital forums focused around TS on platforms like Telegram, 
Signal, and Riot. I also conducted more than 20 interviews with individuals involved in TS 
initiatives and collected and analyzed pamphlets, promotional materials, flyers, and other 
documents related to TS. Most interviews were conducted in Catalan, while others were conducted 
in Spanish. Events and meetings were typically conducted in Catalan and Spanish, as well as 
occasionally English. I am fluent in all three languages and all translations throughout the paper 
are my own.  
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1.2 Technological Sovereignty in Barcelona  
The movement for technological sovereignty represents a confluence of multiple historical and 
contemporary influences in Barcelona. The movement partially emerges as a reaction to the 
intensification of capitalist technological development models in the city. Beginning in 2011, then-
Mayor Xavier Trias sought to turn Barcelona into a premier “smart city,” partnering with multi-
national firms like IBM and Cisco to experiment with “smart” technologies for urban management 
(March and Ribera-Fumaz 2016). Barcelona also became the host of the annual Smart City World 
Expo and the Mobile World Congress—holding the title of “Mobile World Capital.”  
 Yet, the city is also home to an extensive activist community that has mobilized in 
opposition to corporate globalization, neoliberalism, and austerity—including the 15M protests 
and occupations of 2011 (Perugorria and Tejerina 2013; Antentas 2013) and the counter-
globalization movement of the late 1990’s and early 2000’s (Juris 2010). The particular 
manifestations of these movements in Barcelona are rooted historically in the city’s anarchist 
movements of the late 19th and early 20th century (Ealham 2010). Barcelona has also been an 
active hub of activity in the Free Knowledge movement (Fuster Morell 2012; Fuster Morell et al 
2015) and hacker movements, and boasts an extensive solidarity economy sector rooted in 
historical traditions of cooperativism in Catalonia (Miro and Fernandez 2016). Finally, the growth 
and evolution of the movement for Catalan independence from Spain has increasingly prompted 
critical debates over the nature of democracy and sovereignty and the failures and abuses of current 
forms of state power and capitalist development (Benitez Romero et al 2017).  
 The TS community is composed of a diverse range of initiatives, from those focused on 
infrastructure, hardware, and software development, to the provision of technical services and the 
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promotion of reuse and recycling (see Figure 1). For instance, Guifinet is a decentralized network 
of community associations and volunteers that build and maintain their own broadband internet 
infrastructure, managing their own servers, laying fiber optic cables, and relaying signals through 
a series of antennas and routers. The network is the largest such “community wireless network” in 
the world, with over 35,000 active nodes. The Things Network (TTN) builds a community-
managed Internet of Things sensor network through the Guifinet infrastructure.  
 Small worker cooperatives—including Jamgo, Colectic, Adab1ts, Dabne, Coopdevs, and 
Lliuretic—develop open-source software and technical services for local businesses, often in the 
broader Solidarity Economy Network. Meanwhile, eReuse and Alencop promote the responsible 
reuse and recycling of digital devices. Other cooperatives in the housing, mobility, food, and 
service sectors experiment with forms of “platform cooperativism” (Scholz 2014)—using open 
source technologies to innovate and coordinate broader cooperative economies. Cooperation 
across these groups is common, pooling resources, skills, and knowledge in pursuit of shared 
projects. Such is the case of the CommonsCloud Alliance in which multiple groups coordinated 
through the cooperative FemProcomuns collaborate to create a commonly-managed cloud 
infrastructure. There are also multiple initiatives focused on community education and training, 
and creating spaces for collective reflection and theorization, as discussed above.  
  
Table 1: TS Initiatives 
Area of Action Groups, Projects, and Initiatives 
Infrastructure and Hardware Guifinet et al, The Things Network, CommonCloud, 
Equipaments Lliures, Mar de Bits, Ateneus de Fabricacio 
Software and Services Coopdevs, Jamgo, Colectic, Adab1ts, Dabne, LliureTIC, 
Barcelona Free Software 
Reuse and Recycling eReuse.org/reutilitza.cat, Alencop 
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Cross-Sector Economic Activity Katuma, SomMobilitat, Riders por Derechos, Voki Voki, 
SomConexio, Pangea, ITC Commission of XES 
Education and Training Colectic, ExO, Ateneus de Fabricacio, La Comunificadora, 
Alencoop, Smart Citizen/DECODE, Smart Barris, 
Universitat Lliure de Sants, Dimmons (Digital Commons 
Research Group, Open University of Barcelona) 
Reflection and Theorization SobTec, Mobile Social Congress, Calafou, La Teixadora, 
Dimmons 
 
 
 
2. Digital Geographies and Alternative Futures 
I situate the following discussion of the TS movement in relation to recent geographic scholarship 
on processes of technological change and the emergence of new digital technologies in urban life. 
I argue that the TS movement demonstrates the possibilities for alternative modes of digital 
development—a topic that has been thus far neglected in most digital geographies literature 
focused on critiques of the dominant model. To think through the possibilities for alternatives, I 
position the TS movement in relation to two existing areas of geographic scholarship: the extensive 
literatures on grassroots, prefigurative urban politics and alternative economies.  
2.1 Digital Geographies and the “Smart City” 
 The past several years have seen the rapid expansion of geographic scholarship focused on 
the proliferation of digital technologies and their widespread impacts across economies, 
governance, social life, and geographic inquiry itself (Ash, Kitchin, and Leszczynski 2018). Much 
of the emergent scholarship in digital geographies has focused on the “smart city”—the increased 
use of complex assemblages of digital infrastructures, data, and algorithms in the governance of 
cities (Kitchin 2015). Scholars have offered careful explanations of the operations and forms of 
agency exercised by increasingly connected, “smart” infrastructures and devices, and their roles 
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in producing urban space (Dodge et al 2009) and delivering vital services (Goldsmith and 
Crawford 2014; Albino et al 2015).  
 Within this literature there have been continual calls to politicize the smart city. 
Geographers have offered insightful critiques the smart city as a techno-capitalist model of 
entrepreneurial urban governance (Wiig 2015; Luque-Ayala and Marvin 2015), and as a new form 
of securitization, surveillance and control (Vanolo 2014; Klauer et al 2014; Leszczynski; Shaw 
2016). Others have examined how digital media and devices “augment” the experience of urban 
spaces, mediating relationships of power (Graham et al 2013). While scholars explore the 
possibilities for “citizen participation” in smart city initiatives, they have often found very limited 
and constrained forms of participation in practice (Tenney and Sieber 2016; Cardullo and Kitchin 
2018), highlighting the ways smart city programs turn political issues of urban governance into 
problems with “technical” solutions. Citizen participation becomes constrained by techno-
solutionist logics. Despite these critiques, there have been fewer attempts to consider what 
alternative, more democratic, and socially-just alternatives might look like.  
 In her critique of this literature, Rose (2017) has argued that most discussions on the 
“digitally-mediated city” have failed to fully theorize posthuman agency, focusing instead on the 
agential capabilities of digital devices and infrastructures. She calls on geographers to “reconfigure 
their understanding of digitally mediated cities and acknowledge both the reinventiveness and the 
diversity of urban posthuman agency” (Rose 2017: 789). By highlighting the possibilities for urban 
residents to enact different forms of “spatial and temporal organization of practices and meanings” 
(Rose 2017: 787), Rose gestures toward to the possibilities for exploring alternative techno-social 
relations in the city. More explicitly, Elwood and Leszczynski (2018: 640) have recently called for 
“feminist digital geographies” to explore the “possibilities of a liberatory digital politics for re-
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making our technologies and ourselves as digital subjects.” Along this vein, I argue that the TS 
movement in Barcelona offers an example of how urban residents can exercise political agency 
through forms of creative experimentation with digital technologies—performing alternative 
economic practices and enacting forms of radical democracy against the “post-political” turn in 
urban governance.  
2.2 Prefigurative Urban Politics and Alternative Economies 
The de-politicization of key aspects of urban life through the implementation of “smart city” 
models is just the latest in a long succession of “post-political” urban policy agendas focused on 
making cities “competitive, global, secure, and sustainable” (Davidson and Iveson 2015: 544). 
MacLeod (2011), Swyngedouw (2011), and others have examined how urban policymaking has 
become increasingly shaped by the production and policing of consensus as opposed to the 
“dissensus” or agonism seen by many as key to robust urban democracy (Staeheli 2010). This 
constructed consensus as to what constitutes good urban governance allows for the rise of 
technocracy—as experts are brought in to implement global “best practices” and the space of 
democratic debate is continually constrained.   
 In opposition to such “post-political” logics, several scholars have recently explored the 
possibilities for enacting radical alternatives—reclaiming the city as the space of democratic 
politics (Iveson 2014; Davidson and Iveson 2015). While some of this literature has examined 
large-scale mobilizations reclaiming urban space for protest (Staeheli 2013), others have focused 
on examples of prefigurative urban politics—enacting the social, political, and economic changes 
the activists wish to see, beyond petitioning the state for rights (Ince 2012). In an historical case 
from the 1970’s, Gray (2017) examines the autonomous Marxist “Take over the City” movements 
in Italy, presenting their direct “territorial autogestion” as a more radical alternative to rights-based 
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discourses. In a similar way, Wanzer-Serrano (2015) examines the case of the Young Lords in 
Spanish Harlem in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, a liberation movement demanding community 
control over local institutions and land. In a more contemporary example, Bunce (2016) describes 
the East London Community Land Trust as a political strategy for challenging capitalist 
development models and creating new “urban commons.” This literature stresses the material and 
spatial relations of the city as key to enacting such alternative futures—reclaiming radical 
democratic control over the common infrastructures on which urban residents depend and the 
common spaces in which they live. In many cities around the world, these common infrastructures 
and spaces are increasingly controlled, augmented, or mediated by digital technologies.  
 Such prefigurative politics have also been at the heart of geographic literature on various 
kinds of “community economies” (Roelvink et al 2015). This work explores the possibilities for 
creating alternative economic practices beyond or in opposition to the hegemonic capitalist order 
(Bauwens 2005; Gibson-Graham 2006; Benkler 2006; Stiegler 2014). Gibson-Graham (2006) 
develop a vocabulary of economic diversity, recognizing the multiplicity of existing and possible 
arrangements for organizing economic activity. Activists around the world have theorized and 
experimented with alternative “solidarity economy” initiatives (Allard and Davidson 2008), while 
scholars across disciplines have examined processes of creating new “commons” (Healy et al 
2018). All of this literature considers how relationships of production, consumption, labor/work, 
and property are reconfigured through experimentation with alternative economic models guided 
by notions of autonomy, solidarity, equality, and care (Diprose 2017). While the “community 
economies” literature in geography has engaged little with the possibilities offered by digital 
technologies, others have examined the alternative models of production and consumption in the 
free software movement (Söderberg 2015) and the broader possibilities for commons-based modes 
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of peer production made possible through the internet (Bauwens 2005; Benkler and Nissenbaum 
2006).  
 Like the movements for radical urban democracy discussed above, diverse economy 
movements contest hegemonic visions of the future and actively work to build alternatives through 
grassroots forms of organization and experimentation. I draw on both bodies of literature in 
approaching the TS movement in Barcelona. I describe the movement as a network of prefigurative 
projects collectively theorizing and experimenting with alternative political economic models of 
digital production and consumption to re-produce and re-make urban life.  
 
3. From Critique to Alternative Digital Futures 
This section describes TS activists’ broad critiques of the hegemonic model of technological 
development, and then examines the production of a discourse around “technological sovereignty” 
as a way of collectively imagining alternative digital futures. 
 
3.1 Critiquing the Techno-Capitalist Order 
 The TS movement is informed by a well-developed critique of techno-capitalism based on 
the lived experiences and observations of Barcelona-based activists. The critiques offered by TS 
activists are not directed at any particular digital technology or set of technologies, but rather at 
the political economic arrangements and techno-social relations within which such technologies 
are produced, proliferated, and utilized in the contemporary conjuncture. Significantly, this 
approach to critique leaves open possibilities for imagining and experimenting with alternatives.  
 TS activists’ critiques can be organized into four related themes: the loss of control over 
technological systems, the exploitative and opaque business models of contemporary techno-
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capitalism, the depoliticization and de-socialization of technological knowledge, the uneven 
geographies of technological development, and the state’s facilitation of increased surveillance. 
All of these critiques are addressed within the broader TS discourse as demonstrated by activist 
Margarita Padilla’s (2017) explanation of the driving questions behind the movement: “the 
question we wish to discuss is who has the power to make decisions about them [technologies], 
about their development, about their use, about access and about distribution, about supply and 
consumption, about the prestige they have and their power to fascinate...” 
 Many TS activists argue that as digital systems become more complex and infiltrate further 
into all aspects of life, the average person has less knowledge of them and thus less ability to exert 
control or make informed decisions about their relationship to them. As TS activist Chris 
(interview, 3 May 2018) explains: “Technology is continually more present, and we are continually 
more dependent on it. You take a cell phone and you can say, ‘I don’t know half of the things it is 
doing, and in two years when I have the next one, I’ll know even less. And it is going to have a 
greater impact on my life.’ And it will get to the point where you have something that you don’t 
recognize, and it is yourself.” This perspective is common across TS activists, who highlight broad 
concerns about losing control over key aspects of everyday life to techno-capitalist firms with 
limited accountability.  
 TS activists take specific issue with the opaque business models of contemporary techno-
capitalism based on the exploitation of personal data and the monitoring, profiling, and 
manipulation of digitally-mediated activities. As one activist explicates: “People use Google and 
Facebook and Twitter, and it is all free. But they don’t realize that if something is free, you are 
probably the product—your data, your information, and your privacy” (interview, 16 February 
2018). The vast majority of technology users lack basic knowledge about what data are collected, 
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how they are used, by whom, and toward what ends, as many of the algorithms that process such 
data are hidden from view, subject to intellectual property protections.   
 Such exploitative practices are also obscured by the discursive privileging and de-
politicization of technological knowledge. TS activists critique the division of knowledge into 
separate social and technological spheres, echoing common calls in scholarly analysis to recognize 
technologies as always situated in socio-technical milieus (Kitchin and Perng, 2016). For instance, 
Nuria explains that “technologies are ways of fulfilling some need or accomplishing something 
you want to do. They can’t be separated somehow from the rest of life” (interview, 21 March 
2018). Margarita Padilla goes further situating technology at the heart of human life: 
“[t]echnology, from fire or flint to the monumental constructions that we use everywhere, almost 
without noticing, is the body of culture. Without technology, there would be no culture” (Hache 
2017, 10). Recognizing this, TS activists reject the discursive framing of technical knowledge as 
a specialized and privileged field of knowledge to which only a select few have access—generally 
wealthy, white, educated men. They critique how this artificial division of knowledge allows for 
the proliferation of a singular narrative about what technology is and projects the future of 
technology as a linear progression of development divorced from broader social systems.  
 This erasure of the social and political nature of technology is also an erasure of spatial 
differences. TS activists highlight the uneven spatial distribution of technological access, 
knowledge, and authority, namely the concentration of authority over technological development 
in the United States, and Silicon Valley in particular. As the world’s largest technology firms are 
located in the United States (and increasingly China), citizens in Barcelona have limited ability to 
interrogate or challenge the practices of companies that control personal data and maintain the 
infrastructures on which daily lives increasingly depend. The loss of basic technical knowledge 
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also contributes to the loss of broader spatial and political knowledges, as the material and spatial 
nature of technological systems are made invisible, fading into what Thrift (2004) calls the 
“technological unconscious.” Irene reflects on this hidden geography: “You hear about the ‘cloud’ 
and people think it is literally up in the air. You send an email and people think it just magically 
arrives on someone else’s computer. You don’t see that these services work through modems and 
servers that are located in particular places” (interview, 16 February 2018).  
 The TS community also critiques the ways corporate technology is increasingly adopted 
by states and municipalities. They point to Barcelona’s own experimentation with “smart city” and 
related programs as projects of surveillance and control that work to depoliticize vital debates over 
urban development processes while privatizing urban data and vital infrastructure. For instance, 
activists have fought against the implementation of T-Mobilitat—a “smartcard” ticketing system 
for public transportation—highlighting concerns about data privacy, the lack of transparency, and 
the privatization of public services. These critiques have been widely echoed by critical 
geographical scholarship on smart city projects.  
 
3.2 Theorizing Technological Sovereignty 
Since around 2014, the notion of “technological sovereignty” has gained influence in Barcelona 
as a way of imagining and building alternatives to the hegemonic model of technological 
development. Since then TS activists have collectively theorized what technological sovereignty 
might look like in practice and how it might be pursued. Like the prefigurative politics of the 
movements discussed above, this theorization is the product of active experimentation and 
reflection. The two dossiers published by the Calafou Post-Capitalist Eco-Industrial District 
develop a theory of “technological sovereignty” based on the experiences of a range of actually-
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existing open-source technology projects from around the world. The community conference 
SobTec creates a space for local initiatives to exchange ideas and reflect on their own practices 
and their politics. Other events like the Solidarity Economy Fair of Catalonia and the Mobile Social 
Congress create spaces for networking and exchange of ideas across open-source, community-
based technology projects, out of which “technological sovereignty” emerges as a common 
organizing concept. As the working product of ongoing processes of collective experimentation 
and reflection, “technological sovereignty” is a concept with multiple meanings that gets taken up 
and enrolled in a variety of projects in different ways. Here, I offer a rough outline of some of the 
common ways TS is understood in Barcelona.  
 For many TS activists, the notion of “sovereignty” has roots in movements for food 
sovereignty, rather than direct claims on state power. In the introduction to the 2014 Soberanía 
Tecnológica dossier, Alex Hache cites the conception of food sovereignty as the basis for 
theorizing technological sovereignty, explaining that the idea was first coined by Via Campesina 
in 1996 to combat discourses of food security. Logics of food security worked to diminish 
community control over vital food systems, through a rationalization and de-socialization of food 
production and close partnerships between corporate food interests and state apparatuses. Food 
production and distribution became a de-politicized ‘technical’ question. This juxtaposition of 
sovereignty to security is key, as many scholars have highlighted the similar logics of securitization 
on which contemporary processes of digitalization are based (Leszczynski, 2016).  
 The TS movement sits in relation to other movements in Barcelona focused on reclaiming 
energy, food, residential, cultural, and health “sovereignties.” The concept of “sovereignties” has 
become an increasingly powerful organizing concept for progressive and radical politics in 
Barcelona and beyond in recent years. The collective authors of Sobiranies [Sovereignties] 
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(Benitez Romero 2017)—affiliated with the left-wing, pro-independence political platform 
Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (CUP)—present the fight for “sovereignties” as processes of 
creating direct democratic control over the vital systems and infrastructures of everyday life. 
Activists argue that these movements are fundamentally about “putting social reproduction under 
democratic control” (Benitez Romero et al 2017, 49) and promote them as a “proposal against 
capitalism” (ibid). In this sense, the notion of “sovereignties” articulates an alternative political 
economic logic and strategy in a similar way to the various alternative economy movements 
discussed above. It calls for fighting ongoing processes of neoliberalization not just by demanding 
changes to state policy, but by building new structures, relationships, and arrangements for 
meeting the population’s needs.  
 Thus, when applied to technology, the idea of sovereignty is about building alternative 
modes of developing, producing, and consuming technologies that are transparent, democratic, 
and work toward the overall goal of meeting community needs and re-producing collective life. 
Additionally, as digital technologies become increasingly important to the management of other 
vital systems—from food systems and health care, to energy and mobility—TS becomes essential 
to re-claiming broader forms of radical democratic control.  
 While existing practices of “open-source” production are important, they do not go far 
enough. Several authors have highlighted the ambiguous politics of the open-source movement, 
and recognize the various ways open-source knowledge gets enclosed, sometimes feeding further 
capital accumulation. Further, the open-source community is rather limited, consisting of generally 
geographically dispersed individuals and groups without strong territorial ties. TS recognizes the 
importance of open-source models, while seeking ways to socialize and territorialize them—
involving a more diverse and inclusive community and using them to transform broader social, 
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political, and economic processes. As one activist commented in 2016: “We cannot rely only on 
five ‘nerds’ if we truly want to transform our relationship to technology and remake our city” 
(fieldnotes, 15 August 2016). In challenging the privileging of “technical” knowledge above social 
knowledges, TS activists also see questions of gender equity and broader questions of social 
equality as key to creating more inclusive, democratic digital systems.  
4. Enacting Alternative Modes of Digital Development 
The remainder of this paper examines the ways Barcelona-based actors work to create an 
alternative model of digital development in practice. I explore TS initiatives’ alternative forms of 
economic organization and then examine how these alternative models rely on everyday practices 
of care. The following section describes how these projects constitute a particularly urban, place-
based politics, presenting the city as a key site from which to enact such alternatives. The final 
section reflects on the role of the progressive municipal government in promoting TS.  
 
4.1 Alternative Digital Economies 
 TS initiatives experiment with alternative economic models, including the collaborative 
model of open-source software production, as well as commons and cooperative-based 
arrangements. These alternative models challenge traditional notions of labor and property, and 
divisions between producers and consumers, while working to democratize technological 
knowledges. 
 Technology workers’ cooperatives, like Colectic and Jamgo, offer alternative models for 
organizing work in the technology sector. While Stiegler (2014) argues that in contemporary 
“cognitive capitalism” so-called “knowledge workers” are increasingly enrolled in complex 
organizational forms that deprive them of knowledge and agency, these cooperatives implement 
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horizontal forms of decision-making for organizing work processes with workers exercising direct 
control over their own knowledge. As a member of one cooperative explains: “We meet in an 
assembly each Friday to organize the work and make decisions. It can be very complicated and we 
do not always agree, but in the end, we come to collective decisions” (interview, 16 March 2018). 
These cooperatives also make collective decisions about the use or investment of the surplus 
generated by their activities. In the case of Colectic, the cooperative offers digital services on the 
local market, the income from which goes to support the cooperatives’ youth social work 
programs—reinvesting in the capacities of the local community.  
 While in cooperatives such work constitutes a form of employment (cooperative self-
employment), in commons-based projects like Guifinet or TTN, “work” is a more diffuse concept. 
Such projects rely on the contributions of a wide array of local actors, from the neighbors who 
install and maintain their own antennas, sensors, or other equipment, to those who coordinate such 
projects in their neighborhoods or experiment with new equipment to improve the common 
infrastructure. This work is typically not remunerated and is instead inspired by a mixture of 
personal enjoyment, political conviction, and care for the broader community.  
 The economic practices also challenge traditional notions of property. Alternative notions 
of property are clear in the free software and free knowledge movements, within which code, 
designs, and other forms of “intellectual property” are shared via the internet, building a digital 
knowledge commons. This model is harnessed by actors in the TS movement, as when the worker 
cooperative Coopdevs uses code from the Open Food Network to develop the application for 
Katuma, a local agricultural consumption cooperative. As Sergi from Coopdevs explains: “we 
developed the application from the Open Food Network, adjusting it for our needs, but we don’t 
own it. We develop it with them, and the cooperative [Katuma] can do what they want with it. 
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They can replace us with other developers and keep using the app. And others can take and use 
and change the app however they want” (interview, 29 January 2018). 
 Notions of property are further challenged by the practices of Guifinet and eReuse. While 
in free software development the “property” in question is intellectual property, and thus easily 
shared via the internet, in these projects property consists largely of material objects and 
infrastructure. In the case of eReuse, electronic devices are managed through “community 
licenses” in which individuals exercise a right to use devices, but are required to adhere to 
particular principles regarding the devices’ reuse and eventual disposal. Such an arrangement 
reconsiders property in its original legal sense, as a bundle of rights over a particular object—
rights that may be selectively restricted or contingent on particular actions.  
  In Guifinet, much of the infrastructure that makes up the network is private property, but 
is offered voluntarily to the common infrastructure, while other pieces of equipment may be owned 
collectively by a local association or the Guifi Foundation. The networked nature of the 
infrastructure means that any individual piece of equipment is reliant on the broader whole. While 
I own my own antenna, router, and cables, they only function if connected to the broader network. 
This co-dependence of the material infrastructures necessarily obscures notions of property. While 
anyone is welcome to withdraw their individually-owned piece of equipment, that equipment loses 
its use-value outside of the broader network. 
 These models also blur divisions between producers and consumers. For instance, in 
GuifiAmunt, the local Guifi association for the neighborhoods of Horta and El Carmel, members 
pay five euros per month to maintain and update the shared infrastructure. Not every member 
actively participates in the maintenance of the infrastructure beyond their own home—either for 
lack of time, desire, or technical knowledge—but there are no distinctions among the association 
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members. All decisions are made by consensus at monthly meetings. While some members may 
have more technical knowledge, or be more involved in the work of the project, they collectively 
decide on updates or changes to the network. In the case of Katuma, the local food cooperative is 
composed of agricultural producers, app developers, and local consumers with decisions made 
collectively among them. Such organizational forms recognize the co-dependent relationship 
between production and consumption and build democratic practices for managing that 
relationship and the various knowledges on which it is based.  
 Yet, these alternative economic practices also face challenges, including limited funding 
and their reliance on volunteer or part-time labor. As many activists point out, the business models 
of companies like Google and Facebook offer high-quality services for free, making profit from 
the exploitation of personal data. It is difficult to convince individuals, small companies, and even 
cooperatives to spend more to invest in open-source, community-based technologies, as the true 
cost of labor, materials, and maintenance of such systems are made invisible in the dominant 
model. Activists admit that the future expansion of technological sovereignty depends on exploring 
new practices and alliances, and building greater awareness of the abuses of the hegemonic model 
within the local community.  
  
4.2 Practices of Care 
 In contrast to the logics of capital accumulation and securitization on which contemporary 
models of “governing through code” (Klauser et al 2014) rely, the TS initiatives are driven by an 
ethics of care. That is, the initiatives are not purely “economic” but are concerned more broadly 
with social development and community wellbeing; or rather, they are “economic” in the word’s 
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original sense of “to take care” (Stiegler 2014). These projects rely on practices of care of 
technological objects and infrastructures, care for others, and care of the self. 
 Many TS initiatives are concerned with the care of technological systems and objects. This 
care is based on a recognition of the growing importance of these systems to everyday life and the 
need to maintain and improve them in order to support their social functions. As one Guifi actor 
explained: “Internet access isn’t a luxury anymore, it’s almost as important as having electricity. 
People rely on it to work, to communicate with family, to manage their money. So, we need the 
network to be reliable” (fieldnotes, 26 June 2016). Recognizing this, Guifi members organize 
themselves to fix technical issues when they arise and to continually improve the infrastructure by 
experimenting with and integrating innovations, like fiber optic cables.  
 This care is based on a rejection of capitalist models of programmed obsolescence and a 
series of practices meant to extend the usable life of devices and systems. eReuse coordinates the 
reuse of devices within communities until all use-value has been depleted, combatting “premature 
recycling” (Franquesa and Navarro 2018). Events like the Mobile Social Congress often include 
“Re-Start Parties” in which activists teach people how to extend the lives of their devices. In 
Guifinet, when one piece of equipment is replaced in order to strengthen the network, the old 
equipment is moved elsewhere in the network where it can take on a new use. The association La 
Mar de Bytes makes use of second-hand and recycled equipment to maintain community-managed 
severs for web-hosting and email. Such practices are based on a commitment to responsibly 
manage collective resources, and a recognition of the social and environmental impacts of e-waste 
and mineral mining in the Global South—issues given special attention at the annual Mobile Social 
Congress.  
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 TS projects are often inspired by a sense of care for others, or care for the community, with 
their primary objective to meet a social need or offer a social service. As such, many projects 
contest constructed divisions between the technical and the social, in which technical knowledge 
is privileged and value neutral. This is clear in cases like Colectic, where the cooperative integrates 
technological work with community-based social work. As cooperative member Nuria explains 
regarding their work with local youth: “Our work is to accompany youth in this process of learning 
about new technologies, so that is it not just ‘connect yourself to internet to watch whatever’ but 
to be critical and aware of how things work, what is happening with their data, and what these 
systems can be used for” (interview, 21 March 2018).   
 The Ateneus de Fabricació carry out similar work, offering public access to 3D printers 
and digital production technology with a focus on social outcomes and shared property. The 
network’s moto, “Let’s materialize ideas, let’s co-create our environment,” is based on an ethic of 
care oriented to the surrounding community and informed by a sense of being-in-common in urban 
space. Director Jordi Reynes explains that the digital production revolution will produce new 
forms of inequality and injustice, unless it is radically socialized. For this reason, the ateneus are 
staffed by both technologists and community organizers, who work to identify community needs, 
and access to the facilities requires some form of service or contribution to the community in 
exchange.  
 Finally, TS initiatives are based around practices of care for the self, in which individuals 
cultivate deliberate and ethical relationships to technology. This is seen in the forms of 
experimentation, self-help, and knowledge-sharing common at weekly Guifilabs. For instance, at 
one event a Guifi contributor explained the process by which he created his own home automation 
system and manages it through an open source platform. Such activities represent forms of 
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technological experimentation with one’s direct living environment while gaining and sharing new 
forms of knowledge. In more everyday examples, for those without formal technical training the 
use of self-help guides to install a Guifi connection involves processes of cultivating oneself as a 
technological subject and reclaiming forms of technical knowledge.  
 Events like SobTec, MSC, and community workshops also offer opportunities for 
individuals to reclaim knowledge and cultivate oneself as a digital subject. Discussions at these 
events focus on critiques of capitalist technological models, how personal data is captured and 
exploited, and the ways these systems produce certain identities and senses of self—interpolating 
subjects as consumers. In a workshop on digital political participation organized by Colectic, the 
facilitators lead group reflections on the kinds of personal data shared online and the multiple ways 
that data is captured, monetized, and exploited. This critique is coupled with an exploration of the 
alternatives produced within the TS community and the ways these alternatives offer greater 
freedom and control over personal data. Participating in these spaces acts as form of cultivating 
new subject positions. These practices continually push back against widespread social and 
cultural conventions that see technology as a specialized sphere of knowledge on which the 
“layperson” majority is not qualified to opine.  
 
4.3 TS and the City 
While TS activists experiment with alternative economic relationships and practices around digital 
technology, they do so from within localized communities. The projects discussed in this paper 
place a great importance on working “from the territory.” This is based on an understanding and 
appreciation of difference across space, and of technology as always entangled in the social and 
thus always spatialized. Yet, these projects are also highly connected and networked to partners, 
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collaborators, and interlocutors around the globe—constituting what Stiegler (2014, 26) calls “the 
inscription of territory in a planetary reticularity.” 
 For instance, the technology/social work cooperative Colectic works specifically in the 
neighborhood of El Raval. As Nuria explains: “Sometimes we are asked to help facilitate some 
community process in another neighborhood, and we have to say no. We can have expertise in 
certain technologies and can maybe help in that area, but we don’t know the community. We don’t 
know their needs or issues. It wouldn’t be appropriate for us to lead a community process like that” 
(interview, 21 March 2018). Likewise, Jordi emphasizes the importance of the public 3D printing 
labs being rooted in “the territory”: “Every neighborhood is different, has its own needs and 
challenges. I can’t sit here in an office and say what will work in each neighborhood. So we have 
had to work from the territory [des del territori] talking to people about what they need and letting 
them lead the process, deciding what role these technologies might play in their lives” (interview, 
25 July 2016).  
 Projects like Guifinet and TTN actively territorialize—building and maintaining material 
infrastructures. In both cases, relationships of proximity and the physical and social characteristics 
of particular spaces dictate if and how the network can be extended. Most Guifinet connections 
are established by antennae relaying a signal from rooftop to rooftop, requiring a line of sight from 
node to node. Take, for instance, one Guifinet member’s reflection on the difficulty of establishing 
connections in the Gothic Quarter of Barcelona: “In the Gothic Quarter it is really hard. It’s almost 
impossible to have a roof with a line of sight to another node because the buildings are so low and 
surrounded by taller ones. It’s dense, so we could run fiber optic cables, but there are so few actual 
residents now, it’s all tourists and short term rentals. There aren’t enough people for it to work.” 
(fieldnotes, 18 January 2018). The project requires working with the complex spatial relations in 
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which one finds oneself, including dealing with neighbors who may be opposed to having an 
antenna on the roof of their building, a rental market that complicates long-term occupancy, and 
the particular characteristics of roofs and the urban landscape. As such, Guifinet is a project of 
actively and deliberately co-producing the space of the city in accordance with the lived realities 
and needs of local residents. Doing so contests the invisibilization of the “technological 
unconscious” and recognizes the increasing importance of spatialized digital infrastructures to 
everyday life.  
 While all of these projects are committed to working locally, many of them are also 
extensively networked beyond the city. The cooperatives discussed above often work in 
collaborative networks with free-software programmers around the world, drawing on and 
contributing to a digital commons of open-source code. Representatives from Guifinet regularly 
work with other groups interested in building their own community-managed infrastructure, such 
as when Guifi participants spent a Guifilab helping the leader of an indigenous community in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon explore the feasibility of building infrastructure to bring internet access to his 
village. The annual Mobile Social Congress includes speakers from around the world—and in 
particular from the Global South—who come to discuss issues of human rights in electronics 
manufacturing, or social and environmental effects of e-waste and mineral mining.  
 Such connections and partnerships demonstrate the potential for alternative modes of 
digital development to be both deeply territorialized and attuned to the needs and conditions of 
particular communities, while also radically open to sharing and exchanging information, 
collaborating on projects, and maintaining extensive networks of solidarity. By working from 
within localized communities and actively reshaping the spaces of the city, the TS movement 
contests hegemonic “smart city” models. Yet, most of these initiatives remain rather small—
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confronting the familiar issues of scale and long-term sustainability explored in much of the 
literature on postcapitalist economies and prefigurative urban politics. For some within the TS 
community, the transformation and democratization of municipal institutions offers one potential 
opportunity to build technological sovereignty on a broader scale.  
 
4.4 Technological Sovereignty and Municipal Government  
 Emerging from a social movement base, Barcelona En Comú (“Barcelona in Common” in 
Catalan) won control of city hall in the 2015 municipal elections, led by housing activist Ada 
Colau. Since then, the municipal administration has embraced discourses of technological 
sovereignty to rethink its existing smart city program. A June 2016 op-ed by Deputy Mayor 
Gerardo Pisarello titled “Ciutats amb Sobirania Tecnològica” (El Periódico, 22 June 2016) calls 
on European cities to reject corporate prescriptions of the smart city in favor of a network of cities 
working toward TS. Meanwhile, Digital Innovation Commissioner Francesca Bria has become an 
active voice for alternative municipal technological models across Europe, leading the production 
of an “Ethical Digital Standards” municipal policy guide (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2018). 
Situated within a broader movement around progressive “municipalism” in Spain and around 
Europe, the Colau government claims the city as the ideal site and scale from which to lead radical 
democratic reforms, including around digital technology.  
 The Barcelona en Comú government has promoted TS through a series of changes to 
municipal practices with an emphasis on free software, open-data, transparency, and citizen 
participation. The administration has begun migrating municipal computer systems away from 
proprietary software packages to open-source alternatives like LibreOffice and Linux-based 
operating systems. This migration has created 100 new permanent paid positions for local citizens 
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with knowledge of open source systems and helps build and promote the broader community of 
open source software in Barcelona and beyond. The administration has also changed municipal 
contracting guidelines to give leverage to local cooperatives and firms based on open-source 
technology and social consciousness, and have implemented programs and subsidies to support 
cooperative and commons-based enterprises.  
 Decidim [We Decide] is a municipal project to create an open-source digital platform for 
citizen participation, in which citizens can make proposals and contribute to the development of 
municipal initiatives. The platform was developed by a broad community of activists and 
technologists and is now used by municipalities, cooperatives, and other organizations across 
Europe. The Ateneus de Fabricació are projects of the municipal government, receiving their 
funding from the city, while several of the collectives discussed above work out of self-managed 
community spaces owned by the municipal government. 
 Municipal support has helped promote TS initiatives and worked to imagine an alternative 
municipal model. Yet, such alliances also bring concerns and limitations. Beyond fears of co-
optation or state surveillance, municipal priorities also change regularly with electoral cycles and 
are limited by the structures of the institutions. As such, despite progressive changes since 2015, 
Barcelona continues to host large corporate technology events and continues to encourage myriad 
forms of investment from large technology firms, reflecting what some activists see as the 
administration’s broader failure to break with the city’s capitalist development model and posit a 
real radical alternative (Delgado 2017). At least some of the shortcomings of the administration 
stem from the lack municipal authority in relation to regional and national governments; while 
Barcelona En Comú’s lack of a majority on the city council further limits their ability to implement 
radical changes. Yet, it is also important to consider the limits of what can be accomplished through 
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current forms of administrative power and the dangers of looking toward that state as a solution. 
Thus, while many projects benefit from municipal programs and many activists see the city as the 
territorial base of digital transformation, most TS initiatives remain autonomous.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has explored the possibilities for alternative modes of digital development in urban life 
through the example of a movement toward “technological sovereignty” in Barcelona—an 
informal network of initiatives experimenting with locally-rooted postcapitalist digital economies. 
This discussion makes several significant contributions to geographic scholarship. First, it moves 
beyond the now well-established critiques of the “smart city” to consider the ways traditions of 
prefigurative urban politics and experiments with postcapitalist economic models may offer 
possibilities for re-thinking digital urban futures. A rejection of contemporary “smart city” 
programs does not need to mean a rejection of digital innovation and development, which instead 
can become loci for imagining and building alternatives. Second, by engaging existing literature 
on urban politics and alternative economies, I highlight the way emerging digital technologies 
open possibilities for pursing different political economic logics and experimenting with 
alternative practices. Digital technologies can facilitate new forms of political organizing and 
democratic decision-making, and can help drive new arrangements of work, property, production, 
and consumption in urban life. Further, by framing technological sovereignty as just one of 
multiple entangled “sovereignties”—conceptualized around food, energy, culture, health, etc.—
the TS movement raises important questions about the complex, entangled, and far-reaching nature 
of ongoing processes of digitalization and the dangers of leaving these processes to capitalist firms.  
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APPENDIX B 
Re-Claiming the Digitally-Mediated City: Spatial Knowledge, Digital Infrastructure, and the 
Work of Amateurs 
***In Review at Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space 
Abstract: This paper examines the practices of Guifinet—a community wireless network in 
Catalonia, Spain. The largest such project in the world, Guifinet actors build and maintain their 
own broadband internet infrastructure through forms of de-centralized grassroots organization and 
experimentation with new digital technologies. I position this discussion in relation to literature on 
the “automatic production of space” (French and Thrift 2002) or the “transduction of space” 
(Kitchin and Dodge 2011), which highlight the agentive capacities of connected infrastructures 
and digital devices to produce and reproduce space. Despite calls to politicize processes of 
digitalization and the broader techno-social relations of the city, how these digital infrastructures 
might be made more democratic, transparent, and “for the people” (French and Thrift 2002) 
remains unclear.  I draw on Bernard Stiegler’s notion of proletarianization as the loss of 
knowledge, to argue that the automatic production of space as it is commonly described functions 
as a proletarianization of space—or the loss of urban residents’ knowledge of the spaces they 
inhabit and help produce. I present Guifinet as a project of spatial “de-proletarianization”—as 
amateur actors re-claim knowledge over the processes of spatial production, and iteratively employ 
that knowledge to remake digital infrastructures.  
Key Words: Urban Space, Digital Infrastructure, Knowledge, Grassroots Organizing 
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1. Introduction 
 In their 2002 article, “The Automatic Production of Space”, Thrift and French argue that 
“software has come to intervene in nearly all aspects of everyday life and has begun to sink into 
its taken-for-granted background” (Thrift and French, 2002: 309). In the conclusion of that article, 
the authors write: “One of the more pressing contemporary political tasks must therefore be to 
design friendlier 'information ecologies' (Nardi and O'Day 1999) that, because of their diversity of 
outcome, will allow us to shape overlapping spatial mosaics in which effective participation is still 
possible and still necessary. Automatic can be for the people” (Thrift and French, 2002: 331 my 
emphasis).  
 Since that time, many scholars have explored how urban space is produced, managed, and 
governed through increasingly complex systems of connected digital devices, sensors, data, and 
software code (Kitchin and Perng, 2016; Leszczynski, 2016; Marvin and Luque-Ayala, 2017; 
Shelton et al, 2015). Particularly influential has been Kitchin and Dodge’s (2005) theorization of 
the “transduction of space”—an ontogenetic theory that highlights the way space is always in the 
process of production, always being brought into being, assisted by assemblages of software, 
hardware, and data.   
 Yet, despite this abundance of scholarship, the question of how such systems might be “for 
the people” remains continually elusive. As Rose (2017) points out, much of this work lacks a 
clear theorization of human agency. Indeed, most accounts of the automatic production of space 
highlight the agentive capacities of technological systems and describe the mostly passive 
interactions of urban residents with these systems. For this reason, I argue that conceptions of the 
automatic production of space have yet to be fully politicized. While scholars have highlighted 
how power operates through such spatialized devices and infrastructures (Graham et al, 2013; 
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Klauser et al, 2014; Vanolo, 2014), and how they create new or reshape existing urban inequalities 
(Gilbert 2010), they have explored less how such relationships between urban residents and digital 
systems may be open to alternative configurations, and thus alternative relationships of power.  
 This article takes up this call by reframing the literature on the automatic production of 
space and the “digitally-mediated city” (Rose 2017) through the lens of Bernard Stiegler’s notion 
of “proletarianization” as the process of losing knowledge. I argue that the increasing governance 
and production of urban space through code, data, and connected infrastructures represents a 
particular form of proletarianization, constituted on urban residents’ loss of spatial knowledge. 
The automation of spatial production relies on the rationalization and control of urban knowledge 
production, through which urban citizens are deprived of basic knowledge of the processes through 
which the spaces they inhabit are produced and governed. Yet, following Stiegler’s conception of 
technology as a pharmakon—as both poison and remedy, and thus requiring care—such 
relationships to technological systems are not inevitable but rather the product of a particular 
grammatology, or spatial and temporal organization of technical objects within broader socio-
technical assemblages. Thus, Stiegler stresses the possibility for processes of de-
proletarianization, constituted as the reclaiming of forms of knowledge, the fomentation of 
individual and collective capabilities, and experimentation with new techno-social practices.  
 To consider the possibilities for such processes of de-proletarianization in relation to the 
production of space, this paper explores the practices of Guifinet, a community-wireless network 
operating across Catalonia, Spain, in order show how they enable—and indeed are dependent 
upon—processes in which urban residents collectively reclaim knowledge of the spaces they 
inhabit and help (re)produce. Guifinet actors build and maintain community-managed broadband 
infrastructure. These practices are dependent upon multiple forms of iterative technological 
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knowledge production and application, as actors build, maintain, and experiment with different 
aspects of the common digital infrastructure. Yet, this technological knowledge is always 
embedded and entangled in the broader socio-spatial relations of the city, involving not just 
knowledge of technological systems, but also over political, social, and economic processes of 
urban change.  
 In exploring how Guifinet actors produce and utilize complex, entangled spatial 
knowledges to build and maintain their own urban digital infrastructure, I build on previous work 
by Powell (2008; 2016), Leontidou (2015), and Corsin Jimenez (2014) who draw attention to the 
practices of informal grassroots techno-social projects as representative of different models of 
human-technological relations in contemporary cities. I also take up Elwood and Leszczynski’s 
(2018) call for a feminist digital geography “empirically grappling with the complexities of the 
significance and implications of digital technologies in the daily lives of actual people,” leading 
toward the “possibilities of a liberatory digital politics for re-making our technologies and 
ourselves as digital subjects” (p. 639-640). 
 Below, I briefly discuss my methods and then introduce Guifinet and situate it in 
contemporary urban techno-politics in Barcelona. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the 
automatic production of space and the digitally-mediated city, and then reframes these 
conversations through the lens of Stiegler’s notion of proletarianization before turning to the 
possibilities for de-proletarianization, highlighting the role of amateurs. Section 3 discusses the 
processes of amateur “technological” knowledge production and sharing within the Guifinet 
project. Finally, Section 4 explores how these forms of amateur “technological” knowledge are 
spatialized and entangled in the broader techno-social relations of the city. Through this, I examine 
the ways knowledge of urban space is re-claimed and shared through such projects, and how that 
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knowledge is put to use in re-shaping urban spaces and infrastructures according to alternative, 
radically-democratic logics.  
1.1 Methods 
  The discussion of Guifinet is based on more than a year of ethnographic fieldwork carried 
out in Barcelona over several periods between 2016 and 2018. During this time, I attended 
meetings and workshops, participated in online forums and group chats around the project, and 
conducted 20 key informant interviews with individuals associated with Guifinet and a broader 
movement around “technological sovereignty” (hereafter, “TS”) in Barcelona. I also installed a 
Guifinet node in my own home and joined the local Guifinet association for the El Carmel and 
Horta neighborhoods of Barcelona. Further, I examined a series of self-help documents and 
YouTube videos produced within the Guifi community to instruct others about how to install their 
own nodes, or troubleshoot problems with existing nodes. Throughout this time, I kept detailed 
fieldnotes about my experiences, observations, and interactions with others involved in Guifinet 
and the broader TS community.  
1.2 Situating Guifinet 
 Guifinet is the largest community wireless network (CWN) in the world with over 35,000 
active nodes as of 2018, spanning across Catalonia and reaching into other regions around Spain. 
While there are multiple approaches to CWN’s, in general such projects work to build and maintain 
internet connections through community-managed infrastructures—often relaying and sharing 
wireless signals through rooftop antennas (Jungnickel 2014; Cardullo 2017; Powell 2008). Begun 
in the early 2000’s as a way to bring internet services to towns and villages outside the 
infrastructural range of private Internet Service Providers (ISPs), Guifinet has grown and adapted 
over the years fueled by a combination of political principle and necessity. Many Guifinet 
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supporters believe that internet access is a vital aspect of contemporary life and should not be left 
in the hands of for-profit private enterprises—highlighting abusive business practices, cooperation 
between ISP’s and governments for surveillance, and concerns about the future loss of net 
neutrality.  
 Guifinet functions through ad hoc, decentralized forms of territorial organization. 
Generally, each active neighborhood, town, or village has its own autonomous Guifi association 
that organizes the building, maintenance, and expansion of a common broadband internet 
infrastructure. Guifinet associations manage their own servers, lay fiber optic cables, and relay 
internet connections through rooftop antennas (Figure 1; Figure 2) to deliver internet access to 
individual homes, community centers, public spaces, or local businesses. Local associations decide 
how to pool resources, designate work tasks, and coordinate or cooperate with other Guifi 
associations, neighborhood associations, non-profits, and local governments in order to support 
the network.  Larger foundations or associations, like the FundacioGuifi or eXo work to coordinate 
and represent the broader network at the city and regional levels. Beyond basic broadband internet 
access, Guifinet has begun expanding their work into the realm of the Internet of Things (IoT), 
sponsoring research into DIY, open-source home automation technology, known as CanGuifi, and 
partnering with The Things Network-Catalonia, a local branch of an international association 
devoted to open source IoT sensing with a focus on addressing social concerns.  
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Figure 1: A “supernode” antenna relaying a wireless internet signal to individual nodes.  
 
          
Figure 2: An individual "node" or connection point receiving a signal from a supernode. 
 
2. The Digitally-Mediated City and the (de-)Proletarianization of Space 
  Before addressing the practices of Guifinet in more detail in the following sections, I first 
review the existing literature on the emergence of the digitally-mediated city and the automatic 
production of space, highlighting the lack of discussion around possible alternatives to hegemonic 
state and capital-led processes. I then reframe this literature through the lens of Stiegler’s 
understanding of proletarianization, arguing that common trajectories of urban digitalization often 
constitute processes of spatial proletarianization—or the loss of spatial knowledge. Finally, I 
examine Stiegler’s call for processes of de-proletarianization and highlight some existing literature 
in geography and urban studies that point to those possibilities.  
 105 
2.1 The Automatic Production of Space and the Digitally-Mediated City 
 Writing in 2002, Thrift and French explored the multiple spaces in which software had 
begun to be deployed in everyday life—highlighting the growing role of software in cars, 
elevators, mobile phones, and the emergence of “wearables”. They argue that these devices play 
increasingly important roles in producing space, and highlight the political implications of these 
developments, writing that “software challenges us to understand new forms of technological 
politics and new practices of political invention, legibility and intervention that we are only just 
beginning to comprehend as political at all” (Thrift and French, 2002: 331).  
 Kitchin and Dodge (2005) build on Thrift and French’s insights in their theory of the 
“transduction of space.” They explore the nature of code, through a discussion of coded objects, 
coded infrastructures, coded processes, and finally coded assemblages—composed of complexly 
interdependent and entwined objects, infrastructures, and processes. The authors argue that “the 
power of these assemblages is their interconnection and interdependence, creating systems whose 
complexity and power are much greater than the sum of their parts” (Kitchin and Dodge, 2005: 
164). They conclude that “code, to varying degrees, conditions existence” (ibid.).  
 Based on this understanding of the role of coded assemblages in everyday life and spaces, 
Kitchin and Dodge explain the transduction of space as an ontogenetic theory of space, in which 
such everyday processes are understood to actively bring space into being. Kitchin and Dodge 
(2005: 174 my emphasis) argue that: 
 this conceptualization of space as an ontogenetic, collaborative manufacture does not 
 deny the salience of structural forces such as political economy or capitalism or 
 neoliberalism or institutional structures such as the state and its agencies; rather, it 
 refigures all of these elements as sets of ongoing, relational, and contingent discursive 
 and material practices that are citational and transformative. These practices, too, are in a 
 state of ontogenesis, always  being remade in ongoing processes, and inducing 
 transductions in collective life. These structures do not sit outside of collective life, but 
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 are (re)made through its performance, providing citational context at the same time that 
 they are perpetuated.  
Referencing Butler’s performativity, the authors see the processes by which space is transduced 
through code to be largely unconscious, as the repetition of particular processes and relations come 
to seem natural and thus taken-for-granted. As they “fade into the background,” these vast material 
assemblages that significantly shape everyday life have been described as the “technological 
unconscious” (Clough 2000; Thrift, 2004)—only becoming visible when they stop working as 
intended. Yet, significantly, an ontogenetic, performative understanding of space precisely opens 
the possibility to remake space through alternative practices and performances.  
 Scholars have explored in depth how such processes of technologizing urban space have 
accelerated in recent years with the emergence of so-called “smart city” development models, 
based primarily on the extensive rationalization of urban processes through the implementation of 
connected sensor networks and the collection and analysis of data (Crang and Graham 2007; 
Kitchin and Perng 2016; Batty, 2013). They have considered the ways the proliferation of screens 
and new forms of visualization, environmental sensors, and other coded infrastructures re-
configure spatial relations in efforts to further rationalize urban processes and securitize urban 
futures. Scholars and urban residents alike have critiqued these models for implementing new 
forms of technocratic governance with limited democratic oversight (Lesczcynski, 2016; Gabrys, 
2014; Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2015; March and Ribera-Fumaz, 2016).  
 Others have critiqued such programs for privatizing vital aspects of urban government, or 
have highlighted their role within broader processes of capitalist development and evolving forms 
of entrepreneurial urbanism (Söderström et al 2014; Wiig 2015). For instance, Marvin and Luque-
Ayala (2017) trace the emergence of Urban Operating Systems, showing how particular forms of 
knowledge production about the city become organized and concentrated in the hands of corporate 
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capital. Within this critique, they point to emerging forms of control, writing: “Underpinned by 
modularity, transferability and an alleged flexibility, this diagrammatic of control is based on 
functional simplification and selective integration. It implies the establishment of narrow channels 
for knowledge circulation alongside specific forms of decision making” (p. 90). The development 
of digital infrastructures in the city is used to rationalize and control processes of spatial knowledge 
production—channeling that knowledge into tightly controlled processes of urban governance.  
 Yet, despite these many critiques and the acknowledgement that that production of space 
through code is an ongoing, contingent, and performative process, there is little engagement with 
how those processes might be performatively contested or re-made differently. As a response to 
the numerous critiques of smart city development models, companies and municipal governments 
have begun calling for “citizen-centered” approaches to the smart city, usually through 
experiments with civic hackathons, living labs, and other forms of citizen participation. Yet, the 
models of “participation” around which such smart city revisions have been based have tended to 
lack a radical democratic impulse and reinforce existing logics and relationships of power (Tenney 
and Sieber 2016). In attempting to classify different models of citizen participation in smart city 
programs, Cardullo and Kitchin (2018) argue that the majority of participatory approaches rely on 
neoliberal conceptions of citizenship, focused on market-led solutions and a sense of individual 
responsibility. Cardullo et al (2018) highlight a similar occurrence in the case of “living labs” and 
civic hacking initiatives, finding that they rely on paternalistic relationships and are narrowly 
framed within projects of neoliberal urban transformation. In these cases of “participation,” 
citizens are enrolled to produce knowledge for use in the existing structures of neoliberal urban 
governance. They do not gain and employ that knowledge themselves to exercise new forms of 
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control over the spaces in which they live—but become enrolled in broader, rationalized, and 
controlled socio-technical assemblages.  
2.2 The Proletarianization of the Urban Citizen and the Loss of Spatial Knowledge 
 Reflecting on this vast literature around the digitalization of urban space, I argue that many 
of the processes and cases described in the literature could be understood as a particular form of 
proletarianization—the proletarianization of the urban citizen, constituted on the loss of spatial 
knowledge. Stiegler’s critique of political economy revises Marx’s notion of proletarianization—
framing it as a “process of losing knowledge” (Stiegler 2010, 38) facilitated by a particular 
“grammatizations” of technology in social, political, and economic life.   
 In Stiegler’s use of the term “proletarianization”, the process described by Marx as the 
devaluation of labor through the organization and integration of machines and workers’ bodies in 
the production process represents just one form of proletarianization constituted by workers’ loss 
of savoir-faire, or knowledge of production. Stiegler (2010) describes further processes of 
“cognitive and affective proletarianization” (p. 30) constituted by the proletarianization of 
consumption—or knowledge of ways of living—and of theoretical knowledge. Drawing on 
Deleuze’s (1992) “Postscript on Societies of Control,” Stiegler (2010) sees the proletarianization 
of consumption in the increased use of media technologies in the 20th century to capture attention 
and occupy available brain-time. The integration of new technologies in consumption and leisure-
time under contemporary capitalism works to control populations and deprive individuals and 
collectives of savoir-vivre or “knowledge of living.” A third phase of proletarianization is 
constituted by the loss of theoretical knowledge, given over to calculation and algorithmic 
decision-making in the ongoing era of “cognitive capitalism.” In this phase, the creative and critical 
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capacities of designers and “knowledge workers” are short-circuited and integrated into 
increasingly complex socio-technical milieus of which they have limited knowledge and authority.  
 These processes of proletarianization are thus the product of ongoing processes of techno-
capitalist development, in which technologies are enrolled in complex assemblages that work to 
rationalize and control. Through this, individuals and communities are systematically deprived of 
essential knowledges, including knowledge of how technologies work, how they affect and 
influence people’s lives and actions, and the knowledge needed to understand and critically 
analyze the complex systems in which one lives.  
 Approaching the digitally-mediated city through this lens, I argue that many of the insights 
and arguments put forward in the literature demonstrate how key forms of spatial knowledge are 
lost to most urban citizens with the implementation of new digital infrastructures. Much like the 
use of technology in industrial production processes, the control of leisure time, and increasingly 
in processes of complex decision-making and “knowledge work”, digital technologies are 
increasingly used to rationalize and control the production of urban space.  Marvin and Luque-
Ayala’s (2017) previously mentioned work on Urban Operating Systems for instance, highlights 
the ways such projects create “narrow channels of knowledge circulation.” Rose’s (2017) critique 
of work on the digitally-mediating city for undertheorizing forms of posthuman agency also 
highlights the ways knowledge production is seen to take place increasingly within the confines 
of technological systems—one in which human actors are present, but are not seen as key actors. 
Rather than see this as a failure of smart city scholarship, this focus on the agency of technological 
systems over that of “human” actors could be understood as reflective of the processes of 
proletarianization at work—as the spaces for critical human action within such systems become 
increasingly constrained. Finally, the many critiques of smart city projects as technocratic (Kitchin 
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2014) and the calls for creating more spaces for “citizen participation” (Cardullo and Kitchin 2018) 
are clear reflections of this process of proletarianization—as urban residents lose essential forms 
of knowledge and thus decision-making power over urban processes with the integration of new 
digital infrastructures.   
2.3 De-Proletarianizing Spatial Knowledge in the Digitally-Mediated City 
 Yet, significantly, Stiegler argues that proletarianization is not somehow the inevitable 
consequence of technological development, but rather is produced by a particular 
grammatization—a particular relationship to technology and logic of organization that deprives 
individuals of knowledge and subjects them to the logic of a hegemonic system. As such, socio-
technical relations are always open to processes of re-invention, or re-organization. Describing the 
possibilities for “de-proletarianization”, Stiegler calls for processes of reclaiming knowledge, 
gaining new capabilities, and experimenting with new forms of socio-technical organization, 
highlighting the figure of the amateur. As Dillet (2017) explains: “For Stiegler, the amateur is a 
revolutionary agent, since in the age of generalized proletarianization and surplus population, and 
far from representing the public at large or the consumer in the ‘sharing economy,’ the amateur is 
an active participant in social circles, a producer of new practices, new discourses and artefacts.”  
 In her engagement with Steigler, Rose (2017) offers a theoretical approach to posthuman 
agency in the digitally-mediated city based around processes of reinvention with technological 
objects and systems. She highlights the ways urban residents differentially interact with and make 
use of urban technologies in their daily lives, enacting different spatialities and temporalities. Rose 
(2017) describes these enactments as “embodied practices through which posthumans watch, 
touch, learn, think, hear, move, and gesture, in streets, squares, parks, and workplaces, mimicking, 
recombining, and reinventing” (p. 786). While Rose focuses primarily on the ability of urban 
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residents to differentially make use of and interact with digital devices and other technologies, I 
argue that her theorization of posthuman agency is also useful for thinking through the possibilities 
for more direct actions focused on challenging control over the infrastructures and devices 
themselves and experimenting with more radically alternative forms of spatial and temporal 
organization.  
 In thinking through the possibilities for processes of de-proletarianization, I build on the 
work of several authors who have written about similar grassroots techno-social projects, arguing 
that they offer examples of alternative, more radically-democratic models of urban technological 
development in opposition to capitalist regimes of property, efficiency, and security (Powell 2008 
and 2016; Leontidou 2015, Corsin Jimenez 2014). Corsin Jimenez (2014) examines the 
development of open source infrastructure and hardware through the project Inteligencias 
Colectivas, coordinated through Zoohaus, a guerrilla architecture collective based in Madrid, 
Spain. The author highlights how the project claims a “right to infrastructure” through processes 
of documenting and sharing knowledge about practices of actively producing one’s own urban 
spaces—drawing inspiration from practices of urban informality in the global South. In a related 
move, Leontidou (2015) reflects on the case of Athens and the ways highly-educated, un- or under-
employed youth in the context of a retrenched crisis of the capitalist economy pursue projects of 
“grassroots creativity” that stand to challenge hegemonic notions of the “smart city.” Such cases 
compellingly demonstrate Rose’s (2017) notion of posthuman agency in the digitally-mediated 
city as a process of reinvention with technological assemblages, rather than a rejection of or 
resistance against their agentive capacities.  They also demonstrate the way these forms of radical 
reinvention rely on practices of amateur knowledge production and sharing that make visible the 
forms of power and knowledge on which processes of urban change rely.   
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3. Producing and Sharing Technological Knowledge  
 As urban space and everyday life become increasingly dependent on digital technologies 
and infrastructures, re-claiming spatial knowledge and thus control over processes of spatial 
production depends on the democratization of “technological” knowledge. Guifinet works to make 
technological knowledge accessible and meaningful to a broader public across Barcelona and 
Catalonia. One way they do this is through a series of self-help guides and videos explaining basic 
aspects of network technology and how to complete basic tasks in setting up a node or 
troubleshooting connectivity issues. Further, at weekly “guifilabs” in Barcelona, speakers 
frequently give presentations explaining key technical aspects of the Guifinet project. Beyond this, 
some Guifi actors conduct new experiments in open-source technology for use in the broader 
community. In this section, I focus on three examples of amateur technological knowledge sharing. 
I first focus on the DIY guide for installing a Guifinet node in the El Carmel and Horta 
neighborhoods. I then examine a Guifilab presentation in which the speaker explained the 
electromagnetic spectrum and its importance to Guifinet activities. Finally, I discuss the Can Guifi 
project, an experiment in DIY, open-source home automation. Across these examples, I highlight 
the way “technological” knowledge is produced and shared in the community, and how that 
knowledge is embedded in local contexts and entangled in broader socio-spatial knowledges. This 
represents a radically different model to the “functional simplification” and “narrow channels of 
knowledge production” (Marvin and Luque-Ayala 2017: 90) on which “smart city” and related 
models are based.  
 
3.1 Do-It-Yourself Install Guides 
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 The Guifi community makes use of Do-It-Yourself (DIY) guides for a number of purposes, 
including giving instructions for setting up a new node in the Guifi network and for troubleshooting 
common connectivity issues. Many versions of these guides exist, as they are frequently updated 
to reflect changes in the network, and as each decentralized Guifi association is organized slightly 
differently. In September 2017, I used one of these DIY guides to set up a Guifi node in my own 
home in Horta, a neighborhood on the outskirts of Barcelona. The guide I used, while similar to 
other available guides in the broader Guifi community, was prepared specifically by and for 
members of GuifiAmunt—the Guifi association for the neighborhoods of El Carmel and Horta.  
 Before using the guide, I contacted one of the local organizers and explained that I wanted 
to connect to the shared network. We met up in local plaza to discuss the matter and he explained 
to me roughly how the network is set up in the neighborhood. They have three main 
“supernodes”—or main network relay points—to which the individual nodes are connected 
(Figure 6). In order to connect, I needed to find a place—typically on the roof although sometimes 
on a balcony or terrace—from which an antenna would have a direct line of sight to one of the 
supernodes. Later that evening, I texted him a panoramic photo from my terrace and he sent the 
photo back with a box indicating where the closest supernode is located (Figure 7). He then sent 
me the guide for setting up a node and told me what kind of hardware I would need, in this case a 
Mikrotik Routerboard SXT 5HnD—a small antenna compatible with the existing infrastructure, 
costing around 60 euros—a 10-meter-long Ethernet cable, an extension cord, and a wireless router. 
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If I needed assistance, he gave me contact numbers of several other local experienced members 
who might be able to help.  
 
Figure 3: A conceptual map of the local Guifi network in the El Carmel, Horta, and Montbau neighborhoods. Showing 
"supernode" connections in green and individual nodes in blue. CREDIT: GuifiAmunt. 
 
 
Figure 4: View from my terrace in Barcelona with the location of the Rembrandt supernode marked with a yellow 
box. 
  
 The guide, written in Catalan, is simply titled “How to create a username, node, device, 
connect and configure the antenna and the proxy” and is divided into seven main steps, plus an 
“Annex” answering common questions, like “What is an IP address?” and “What is a MAC 
address?” The guide offers step-by-step instructions and explanations from creating an account 
and registering a node within the broader Guifi platform, to setting up and configuring the antenna 
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and connecting to the internet through a proxy. One of the primary steps involves adding the new 
node within the Guifinet map (Figure 8, Figure 9), including adding latitude and longitude and the 
approximate height of the antenna above street level, and then designating to which supernode it 
will connect. Based on the information entered about the new node, the system then models its 
spatial relation to other nodes and supernodes in the area—showing distance, height difference, 
strength of signal, and any potential interference or obstacle between the nodes. While this system 
is meant to assess the feasibility of a potential connection between two nodes, the guide also 
instructs the user to conduct a real-life test—setting up the antenna and testing its connection to 
surrounding nodes. Once this connection is defined in the Guifinet system, the guide instructs the 
user to enter information about the particular antenna or other hardware being used. It also explains 
why this information is needed and where it can be found on the antenna itself or its accompanying 
materials.  
 
Figure 5: Map of Guifinet nodes. Screenshot from https://guifi.net/ca/node/2413/view/map (accessed 27 February 
2019) 
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Figure 6: Guifinet map zoomed in to the Horta neighborhood. Screenshot taken from 
https://guifi.net/ca/node/2413/view/map (Accessed 27 Feburary 2019). 
 
 Another of the primary steps focuses on configuring the antenna to complete the connection 
to the supernode. The guide walks the user through accessing the operating system of the antenna, 
scanning for possible connections, finding and selecting the correct signal, and entering the needed 
information to establish a connection—including IP addresses for the supernode and the local Guifi 
Domain Name Servers (DNS). The user is then instructed to test the connection by opening a 
systems window and “pinging” the IP address of the supernode. Once this is done, the guide gives 
instructions for how to connect to the internet through a proxy. Most of Guifi infrastructure 
functions as a private network. The user must then connect to the internet through a proxy—one 
of the Guifi nodes with a direct internet connection. The guide explains how to enter the Internet 
configuration options in Windows, Apple, and Ubuntu operating systems and where to enter the 
IP address of the proxy connection, in this case for a supernode named BCNLorda17. With this 
completed, the antenna should be connected to the local Guifi network, and through it to the 
 117 
internet. The user can then connect the antenna to a wireless router using a standard Ethernet cable 
and configure the router to supply wireless internet access to a given flat or space.  
 In following these instructions, the user learns step-by-step the basics of wireless 
networking, including its reliance on particular sets of material infrastructures, their spatial 
relations, and the protocols through which connections are created. The user is also able to see 
how they fit within the broader network—which other nodes exist, how they connect to each other, 
and what roles each play as end-point connections or as relay points between nodes. This 
experience, facilitated by the DIY connection guide, allows Guifinet users to gain key knowledge 
about the infrastructures they rely upon—including how it works, who builds and maintains it, and 
how it is spatially situated within their lives. This experience contrasts more typical examples of 
urban digital infrastructures in which the vast majority of residents have exceedingly limited access 
to knowledge about how they work, what they do, who controls them, or even where they are 
located. Further, while the ubiquity of internet connectivity has been argued to create new forms 
of spatial displacement—as users interact with others and access information in faraway places—
the process of setting up one’s own internet connection makes exceedingly visible the local socio-
spatial relations on which such connections always rely, even when supplied by a private Internet 
Service Provider.  
 
3.2 Guifilab 
 In September 2017, I attended a guifilab meeting held at the Can Felipa community center 
in the Poblenou neighborhood of Barcelona. This particular guifilab featured a formal presentation 
titled “Radio Communications and the Regulation of the Spectrum.” The presenter, an experienced 
Guifi member, aimed to give the audience a basic understanding of the electromagnetic spectrum 
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(EMS), how it is regulated, and its importance to Guifinet activities. Through this, he also 
explained the various ways Guifi associations build internet infrastructure and their relative pros 
and cons.  
 The speaker, Joan, started with the very basics, explaining the difference in wavelengths, 
from radio waves to gamma rays. The waves used to transmit information through guifi and other 
wireless networks are radio waves, on the larger side of the spectrum. Smaller wavelengths, like 
gamma rays, can be harmful to human health, while the longer wavelengths are not. Joan stressed 
this point at several moments throughout the presentation, seemingly because it is a question often 
raised by neighbors and others who are concerned about Guifinet projects in their building or 
neighborhood, fearing it may have negative health effects. Joan explains how questions of power 
and frequency affect which kinds of antennas Guifi projects use, with longer wavelengths requiring 
larger antennas. He also explains that communications of the same wavelength can interfere with 
one another, and that as the waves are transmitted through the air they can face interference from 
other environmental factors. The benefit of fiber optic cable is that the communication is contained 
within the cable and thus faces less interference and no conflicts with other waves. Fiber optics 
basically allows more channels of communication to be open at one time. While Guifinet projects 
do make use of fiber optics for this reason, it is not currently a feasible option for most of the Guifi 
network.  
 Joan then moved into a section titled “Who controls the waves?” in which he explained the 
different regulations and regulatory relationships around radiowaves. He mentioned the 
International Telecommunication Union, which divides the world into 3 regions—essentially, the 
Americas, Asia, and Europe/Middle East/Africa—each with a distinct allocation of radio wave 
frequencies. Within the EU, the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications 
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Administrations creates common directives for the management and allocation of radio waves, and 
national regulations in Spain are managed by the Ministry of Industry, Tourism, and Commerce.  
 The Ley General de Telecomunicaciones (or General Law of Telecommunications) sets 
regulations nationally, with Article 5 allocating different frequencies to different uses, including 
set frequencies for the “public domain” including “commons,” “special,” and “private” uses. 
Article 11 further explains the common use of the public spectrum. Joan explained to the audience 
that the other frequencies are privately held or otherwise reserved. Access to these frequencies and 
the hardware needed to make use of them is very expensive, whereas Guifi relies on the use of the 
public domain as a “commons.” The limitation of this is that it is a finite and shared resource. Joan 
uses the example of water to demonstrate, drawing a comparison between public domain 
frequencies and a well in a small village. If everyone uses too much, the resource becomes strained. 
It thus needs common management and protection against unnecessary or wasteful use. Joan ended 
his talk with a discussion of different kinds of antennas used in Guifi projects and what their power 
and frequency settings mean for the practical task of building new infrastructure.  
 This event demonstrates another way that Guifinet members work to spread and share basic 
technological knowledge in order to encourage amateur technological practices in the city. While 
detailed knowledge of the EMS is probably not necessary to carry out basic tasks in Guifinet 
projects, understanding it and how it is regulated is useful for making informed decisions about 
future infrastructure extensions or upgrades, for ensuring Guifi activities stay within legal uses of 
the public domain spectrum, and for reflecting on the EMS as a shared resource whose use is 
shaped by numerous limitations and relationships of power and access. This knowledge is also 
useful for assuring neighbors and others who might have concerns about risks associated with 
radio waves. Such practices share technological knowledge necessary for producing and 
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maintaining digital infrastructure while embedding that technological knowledge in its broader 
legal, political, social, and spatial entanglements.  
 
3.3 CanGuifi 
 In May 2018, I attended a Guifilab in the Raval neighborhood of Barcelona. At this 
particular meeting, two Guifi members presented their work on the project CanGuifi, an 
experiment with an open-source DIY Internet of Things (IoT) sensing network designed to monitor 
home electricity use as part of project to fight energy poverty and the abuses of private energy 
companies. The project sought to develop the assemblage of hardware, software, and protocols 
need to carry out the project, but was driven by specific social and political concerns with the 
current hegemonic model of technological development in the city. As the project’s public 
materials explain: “Can Guifi is the exploration of next generation networked services to address 
the inequalities that the same technologies and infrastructures produce when they are managed in 
a monopolistic manner.” Can Guifi was thus inspired by a recognition of the way connected 
infrastructures are often used to spearhead increasingly exploitative business practices by private 
firms, in this case the increasing use of “smart meters” by private energy companies to create new 
pricing schemes and new forms of control and monitoring of individual energy use patterns.  
 The project was led by Guifinet members with supporting funds from the Barcelona 
municipal government and all of the materials from the project were made freely available online 
so they could be used and experimented with elsewhere. The project built on other ongoing 
experiments around the city with open-source DIY sensing technology. At a guifilab meeting in 
September 2017, a member presented about his own personal experimentation with an open-
source, DIY home automation system. At the same time, another local group known as The Things 
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Network (TTN) began a partnership with Guifinet in 2017 to experiment with a series of LoRa 
(long range) antennas to carry out a DIY sensing project around the city.  
 Beyond experimenting with the particular technical apparatuses needed to carry out the 
project, Can Guifi also acted as an important opportunity to think through important questions 
around new “smart” technologies, including questions of data privacy and ownership. As a DIY 
project, these questions are ones that require collective reflection and debate, reconciling values 
and political commitments with the design, capabilities, and flexibility of technological systems. 
In developing this technology, project leaders hoped to form new partnerships with other local 
groups fighting energy poverty and with groups like SomEnergia, a local renewable energy 
cooperative with close to 40,000 members.  
 This project aimed to produce and spread multiple forms of knowledge. First, it produced 
new technological knowledge about how to produce low-cost, easy to use home sensing systems, 
and made that knowledge available to a broader public through public presentations, experiments 
in particular buildings around the city, and by sharing plans and information through digital 
networks. This aimed to give people greater knowledge about the technical devices increasingly 
spreading into new domains and spaces of everyday life. Second, the final product of Can Guifi is 
meant to give individuals and communities greater knowledge over how their energy systems work 
and their relationships to energy providers. This new knowledge holds the potential to inspire new 
counter-hegemonic practices. It could drive new membership and participation in existing 
renewable energy cooperatives; or, as one Guifilab attendee suggested, neighbors could create new 
forms of collective consumption by replacing individual energy meters with community energy 
meters, allowing communities to collectively control and manage their own energy consumption. 
In this way, Can Guifi is not a purely “technological” project, but one focused on creating new 
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kinds of social and economic relations, a fact most clearly articulated by the project’s coinage of 
the term Internet of People (IoP) instead of Internet of Things (IoT).  
 
4. Techno-Social Entanglements and the Production of Spatial Knowledge 
 Approaching Guifinet as an example of spatial de-proletarianization, I highlight the 
essential role of knowledge production and sharing in the success of Guifinet’s activities, and the 
way these knowledges cut across any neatly defined boundaries between technological and social 
knowledges. These forms of knowledge fuel the production of alternative urban infrastructures 
that are controlled collectively and cooperatively by their users. While these self-help guides 
discussed above lay out the basic technological features of the network, they themselves are only 
a small part of the process of building and maintaining the infrastructure, which requires that 
Guifinet members navigate complex social-spatial environments and form community 
partnerships and individual social relationships. To demonstrate this, I divide this section in two 
parts, one describing the successful installation of new Guifi infrastructure, and another describing 
a case in which multiple complications and challenges prevented the extension of the Guifi 
network.  
4.1 Maintaining and Improving the infrastructure of GuifiAmunt 
 Beyond connecting new nodes to the Guifi network, individual local Guifi associations 
organize to maintain, expand, and improve the shared infrastructure in their area. While individual 
members typically buy their own household antennas and routers, the network also relies on a 
variety of other shared hardware—like network switches, servers, and larger antennas for use at 
supernodes—as well as cables, extension cords, and protective cases, among other materials. As 
these pieces of hardware age, become damaged or outdated, they periodically need to be replaced 
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or updated. Likewise, as the network takes on new users or expands into new areas of the 
neighborhood, new hardware may be needed to create a new supernode or to handle increased 
traffic. These materials represent the shared costs to maintaining and expanding the network.  
 While each association handles these costs differently, in the case of GuifiAmunt, 
association members pay five euros per month toward a common fund that can then be used to 
purchase new hardware and other necessary supplies. Major decisions about when and how to 
update or expand existing shared infrastructure are made collectively at monthly association 
meetings, while members use a group Telegram chat to communicate about the everyday needs of 
the network. As a member of the association, I regularly attended these meetings and participated 
in the group chat. During this time, there were a series of issues that had to be navigated and 
resolved in the network—these issues demonstrate the complex, spatialized, techno-social 
entanglements navigated in regular Guifi practices.  
 A concern discussed at one meeting was about the future of the local neighborhood 
association—one of GuifiAmunt’s primary community partners. Once an important leader of local 
community organizing, the association was going through a difficult time. Recently, attendance at 
meetings and events had been declining, several of the association board members planned to step 
down, and there was talk of closing the association’s office—where GuifiAmunt met and hosted a 
server. While this closure would not affect GuifiAmunt’s primary infrastructure, the association 
would have to find a new space from which to manage the network. The possible future directions 
of the neighborhood association were a point of contention. There was some interest in petitioning 
city hall to hire a community organizer to come and work at the association—someone who would 
have the time, energy, and training to carry out the work effectively. Yet, there was concern that 
this would constitute a step toward the formalization and professionalization of what was up to 
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that point an informal, grassroots association. If the neighborhood association were to close, there 
was a chance GuifiAmunt could try to build a new partnership with another local community 
center. Yet, this again was not viewed favorably, as the community center was run by the city hall 
and GuifiAmunt members preferred to partner with an independent grassroots association. 
GuifiAmunt’s discussions around this issue point to the complex and evolving socio-spatial 
relations that they actively navigate while building and maintaining their own broadband internet 
infrastructure. Building and maintaining the shared infrastructure requires building and 
maintaining community relations and working toward broader forms of community control and 
local democracy.  
 GuifiAmunt also managed a series of unexpected issues with the shared infrastructure, 
from frequent power outages at the site of a key supernode, to the breakdown of important pieces 
of hardware from severe weather events. For instance, during one summer heat wave, the high 
temperatures melted the protective covering over some cables and ended up burning out one of the 
antennas. In another case, high winds had blown over and damaged one antenna. Association 
members become aware of these issues when the internet connection is interrupted to one or more 
nodes, at which point the association investigates, tracing the problem back to a particular node or 
supernode and going to check on its status. These issues demonstrate the way GuifiAmunt’s 
activities require forms of self-organization capable of reacting to unexpected events in the area 
and a continuous vigilance over the status of the shared infrastructure.  
 Beyond these repairs, GuifiAmunt also worked to strengthen and extend their existing 
infrastructure in the hopes of making it more reliable and able to bring in new members while 
taking advantage of new developments in networking technology. Some improvements were fairly 
simple, like swapping out an older antenna for a newer one—and then often using that older 
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antenna somewhere else in the network. Other improvements were more complicated, involving 
installing new pieces of hardware and reorganizing primary network connections between nodes. 
Such actions required knowledge over the current state of the infrastructure and an ability to 
imagine future possibilities for improvement. Yet, these are not simply technical calculations. 
Planning out the expansion and improvement of the network requires a familiarity with the 
materiality of the cityscape to know which connections are potentially feasible, as well as 
knowledge of the complex socio-spatial relations around individual nodes.  
 For instance, when any new node is set up on the roof of a building (typically in which one 
of the association members lives), all of the other residents have to be notified. Guifinet has a 
shared template for this notification, explaining the project and citing the Spanish law that gives 
individuals the right to set up private communication infrastructure in such shared spaces. Yet, in 
several instances, neighbors may challenge the installation of such infrastructures, often based on 
fears about negative health effects or suspicions about what the hardware is really being used for. 
Such social relations around the infrastructure can and does actively effect where and how the 
network might expand.  
  These examples of the everyday practices involved in the maintenance and expansion of 
shared infrastructure demonstrate the multiple forms of complex, entangled spatial knowledges 
gained and employed by association members. These spatial knowledges combine technical, 
social, political/ethical, legal, and environmental elements. Significantly, the multiple knowledges 
needed to navigate these processes do not reside in a single individual, but are held in common 
and shared through regular meetings and communication among the members, allowing for 
grassroots, democratic forms of organization and intervention around the production of digital 
urban infrastructure.  
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4.2 Guifinet limitations in the Gothic Quarter 
 While GuifiAmunt members collectively navigate complex material, technical, political, 
and social entanglements in order to maintain and extend their shared infrastructure, these same 
entanglements place constraints on the feasibility of the Guifinet project elsewhere in the city. 
While several neighborhoods throughout the city have highly developed networks with many 
users, others do not. In particular, there are significant limitations to Guifinet expansion in the 
Barri Gòitc—or Gothic Quarter—of Barcelona. These limitations, or constraints, were the topic 
of discussion at one Guifilab in January 2018.  
 The municipal government had recently acquired a space in the building of an old art school 
in the middle of the Gothic Quarter and converted it into a multi-use community space as part of 
their plan to combat real estate speculation and promote community activities and enterprises in 
the historic center. A municipal representative involved in the project approached eXo, the 
Barcelona Guifi association, to ask them to connect the building to the common network for the 
space’s inauguration. At the Guifilab, experienced Guifi participants discussed the possibility of 
doing so and almost immediately recognized it would not be feasible.  
 One of the first concerns raised by those in attendance at the Guifilab was that there is not 
a pre-existing, developed Guifi network in the Gothic Quarter, meaning finding a supernode close 
enough to connect to would be quite difficult. The reason for this lack of developed infrastructure, 
they explained, was the combination of a variety of factors, one being the physical and material 
cityscape of the neighborhood. Specifically, it is physically difficult to build infrastructure in the 
area because of the height and style of the roofs. Guifinet typically relies on antenna technology, 
requiring a line of sight from an antenna on the roof of a building to a supernode. Low-lying roofs, 
particularly when surrounded by taller buildings, as well as roofs with limited access make 
 127 
connection difficult without hoisting the antenna on the top of a long pole, which can also be rather 
complicated. One participant raises the point that the area is rather small and dense, making it a 
good candidate to lay fiber optic cables, but without a large, organized community willing to 
support such a project, it is not viable. 
 This point led to another major reason there is not a developed network in the Gothic 
Quarter. Over the past several years the neighborhood had begun experiencing rapid changes 
driven by the continually growing tourism industry, and more specifically by the rise of Airbnb 
and similar platforms. As permanent housing has been converted into tourist accommodations and 
short-term rentals, the neighborhood has experienced the steady loss of long-term residents and 
the weakening of community ties. As Guifinet relies on forms of grassroots community 
organization, the lack of long-term residents means the extension of infrastructure into the 
neighborhood is not feasible. This is common issue in the development and expansion of 
community wireless networks, as Cardullo (2017) highlights in the case of the Open Wireless 
Network in London.  
 Yet another limitation to extending the Guifi network to connect the building in question 
involved a lack of trust in the municipal government. Since coming to power in 2015, there had 
been a series of discussions between Guifinet actors and the progressive municipal government in 
the hopes of establishing some form of collaboration. After several meetings to discuss ways the 
city could support Guifi activities and even move municipal connections to the community 
network, the group has seen very little follow through. Undertaking such a complicated expansion 
of the network to connect one municipal building without any kind of broad municipal cooperation 
simply did not seem feasible.  
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 This particular example of the Gothic Quarter again demonstrates how Guifi actors possess 
and share a multiplicity of entangled knowledges about the spaces of the city. In assessing the 
feasibility of this particular project, Guifilab participants reflected on their knowledge of the 
physical and material cityscape, the capabilities of antenna and fiber optic networking technology, 
ongoing processes of social and economic change in the neighborhood, and their own political 
relations with the municipal government.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 Geographers have carefully examined how the development and expansion of connected 
infrastructures re-shape the production of urban spaces, and have thoughtfully critiqued their 
entanglement in evolving forms of knowledge production and decision-making. The many 
critiques of the “smart city” closely echo Stiegler’s discussion of proletarianization as the process 
of losing knowledge. This article has explored how the amateur techno-social practices of a 
community wireless network in Barcelona constitute an alternative regime of spatial knowledge 
production and sharing in the digitally-mediated city in contrast to familiar narratives about the 
“automatic production of space.” In the process of building, maintaining, and expanding 
community-managed digital infrastructure, participants in the project produce, share, and draw on 
multiple knowledges about the spaces of the city while gaining new capabilities.  
 I thus argue that Guifinet can be understood as a project of spatial de-proletarianization—
or a reclaiming of shared knowledge of, and thus control over, urban space. This spatial knowledge 
involves an understanding of the complex entanglements of technological, social, political, 
economic, material, and environmental systems in particular places. As scholars, planners, and 
municipal officials begin to critically consider the possibilities for meaningful forms of 
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participation in the “smart city,” it is perhaps useful to consider the practices of such grassroots 
projects and the broader processes of knowledge production and circulation in which they are 
involved. Do processes of participation simply include human activities within largely constrained 
corporate or state-led technological systems? Or do they facilitate the production of “new 
discourses, new practices, new artefacts” (Dillet 2017) as communities come to experiment with 
alternative forms of techno-sociality?   
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APPENDIX C 
 
Unruly Digital Subjects and the Politics of Technological Expertise 
 
***For submission to Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 
 
 
Abstract: This paper interrogates the differential production of digital subjectivities—approached 
as the ways individuals come to understand themselves and their agency in relation to digital 
objects and systems. While posthuman agency may be understood as complex and emergent, the 
hegemonic discourses of contemporary techno-capitalism continue to privilege depoliticized 
conceptions of technological knowledge and re-produce hierarchies of technological expertise that 
are intimately entangled in the reproduction of gender, race, age, ability, sexuality, and other 
markers of difference. These hierarchies significantly shape the way individuals and communities 
come to interact with and position themselves in relation to evolving digital technologies. This 
paper draws on Stiegler (1998) and Barad’s (2007) work on the co-constitution of humanity and 
technics to explore how subjectivities are constituted differently in complex embodied 
entanglements with an array of agential nonhuman others. This paper offers an empirical 
discussion of a grassroots movement in Barcelona focused on building alternative social, political, 
and economic relationships to dominant technological systems. It examines the embodied practices 
that challenge and disrupt established digital subject positions and expectations of good “digital 
citizenship”, as individuals-in-collectives experiment with new modes of interacting with digital 
devices and systems and come to imagine and enact alternative techno-social futures.   
 
Keywords: Subjectivity, Digital, Futures, Posthuman 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 Within the recent “digital turn” in geography (Ash et al, 2018), a growing body of literature 
interrogates questions of digital subjects and subjectivities. Yet, where “digital subject/ivities” 
(Kinsley, 2019) are discussed, they are mostly approached as a question of how digital 
technologies affect everyday experience or how algorithmic logics create new data-based subject 
positions. There has been less attention given to how individuals understand themselves in relation 
to digital technologies—how they experience and think of themselves as digital actors 
differentially positioned in hierarchies of technological agency and expertise. 
 This paper interrogates the discursive privileging of technological knowledge and the 
constitution of differentiated and hierarchized subject positions in relation to the digital. While 
particular subjects—overwhelmingly white, middle-class men with formal technical training—are 
positioned as leaders of the “digital revolution” making key decisions about the future direction of 
technological development, the remainder of the population is positioned as the grateful 
beneficiaries of innovation, anxiously awaiting the next “big thing.” More alarmingly, individuals 
are called upon to exercise good “digital citizenship”, understood “as an unproblematic and 
instrumental process of becoming an ‘effective’ citizen able to cope in a fast changing and 
disrupted new world of work and leisure” (Emejulu & McGregor, 2019: p. 133). While 
“posthuman agency” certainly exceeds such positionings (Rose, 2017), these citizenship projects 
work to orient embodied engagements with digital devices and systems and significantly constrain 
the possibilities for experimenting with alternative modes of digital development in the 
contemporary conjuncture.  
 This paper considers how hegemonic techno-capitalist subject positions and the policing 
of technological expertise can and must be contested to provide for alternative techno-social 
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futures and new forms of digital citizenship. It does so through a discussion of the practices of a 
social movement for “technological sovereignty” (hereafter, “TS”) in Barcelona, Spain. The TS 
movement is an informal network of community groups, cooperatives, and activists working to 
build alternative economies and institute new forms of democratic control over processes of 
technological change in the city (Lynch, 2019). This paper demonstrates how subjects involved in 
TS-related initiatives experiment with counter-hegemonic subject positions in relation to digital 
technologies, challenging the discursive privileging of technological knowledge and the gendered 
and racialized ideologies with which it is entangled. In TS initiatives, notions of technological 
expertise and the hierarchical division of labor are given over to a diversity of subjects as people 
collaborate to develop and use open-source technologies in alternative social, political, and 
economic projects. This contesting of boundaries between the technological and the social, 
political, and economic is accompanied by an attentiveness to the gendered and raced dimensions 
of contemporary digital technologies and an explicit focus on gender equity. I present these 
practices as the production of unruly digital subjects—subjects that refuse to adhere to the accepted 
categories and forms of authority through which good “digital citizenship” is expected to be 
exercised. The production of unruly digital subjectivities involves embodied practices of 
experimental engagement with digital technologies in ways that transgress the hegemonic subject 
positions of techno-capitalism and expectations of good “digital citizenship”.  
 This paper contributes to Elwood and Leszczynski’s (2018: p. 640) call for feminist digital 
geographies, exploring the “possibilities of a liberatory digital politics for re-making our 
technologies and ourselves as digital subjects.” It also expands on Rose’s (2017) work on 
differentiated “(post)human agency in the digitally-mediated city” by exploring how individuals 
come to understand and challenge that differentiated agency in the specific case of the TS 
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movement in Barcelona. In doing so, the paper builds on feminist and queer critiques of science 
and technology more broadly (Haraway, 1985; Barad, 2007)—challenging claims to universality 
and raising questions “about who speaks for technology, and concomitantly, who is spoken for by 
technology” (Cockayne & Richardson, 2017: p. 1588). In particular, I draw on the work of several 
theorists who stress the co-constitution of humanity and technics, and thus the ways subjects 
continually emerge differently through iterative forms of embodied interaction (or intra-action) in 
the world (Stiegler 1998; Barad 2007).  
 This paper is based on over a year of ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Barcelona 
between 2016 and 2018. During this time, I conducted participant observation with several 
community organizations involved in promoting “technological sovereignty” and at events 
focused on technology politics in the city. This paper draws in particular on my participant 
observation in a workshop series on digital political participation organized by two feminist TS 
activists, and in the Ateneus de Fabricació—a network of municipal-sponsored digital production 
spaces similar to a FabLab (Walter-Herrmann and Büching 2014) but organized according to an 
alternative political economic logic. I also interviewed 23 individuals involved in TS-related 
projects, and collected and analyzed various manifestos, pamphlets, flyers, and other promotional 
materials. All interviews and events were conducted in either Catalan or Spanish. I am fluent in 
both languages and all translations throughout this paper are my own.  
 The following section situates this paper in relation to the broader literatures on digital 
subjectivity in geography, examining approaches that consider the material and affective 
entanglement of bodies and digital systems as well as those that stress the gendering and 
racialization of digital technologies. I bring these approaches together through the work of Stiegler 
(1998), Barad (2007), and others who stress the iterative production of difference through ongoing 
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embodied practices in interaction with technological devices and systems. This sets up a 
framework for understanding the practices of TS activists in Barcelona as practices of producing 
unruly digital subjects. Section 3 offers an overview of the TS movement in Barcelona and the 
way its practices disrupt the discursive separation and privileging of the “technological” from the 
social. Section 4 examines the role of feminism in the movement and the production of explicitly 
feminist discourses and practices in TS initiatives. Section 5 considers how TS activist enact 
alternative subject positions in embodied and emplaced entanglements with digital technologies, 
experimenting with modes of being and relating to digital systems that transgress de-politicized 
notions of good digital citizenship.  
 
2. DIGITAL SUBJECTS, DIFFERENCE, AND THE POLITICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
EXPERTISE 
2.1 Digital Subject/ivities 
 Reviewing recent literature in the emerging field of digital geographies, Kinsley (2019) 
identifies three primary approaches to the topic of digital subject/ivities: the digital subject as the 
discretized object of surveillance, the “‘statistical doubles’ (Rouvroy & Berns, 2013) represented 
in data” (p. 153), and the subjective experiences mediated or produced through digital 
technologies. Reflecting on these contributions, Kinsley (2019, p. 154) highlights how:  
 We negotiate the performance of our identity through conditions of mediation, from 
 government-issued personal identity codes to messages on WhatsApp… We assume 
 particular forms of status or receive responsibilities, and afford those qualities to 
 organizations that may act autonomously, from companies to ‘intelligent agents’. 
 
This mediation is seen in the work of Cockayne and Richardson (2017) and the contributors to a 
special issue of Gender, Place & Culture (GPC) on “Queering Code/Space” examine the multiple 
ways digital technologies mediate experiences of urban space and the constitution of non-
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normative sexual subjectivities. For instance, Miles (2017), in the same issue of GPC, shows how 
location-based dating apps like Grindr and Tinder reconfigure the way queer men experience urban 
space and their place in a queer community in London. In another contribution, Jenzen (2017) 
explores how trans youth employ creative strategies in producing and consuming social media that 
challenge the cis-normativity of online culture. This literature makes important contributions to 
our understanding of the complex entanglements between digital technologies and everyday, 
embodied lived experience. Yet, most of this work fails to address the question of how subjects 
conceive of and experience their relationship to digital systems and processes of digital innovation, 
production, and consumption, focusing instead on technologies as mediators of subjective 
experience or apparatuses of subjectification.  
 This recent literature on digital subject/ivities has also been largely separate from earlier 
work—primarily from the late 1990’s and early 2000’s—on the production of gender, race, and 
class inequalities in relation to digital technologies and the emerging “information economy”. 
Sundin (1996), for instance, examined the gendering of technology and technological work in the 
case of local policy initiatives in Lindesberg, Sweden, and Holloway et al. (2000) studies the 
reproduction of masculinities and femininities among youth in Information Technology (IT) 
classrooms. Cooper (2000) highlights the production of new masculinities as a mechanism of 
control amongst “knowledge workers” in Silicon Valley. Meanwhile, both Park (1999) and Marez 
(2016) document the re-production of racial hierarchies and inequalities in the labor economy of 
Silicon Valley, differentiated between the “unskilled” labor in production or maintenance, and 
“skilled” work in the so-called “knowledge economy”. All of this work critiques the way 
technology and technological knowledge becomes discursively tied to masculinity and whiteness. 
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 Such empirical accounts help demonstrate the continued effects of pervasive ideologies 
linking technology and “modernity” to masculinity and whiteness (Adas, 1990, 2009). While these 
ideologies enable inequalities in relation to access to technology, it also dramatically shapes the 
current and future trajectories of digital development and innovation—as ideologies of white, 
cisgender, heterosexual, masculinity drive new advancements in digital technology. Fancher 
(2016), for instance, describes how an “artificially intelligent” chatbot purportedly passed the 
Turing Test5 through a performance of embodiment based in whiteness and teenage masculinity, 
while Nobel (2018) examines how racist and sexist biases are encoded into everyday digital 
systems, such as search engines.  
 These ideologies and the inequalities and abuses to which they give rise have been 
thoroughly critiqued by feminist, queer, and critical race scholars—among others—contesting the 
way technological and scientific knowledges become privileged and discursively separated from 
their broader social entanglements (Haraway, 1985; Barad, 2007). Technology and “technical” 
knowledge more broadly gets positioned as universal and singular, and thus depoliticized—made 
explicit in understandings of “technocracy” as de-politicized rule by “experts” (Mitchell, 2002). 
This privileging of technological knowledge cannot be extricated from its basis in ideologies of 
gendered, racialized, and heteronormative dominance, as technology becomes discursively tied to 
universality, rationality, masculinity, and whiteness, with its concomitant “other”—the particular, 
the feminine, the racialized, the queer, the emotional and social.  
                                                
5 The Turing Test refers to a common way of evaluating the level of intelligence of a purportedly 
artificially intelligent (AI) machine. In the test, a human engages in an anonymous text-based 
conversation with two other actors—another human and the artificially intelligent machine. An 
AI is said to pass the Turing Test when the human operator is unable to reliably distinguish 
between the human interlocutor and the machine.  
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 These discursive constructs play a key role in shaping broader subjectivities within 
contemporary techno-capitalism, constituting new regimes of power and control. In The Birth of 
the Clinic (2003), Foucault describes the formalization and institutionalization of medical 
knowledge and its role in constituting new subject positions and relationships of power between 
doctor and patient. Likewise, in The History of Sexuality Vol. 1 (1988) he examines the role of 
priests as privileged subjects claiming exclusive access to God and Biblical knowledge, and thus 
capable to exercising multiple forms of power over congregants—shaping subjectivities through 
the technology of confession. In a similar way, technologists are becoming the priests and doctors 
of today, employing their privileged, de-politicized “expert” knowledge in the exercise of power.  
 
2.2. Techno-Social Entanglements and Embodied Subjectivity 
 I present the actions of TS activists in Barcelona as processes of experimentation with 
counter-hegemonic digital subjectivities in which individuals-in-collectives explore the 
possibilities for alternative relationships to digital systems. To explore the potential unruliness of 
always-differentiated subjectivities in relation to the digital, I draw on the work of Stiegler (1998) 
and Barad (2007) to consider the role of embodied engagements with technology in constituting 
subjectivity. I present the work of TS activists as practices of reflexively experimenting with these 
embodied engagements and exploring the possibilities for them to become otherwise.  
 Stiegler (1998) intervenes in debates about the nature of human-technological relations by 
arguing for an understanding of an “originary technicity”—the notion that humanity has evolved 
over time through its interaction with the material world through technical practices. To make this 
argument, Stiegler follows the work of Leroi-Gourhan (1945) examining the evolution of the 
human species and the use of tools, showing how the human brain and skeleton both co-evolved 
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with technology. Such an argument undermines any conception of technical objects as 
“prostheses” extending a given “natural” body, instead seeing these purportedly external objects 
as constitutive of the human as species. For Stiegler, humans engage in the world through technical 
processes of interacting and shaping the world. These processes constitute simultaneous processes 
of exteriorization and interiorization—that is, the production of material and technical artefacts 
and subjectivities. Yet, Stiegler argues that this originary technicity has been “forgotten” or erased 
from Western thought, beginning with the devaluing of tekne in relation to episteme in the work 
of Aristotle. This devaluing of technics in Western discourse has led to a blindness to the 
complexity of human relationships to technology and the role of technics in constituting human 
life and subjectivity. This “originary forgetting” helps account for the de-politicization of 
technology and the discursive separation of technological knowledge from its broader social 
entanglements. 
 Like Stiegler, Barad’s (2007) stresses the continuous emergence of subjectivity through 
embodied practices of interacting (or in her vocabulary “intra-acting”) in the world in constant 
entanglement with an array of nonhuman others and technical apparatuses. Yet, unlike Stiegler, 
Barad accounts for the iterative production of difference—how subjects emerge as always 
differentiated and spatialized. This approach recognizes the discursive production of difference—
the sorting and ordering of beings and objects into stratified categories of difference—but explores 
how those differences are performatively produced in practice. Differences are iteratively 
produced through ongoing material discursive practices of intra-acting in the world. Barad 
understands these material discursive practices through the figure of the apparatus. She explains: 
“apparatuses are the material conditions of possibility and impossibility of mattering; they enact 
what matters and what is excluded from mattering. Apparatuses enact agential cuts that produce 
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determinate boundaries and properties of ‘entities’ within phenomena, where ‘phenomena’ are the 
ontological inseparability of agentially intra-acting components” (Barad 2007, p. 148). 
Subjectivity is thus a question of locating oneself in the world, if only ever partially and 
momentarily—of conceiving of and experimenting with one’s spatially-situated, embodied, 
material entanglement at the intersection of multiple evolving apparatuses.  
 Barad thus posits the possibilities for production of ethical subjects through modes of 
embodied and emplaced intra-action. She writes: “Subjectivity is not a matter of individuality but 
a relation of responsibility to the other. Crucially, then, the ethical subject is not the disembodied 
rational subject of traditional ethics but rather an embodied sensibility, which responds to its 
proximal relationship to the other through a mode of wonderment that is antecedent to 
consciousness” (Barad 2007, p. 391). In exploring the actions of TS activists in Barcelona, I pay 
attention to the forms of embodied sensibility and relationships of proximity as subjects reflexively 
experiment with different modes of intra-acting in relation to digital technologies. I highlight how 
these practices produce new experiences that draw attention to and re-orient embodied relations to 
digital technologies and open possibilities for imagining and exploring alternative, more ethical—
possibilities for intra-acting and thus producing the emerging techno-social future. 
 In discussing the production of unruly digital subjects in the case of the TS movement in 
Barcelona, I build on recent work across disciplines exploring possibilities for alternative techno-
social futures. Emejulu and McGregor (2019) call for digital education based on notions of praxis-
based “radical digital citizenship” in which “individuals and groups: (1) critically analyse the 
social, political, economic and environmental consequences of technologies in everyday life; (2) 
collectively deliberate and take action to build alternative and emancipatory technologies and 
technological practices” (p. 131). The authors argue for the need for new educational practices that 
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help students to understand their complex entanglements in technological systems and to “debunk 
magical thinking whereby the ‘digital’ is invoked as a fetish” (ibid., p. 132). Yet, this work lacks 
a deeper engagement with the production of the differential modes of embodiment through which 
subjects encounter and engage digital technologies.  
 In contrast, Weheliye (2005) highlights the importance of embodied differences in his 
accounts of the role of sound technologies in the active production of black cultural identity and 
subjectivities in the US—positioning racialized subjects as technological actors experimenting 
with alternative ways of being in relation to technological objects and systems. Similarly, Marez 
(2016) describes Mexican farmworkers and activists in California as embodied technological 
actors experimenting with new media technologies in organizing for labor rights and coordinating 
broad solidarity networks. He contrasts this depiction with the practices designed to erase and 
obscure the technological agency or racialized subjects—de-valuing the technical skills they 
employ in using, maintaining, and repairing complex agricultural machinery and subjecting their 
bodies to technical assemblages of surveillance and control. More specifically, in the case of 
Barcelona, Egaña and Solá (2016) explore artistic practice in the local transfeminist movement 
and its relationship to hacker and open-software movements. They highlight “how the 
technological is, together with the body, a space from which to transform reality” (Egaña & Solá, 
2016: p. 80), drawing connections between calls for technological sovereignty and bodily 
sovereignty and their entanglement in experiments with new forms of subjectivity.   
 To explore the production of unruly digital subjects in Barcelona, I first consider how the 
practices of TS actors work to disrupt the discursive separation of the technological from the 
social—that is, the way they draw attention to and reflect on the intimate, constitutive relations 
between technicity and sociality. I then consider how they draw attention to the differentiation and 
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hierarchization of subject positions in relation to “technological” knowledge. The final section 
examines the embodied practices through which TS actors reflexively experiment with alternative 
modes of relating to digital devices and systems and come to project alternative techno-social 
futures.  
 
3. TECHNOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNTY: SUBJECTIFICATION BEYOND THE TECHNO-
SOCIAL BINARY 
 The movement for technological sovereignty in Barcelona is an informal network of 
community initiatives, cooperatives, and activists experimenting with the production and use of 
open-source technologies in order to claim greater community control over processes of 
technological development and change in everyday life. TS-related initiatives include projects like 
Guifinet, The Things Network, and CommonsCloud focused on developing common digital 
infrastructures; a growing list of local technology cooperatives offering digital services on the local 
market; and groups organizing events and spaces for collective theorizing and organizing like the 
annual Technological Sovereignty Congress (SobTec) or the Mobile Social Congress (MSC). The 
movement is extensively networked with multiple political and social struggles in the city—over 
digital inclusion, local democracy, labor rights, gender equality, and economic justice.  
 The movement is composed of a broad diversity of individuals from a variety of 
backgrounds not typically represented in the mainstream technology sector. These backgrounds 
are representative of the ways TS activists contest the techno-social binary and seek to disrupt 
dominant hierarchies of technological expertise. On the one hand, some actors come to the 
movement from a formal background in computer science or engineering, which they come 
understand in a broader social or political consciousness. For instance, as the founder of a local 
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programming cooperative explains: “I studied computer science and then worked in the corporate 
technology sector, but couldn’t do it any longer for ethical reasons. I had always seen my politics 
and my work in technology as separate, but I started to see how my work was contributing to 
exploitation, to war, to things that go against my political and ethical beliefs” (interview, 18 
January 2018). Others with formal technical training expressed similar sentiments, recognizing 
that their “technological” education failed to prepare them to recognize and think through the social 
and political implications of their work. Over time, many of them came to recognize and reflect 
on their broader entanglements in the world and imagine new kinds of technological practice.  
 Others come from less “techie” backgrounds and more directly challenge the politics of 
technological expertise. For instance, TS activist Nuria studied Fine Arts before becoming 
involved in local autonomous hacker spaces in the 1990’s, through which she learned about web 
design, server maintenance, and other skills. She explains: “I could have studied some technical 
skill at the Polytechnic, but that wouldn’t mean it would be useful for the work I do. I’ve learned 
to use and develop the technologies that I’ve needed in different moments for particular social and 
political projects” (interview, 21 March 2018). For Nuria, her interest in digital technology stems 
from the possibilities it offers for social and political change.  
 Another activist, Montse, was trained in social psychology and worked as a social worker 
before facing prolonged unemployment following the 2008 financial crisis. Inspired by her 
participation in a local renewable energy cooperative, she decided to help start a small 
telecommunications cooperative, despite an admitted lack of formal technical knowledge or 
training. She explains that in starting the cooperative, she reflected on the growing importance of 
digital technologies and infrastructures in everyday life and her own political concerns with the 
corporate monopoly: “From my participation with SomEnergia [energy cooperative], I started to 
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think about the other systems we depend on and how they are managed. Here in Barcelona, we 
have a big problem with telecommunication companies, so we wanted to find a way to take back 
collective control” (interview 15 August 2016). All of these examples point to the way particular 
subjects came to reflect on their own practices and the everyday entanglements of technology with 
social and political life—experiences that challenged, for them, the discursive separation and de-
politicization of a fetishized realm of “technology.”  
 This diversity of backgrounds is reflected in ongoing processes of debate and discussion 
through which TS actors challenge traditional divides and discursive boundaries. Many of the TS 
initiatives work to promote critical collective debate around the direction of technological change 
and cultivate new relationships with digital technologies, both amongst themselves and within the 
communities in which they are embedded. Internal meetings of TS collectives often involve active 
debate and discussion about particular corporate technologies and the possibilities, limitations, or 
desirability of progressive alternatives—as TS activists continually challenge their own 
understanding and expectations of digital objects and systems. For instance, in regular meetings 
of the SobTec organizing committee, participants frequently discussed particular technologies, 
debating the social and political implications of gamification6 or artificial intelligence, and the 
potential or not of progressive and radical uses. As a space from which to collectively theorize 
“technological sovereignty” as an organizing concept, the SocTec organizing group also serves a 
space of collective reflection and subject formation. Participants de-construct and challenge the 
de-politicization of technology and their own relationships to it.  
                                                
6 “Gamification” refers to the integration of elements of gaming (competition, rewards, etc.) into 
digital systems, such as the “Like” button on Facebook. Gamification works as a way to enhance 
“user experience” and encourage particular forms of engagement—maximizing time spent on a 
website or application, or producing specific kinds of data to be exploited (Zichermann and 
Cunningham 2011).  
 147 
 Other activities are focused outward toward the broader community. For instance, Lleialtec 
is a project focused on installing and maintaining open-source systems in autonomous and 
municipal community spaces. As one of the project leaders explains: “the consciousness of the 
citizenry is the objective. The open-source infrastructure of the building is the example, but not 
the objective” (personal interview, 3 May 2018). The group wants to bring open-source 
infrastructures into the spaces of everyday life in the city—sites where neighbors meet for local 
theatre productions, book clubs, continuing education classes, or to organize community events. 
La Lleialtec aims to integrate critical conversations about technology into these spaces in order to 
raise consciousness among the public about the abuses of the current hegemonic model and the 
possibilities for alternatives; “We think that at least people should understand where their data 
are—if they are in their PC or in their phone, or if they are in the cloud… What is the cloud? What 
is a client server?” (Ibid.). Working with the local theatre group, the initiative plans to develop a 
series of short skits exploring the entanglement of digital technologies in everyday life and its 
effects. Activists reshape the technological infrastructures of the neighborhood, while also creating 
new opportunities for neighbors to reflect on their own relationships to capitalist digital systems. 
Such an approach recognizes everyday, embodied interactions as key to the re-production of 
particular kinds of relations and subjectivities.  
 Other initiatives like SobTec and the Mobile Social Congress create public events where 
members of the local community come to learn about the social, political, and economic impacts 
of corporate technology and about the alternative projects being developed locally in Barcelona. 
As one of the MSC organizers explains: “We want to create a space for critical reflection with the 
citizenry and the entities and cooperatives that are working on these topics… and create a space to 
show that there are alternatives that are being built… that we are in this process of collective 
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construction” (personal interview, 15 March 2018). The MSC, in particular, aims to draw attention 
to aspects of the tech economy that are erased from mainstream discourses and representations.  
 Such events offer spaces for networking and coordination across initiatives as well as an 
opportunity to engage a broader public. Promoting a critical consciousness in the broader public 
is seen as key to TS initiatives. TS activist, Nuria, explains “private technology offers easy 
solutions for the fast consumption of technology” that TS initiatives are not able to compete with 
in terms of cost or convenience (personal interview, 21 March 2018). Convincing people to invest 
time and energy into alternative technologies requires building a social and political consciousness.  
 Both the municipal 3D printing labs, Ateneus de Fabricació, and the technology/social work 
cooperative, Colectic, offer courses and training programs allowing local youth and others to gain 
digital skills and knowledge about the social and political dimensions of corporate technologies 
and open-source alternatives. Jordi Reynes, the director of the Ateneus de Fabricació, explains that 
the objectives of the municipal initiative are three-fold: socio-economic, territorial, and 
educational. By making advanced digital production technology available to the broader public—
in a similar way to a public library—the initiative aims to facilitate experimentation with new local 
economic activities and livelihood strategies, support the well-being of neighborhoods and local 
communities, and allow individuals to develop new skills and capabilities (field notes, 25 July 
2016). Across these examples, the goal of engaging a broader public beyond those already 
involved in TS initiatives and the focus on integrating basic digital skills and knowledge with a 
critical understanding of technology’s social, political, and economic entanglements demonstrate 
what Emejulu and McGregor (2019) call a “radical digital citizenship”.  Such an approach 
challenges the discursive privileging of technological “expertise” and aims to create spaces for 
broader critical discussions about digital technology among a diversity of subjects.  
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4. TECHNOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 
 In addition to challenging the discursive privileging of technological knowledge and policing 
of technological expertise, the activities and critical discourses developed within the TS movement 
seek to challenge the related gendering and racialization of technology. It is important to recognize 
that gendered and racialized ideologies do not disappear in the TS movement and I do not mean to 
present the movement as one of perfect gender and racial harmony. Rather, I focus on the ways 
these issues are highlighted and made visible in the TS movement and the ways digital technology 
becomes a site through which critical discussions about gender and race take place. The level of 
engagement with feminist critiques and energy devoted to addressing gender inequality vary across 
the initiatives and collectives that make up the movement. Some initiatives continue to be 
predominately male, while others strive for gender parity, and others still are run exclusively by 
women. Yet, across these differences, I highlight the ongoing practices that work to actively disrupt 
the deeply engrained gendering of technology. While questions of gender are addressed much more 
directly in the movement and therefore are given more attention here, I also highlight particular 
sites and practices that explicitly address questions of race as well.  
 Many TS activists recognize the link between diverse gender representation in projects and 
initiatives and the re-embedding of technology in its broader social entanglements—discussed 
above. Sam, for instance, explains: “In environments where it is all men, it is technology for 
technology’s sake. It’s more ‘geek’. It’s ‘hey let’s try this’ just because we can and it doesn’t have 
any political or social component” (personal interview, 3 May 2018). Reflecting on the case of 
Pam a Pam, a project building a digital database and map of social economy enterprises in 
Catalonia, Laia explains:  
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 In the group, there are people who aren’t ‘techie’ and we need to break the logic of ‘you need 
 to know how to code to be there’… Pam-a-Pam is a very feminized project, given that 
 consumption is heavily feminized. The project has always been carried out by women 
 technicians. We’ve never had a male technician. And it is noticeable in the way things 
 work, the attention to care. The technicians spend a lot of time making sure the process is 
 participatory, that it is a welcoming space where people feel like they can participate 
 (personal interview 18 May 2018).  
 
 At the most basic level, TS activists work to make visible gendered inequalities in relation 
to digital technology. It is not uncommon for meetings between different initiatives or collectives 
to continue to be primarily—or on some occasions even exclusively—male. Yet, within the 
movement it is common to draw attention to this and critically reflect on its causes and 
implications. Both the Mobile Social Congress and SobTec have featured speakers reflecting 
explicitly on issues of gender representation in the technology sector, while the organizing 
committee of SobTec keeps track of the gendered participation at the annual conference and 
highlight the continued inequalities. Guifinet is a project with a far lower level of women 
participants, but the question of gender inequality is often raised at gatherings and on digital forums 
as participants attempt to reflect on the causes and consequences of this.  
 In re-embedding technology and digital labor in its broader social entanglements, the TS 
movement also involves processes of reconstituting traditional forms of masculinity common in 
tech work. For instance, Joan explains his decision to leave his previous job as a programmer in a 
private tech company to start a small cooperative with a friend. “We both have kids, and it was 
‘leave the house at 8 and get home at 7’… and now, I mean sometimes I work some strange hours, 
but I can take my kids to school and talk to their teacher, and all of that. I can really contribute 
more to my family responsibilities” (personal interview 29 January 2018). In addition to drawing 
attention to the lived realities of digital work and labor, Joan’s explanation stands out for its 
 151 
contrast to accounts of hyper-masculinity and productivity in the techno-capitalist economy 
(Cooper, 2000).  
 While given less attention than gender, several TS initiatives and practices also draw 
attention to the racialization of digital technology in contemporary techno-capitalism. Alencop, for 
instance, is a workers’ cooperative of sub-Saharan African migrants working in e-waste recycling 
and disposal in Barcelona (Lepawsky et al 2017). The cooperative was formed in 2015 after a 
community of migrants were displaced from an old industrial warehouse they occupied in the 
neighborhood of Poblenou to make room for a redevelopment project. They formed the 
cooperative, composed of 25 members from 9 countries, with the help of the municipal 
government and the local neighborhood association. They get called to pick up old electronic 
devices and appliances, which they collect from people’s houses and transport with electric 
tricycles with moving containers attached to the back. In addition to home collections, they help 
empty old industrial spaces, organizing transport and recycling logistics. Beyond this, they work 
to educate the community by giving talks and workshops at community centers about reusing and 
recycling and are in the process of expanding their activities to include the more “skilled” work 
involved in the repair and reuse of devices. They also hope to offer spaces for self-repair, where 
people can come and use tools, the space, and get help and advice on repairing their own appliances 
and electronics. The cooperative’s current activities and future ambitions aim to create a role for 
themselves in the production of more responsible relationships to technological devices. 
Challenging the racialization of technology, they are leading processes of techno-social change 
through their community outreach and advocacy work around reuse and recycling, and by 
developing their own capabilities to work and appropriate devices in new ways.  
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5. UNRULY DIGITAL SUBJECTS 
 This section focuses on the various practices through which TS actors in Barcelona work to 
produce new subject positions in relation to digital technology. I offer two vignettes from my 
participant observation in Barcelona to demonstrate the embodied and material processes of 
subject formation in the TS community—practices that re-socialize technological knowledge and 
challenge the politics of expertise. These vignettes highlight the ways differentiated digital subjects 
come to re-think their embodied-material relationships with digital technologies and 
infrastructures through active practices. 
 
5.1 Ateneus de Fabricació 
 Throughout the fall of 2017, I regularly observed events and meetings at the Ateneu de 
Fabricació (AdF) in the Ciutat Meridiana neighborhood of Barcelona. The Ateneus are digital 
production spaces—similar to a fab lab (Walter-Hermann and Büching 2014)—owned and 
managed by the municipal government and organized according to cooperativist logics. In the 
name of the spaces, the term “ateneu” comes from the name for autonomous, community education 
spaces that acted as important hubs of activity and consciousness-raising in the city’s worker 
movements in the late 19th and early 20th century (Ealham 2005). The space’s founding director 
explains that the name is meant to signal a different model of learning beyond the narrow logic of 
acquiring skills for the knowledge economy. The spaces are designed to democratize access to 
advanced digital technologies and technological knowledge, similar to the way ateneus worked 
historically to democratize education to create worker autonomy. Reshaping subjectivities in 
relation to digital technology is one of the primary goals of AdF. Its mission is for “people to take 
ownership over new technologies” and to create a space for “reflection, experimentation, debate, 
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training, and advising for all who want it” (AdF Ciutat Meridiana website, accessed 28 January 
2019).  Jordi explains that “If don’t radically democratize this 4th industrial revolution and we leave 
it solely to the capitalists, it will only bring more inequality and injustice, just like all the previous 
technological revolutions” (interview 26 June 2016). This position is based on a deep reflection 
on the past several decades of rapid digital change, in which those with access to emerging 
technologies and the education and privileges needed to participate in the information economy 
have benefited from new technologies, while others have seen themselves subjected to intensified 
processes of exploitation and exclusion.     
 Ciutat Meridana is one of the poorest neighborhoods in the city with a large immigrant 
population, carved into a steep valley in the Collserola mountain range on the far edge of the city. 
Hastily built in the last years of the Franco dictatorship, the neighborhood long lacked basic 
services and infrastructures. Yet, the AdF in Ciutat Meridiana was one of the first and the largest 
in the city. The AdF in Ciutat Meridiana consists of two floors and is equipped with laptop 
computers, multiple models of 3D printers—from the most basic models to advance resin-based 
printers—a large automated saw capable of printing large furniture, and a laser cutter—among 
other digital production machines. The space is staffed by two technologists as well as two 
community organizers and a director, and neighborhood residents have open and free access to the 
space based on the system of contraprestacions—or contributions—in which each person making 
use of the facility should give back in some way through service to the community.  
 While at the AdF, I observed a local feminist collective use the facilities to produce materials 
for an anti-domestic violence campaign in the neighborhood, using advanced design software and 
automated laser-cutters. I observed workshops for children who learned to design and print their 
own toys and for community groups to design and print decorations for the neighborhood festival. 
 154 
The AdF also regularly hosts community events with guest speakers or workshop facilitators, 
creating opportunities for neighborhood residents to come learn about emerging technologies like 
augmented reality and 3D scanning.   
 During my participant observation, I regularly observed a group of teenagers who came to 
the AdF twice a week as part of a program to learn about advanced digital production technology. 
The group is part of a program known as the “breakers”—a term used to refer to the “maker” 
movement but with a focus on breaking stereotypes about who can be a maker and what the 
movement is about. The group consisted of 10-12 members in their late teens, from a mix of 
national and ethnic backgrounds. While a few of the members identified as Catalan or Spanish, the 
rest came from immigrant families from Ecuador, El Salvador, Bolivia, Cameroon, and Senegal. 
Two of the members were women.  
 In one of their first projects, the group facilitator, Patricia, taught the participants to use 3D 
modelling and design software to create a design for a model car that they would then print in 
pieces using the laser cutter. While the students worked on computers learning the basic functions 
of the software, the participants were anxious to get to use the 3D printers. When their designs 
were completed, they took turns printing them with the laser cutter. As they each stepped up to 
print their designs, they were visibly excited to watch their designs and ideas materialize in front 
of them. These moments make visible for the participants their embodied and material 
entanglement with digital systems. As one participant expressed: “It is really cool. I designed it 
and now it’s real. I can touch it.” Such comments highlight the way engaging digital production 
technologies like 3D printers in the AdF works to re-orient embodied dispositions and encourage 
individuals to experiment with different modes of engaging digital technologies.  
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 Yet, significantly, in the AdF the experience of materializing one’s ideas using advanced 
digital technology is always re-embedded in the material and spatial relations of the surrounding 
neighborhood and social needs of the local community. In contrast to discourses of 
entrepreneurship and “disruption” common in most mainstream fab labs, the AdF staff stress the 
potential for these technologies to transform local social relations along cooperativist lines and re-
imagine alternative techno-social futures. On one of the first days of the program, Patricia leads 
the group in a discussion exercise, introducing them to a vocabulary for thinking about the AdF 
and the kinds of activities they carry out. She asks the group to reflect on terms like DIY, Arduino, 
Open Source, Ateneu, Maker, and Future. The exercise blended together technical terms like 
Arduino—an open-source micro-controller that can be used to run a range of sensors, motors, or 
other automated functions—with terms related to their broader political and social entanglements. 
In discussing the term “future,” Patricia encourages the participants to think critically about what 
kind of future they want to see, not just for themselves, but for their families and communities. As 
one AdF staff member told me: “I don’t know exactly what a just technological future looks like, 
but I think we need to create opportunities to reflect on it collectively” (fieldnotes, 7 November 
2017). This highlights the way processes of subjectification are not individual affairs. Producing 
unruly digital subjects also requires the production of new ways of being and imagining in 
community with others.  
 As part of the Breakers initiative the group must work together to design and build something 
that meets a social need in the local community. Following the reflection exercise, Patricia tells 
the participants to look around them as they walk home and go about their lives the next few days, 
to think about the social needs they might see around them. How might they use the technologies 
in the AdF to address these needs? The facilitator’s invocation to think critically about the social 
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relationships and problems around them and reflect on possibilities for addressing them stands in 
contrast to more common accounts of “citizen participation” in smart city projects. For instance, 
in Wilson’s (2011) account of participatory geocoding projects, participants are trained to identify 
and geo-code derelict sites in their communities, objectifying and encoding people and spaces 
deemed of interest for governmental intervention. Rather than objectifying sites and people 
deemed to be problems, Patricia encourages the participants to think about their own social 
entanglements and needs in the neighborhood and how they might make use of the digital 
production technologies at their disposal to address them.  
 Perhaps the best example of the production of differentiated unruly digital subjectivities in 
the AdF is the experience of Manuel. Manuel is 20 years old. Originally from Ecuador, he came to 
Spain when he was six years old. He spent most of his teen years in a youth home in Terrassa—an 
industrial city in the Barcelona metro area—after being kicked out of his home for being gay. 
Manuel participated in a Breakers group in the summer of 2017, and then continued coming 
regularly to the AdF to work on community projects and use the facilities. He was now assisting 
Patricia in facilitating the Breakers workshops. When I met him, he had recently designed and 
printed a custom table for a disabled student at the elementary school next to the AdF. He told me 
that he had always been interested in technology, but being more effeminate, he never felt 
comfortable in any other tech-related programs which he says are always very “macho.” He likes 
coming to the AdF because a lot of the staff are women. While most of the Breakers participants 
are young men, he has become close friends with some of the few women participants in the past 
programs, and overall the environment is more welcoming. Manuel explains that at the AdF he has 
been able to work on teams with people to address local social needs, which has allowed him to 
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feel like part of a community and to be able to imagine a future for himself using technology for 
social good.  
 
5.2 Digital Political Participation Workshop 
 In February 2018, I participated in a course on digital political participation sponsored by 
the municipal government and led by two prominent TS activists, Irene and Montse, both members 
of local technology cooperatives. The course took place in a local community center and was a 
total of twelve hours held on Friday evenings and Saturday mornings over two weeks. It was 
designed for leaders of local neighborhood associations, community movements, or cooperatives 
with limited prior engagement in questions of digital technology. The goal of the workshop was to 
give these people some basic tools to use and engage digital technologies effectively in their 
political practices while understanding its broader social, political, and economic impacts.  
 There were 10 participants in the course, including myself, evenly split between men and 
women. In the first session, we each took turns introducing ourselves and explaining what drew 
us to the course. The group included two women from a local cooperative consultancy group—
offering legal, financial, and labor advice to social economy initiatives across the city—who are 
also involved in grassroots projects focused on deepening local democracy in their neighborhood 
in L’Hospitalet de Llobregat, on the outskirts of Barcelona. Other attendees included a member of 
a local mobility cooperative in a small city north of Barcelona, a grassroots organizer linked to a 
left-wing political party, and representatives from several neighborhoods associations from across 
the city.  
 In the introductions, all of the participants explained that they had little previous knowledge 
in how digital technology works beyond their everyday use of email, google services, Whatsapp, 
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etc. The introduced themselves clearly as “users” of digital technology with little knowledge of 
the “technical aspects” of how it all works. Several people mentioned some frustration or concern 
about privacy and surveillance, given recent public scandals involving Facebook or attempts by 
the Spanish state to shut down websites and monitor online speech surrounding the contested 2017 
Catalan independence referendum, but recognized that they did not fully understand how it all 
works.  
 Over the four meetings of the course, Irene and Montse led us through a series of activities 
and critical conversations designed to introduce us to basic concepts in networked technology, 
allow us to reflect on how they work and our relationships to them, and to learn about existing and 
emerging alternatives based around the notion of technological sovereignty. Several of the 
activities in particular, sought to highlight the materiality and spatiality of the digital infrastructures 
on which we increasingly rely and to reflect on who owns, maintains and has access to them.  
 We started the workshop with Irene leading an activity about internet infrastructure. We all 
formed a circle in the room and Irene gave us each a card from a deck. Each card had a piece of 
internet infrastructure on it—i.e. computer, router, server, etc. She found the person with a 
computer and asked us: if she wants to send an email where does that email have to pass to reach 
another person’s computer? One by one we went through organizing the cards based on the steps 
connecting one computer to another: from a computer to a wifi adapter, to a router, to the cables 
and servers of the Internet Service Provider, to a national network, to another ISP’s infrastructure, 
to the receiver’s router, wifi adapter, and computer.  
 This exercise made visible the extensive infrastructure on which we rely for the internet and 
to which we trust our personal data; the exercise brings to consciousness the vast and expanding 
“technological unconscious” (Thrift, 2004). Irene then asked us where in this system our data is 
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vulnerable to interception? We discussed what kind of data might be transmitted in a simple email 
and who may be able to access it through any given point in the material infrastructure. While we 
discussed the possibility for different kinds of encryption, we came to agree that data may be 
vulnerable at any of those steps depending on the situation. The data could be accessed by internet 
service providers, by government institutions, and by hackers and put to different uses. This 
activity helps re-orient embodied sensibilities toward an awareness of and concern for the complex 
digital infrastructures on which daily lives and livelihoods increasingly depend.  
 Next, we did a similar exercise in pairs where each pair chose a digital service and traced 
the data that was sent through the service, where it went, and when and how it might be vulnerable 
to surveillance/interception. I paired with a local neighborhood association leader. We chose 
Whatsapp and went through the different data points and where in the infrastructure they might be 
vulnerable. We then collected basic information about WhatsApp and compared it to similar 
services like Viber, Telegram, Signal, and other messaging and voice applications. We sought to 
answer questions like “who knows the service?”, “where is the company or group based?”, “is the 
app based on open-source code?”  
 After the pair exercise, we came together as a group to reflect on who uses our data and 
who is able to make a profit from it. We talked about how data is used to produce profit for 
technology companies and how it is able to build profiles about us as individuals and our 
connections to others. Many people in the group were angry when they thought about how their 
personal data is being exploited and often even shocked to learn exactly how the internet and most 
tech companies operate. As one woman proclaimed: “ignorance is bliss”. The woman later told to 
me that she felt that she learned a lot through the course. She had previously thought of digital 
technologies as tools for carrying out her political work but had never thought of her relationship 
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to technology itself as political. The activities that made up the workshop helped to disrupt the re-
iterative re-production of certain embodied engagements with digital technologies and systems 
and offer participants opportunities to imagine and experiment with alternative practices.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 This paper has explored the question of digital subjectivity—understood as the way 
individuals understand and experience their relationship to digital technologies. Contemporary 
techno-capitalism relies on the division and stratification of digital subjects according to perceived 
levels of technological expertise and agency that are intimately entangled in the reproduction of 
gendered and racial difference. These differences and re-iteratively reproduced through everyday 
embodied practices of engaging and employing digital devices and systems in particular ways. 
Through repetition, these practices come to be taken-for-granted. This works to de-politicize 
technology and processes of technological development. I have examined the case of the 
movement for technological sovereignty in Barcelona as an example of practices producing unruly 
digital subjects—material and embodied enactments through which individuals come to challenge 
established notions of technological expertise and experiment with alternative relationships to 
digital technologies and systems.  
 In exploring these themes, this paper makes three primary contributions to the emerging 
literature in digital geography. First, I move beyond existing scholarship on digital subjectivities 
in which technology is examined primarily as a mediator of subjective experience to raise the 
question of how subjects differentially experience their relationship to digital technology and 
processes of technological development and change. Second, I offer a theoretical framework to 
integrate recent scholarship on the material and affective relationships to technology with work on 
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the way the “technical” gets discursively tied to modernity, whiteness, and cis-hetero-masculinity, 
and thus de-politicized. Third, through the empirical discussion of the TS movement in Barcelona, 
I offer examples of the kinds of practices through which activists experiment with alternative 
political, economic, and social relationships to technology—simultaneously challenging the 
discursive separation of the technical from the social and the related gendered and racialized 
hierarchies.  
 These contributions point toward a series of future areas for digital geographic inquiry. 
Further research is needed into the daily practices through which dominant techno-capitalist 
subjectivities are reproduced, including the ways the technical practices and agency of women, 
queers, and POC gets discursively erased from dominant narratives and representations. Work is 
also needed to understand the cultural production of Silicon Valley and the way the capitalist tech 
industry monopolizes visions of the future, re-enforcing its image as the driver of technological 
change. Finally, digital geographers might diversify the actors and spaces they research as the 
primary sites of digital development to give voice to the counter-hegemonic technological 
practices of feminist, anti-racist, and anti-colonial collectives from around the world.  
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